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Regional Cooperative Federalism and the
U.S. Electric Grid
Hannah J. Wiseman*
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Constitution makes no direct mention of regional governing entities, yet they are an entrenched part of our federalist system. In the area of
electric grid governance, the federal government enlists independent, private
entities called regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”) to implement
federal policy and achieve state energy goals. RTOs are the most prominent
form of regional cooperative federalism, and other policy spheres, such as
opioid control, also incorporate a similar regional approach. These types of
regional governance structures are a twist on the classic form of cooperative
federalism, in which the federal government relies upon individual states to
achieve federal mandates.
The regionally governed electric grid is a critical policy area. The availability of reliable electricity directly drives economic and human health outcomes, and populating the grid with clean sources of electricity while
maintaining grid reliability is urgent. The use of regional cooperative federalism in this area therefore calls for a fresh look at federalism principles. Many
RTOs are geographically massive; the largest RTO covers all or part of the
territories of fifteen states. In many ways, RTOs better serve the core federalism principles ascribed to more decentralized governmental control, including
policy experimentation and innovation, efficiency, and accountability to stakeholders. Some RTOs have been particularly innovative in formulating new
policies to address changing circumstances, such as demand for more renewable energy. But in the accountability sphere, other RTOs have struggled to
address stakeholder needs.
Regional cooperative federalism will be increasingly important in a world
of complex policy issues that spill beyond local and state lines yet require locally tailored solutions. This Article constructs a normative framework for analyzing the successes and failures of this underrecognized approach, using the
attributes of federalism as guideposts, and suggests a path forward for productively expanding and improving this governance form.
* Professor of Law, Penn State Law; Professor and Wilson Faculty Fellow in the College
of Earth and Mineral Sciences; Institutes of Energy and the Environment Co-funded Faculty,
Penn State University, University Park. The author is grateful to Deborah Sier for valuable
research assistance support for this paper. The author thanks RTOGov for financially supporting
this project and the participants in an RTOGov workshop for their comments on an earlier, very
different draft of this paper. The author is also grateful to Karen Fisher-Vanden and other participants in the Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy Seminar at Penn State, as well
as Seth Blumsack, Kate Konschnik, Dave Owen, Dan Walters, and Shelley Welton for their
comments. All errors and omissions are my own.
February 2022

Vol. 90

No. 1

147

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

148

unknown

Seq: 2

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

TABLE

OF

17-FEB-22

12:31

[Vol. 90:147

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. A REGIONAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Federal, State, and Local Regionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Regional Cooperative Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Choosing Among Regional Governance Forms . . . . .
II. FUNCTIONAL FEDERALISM: ACHIEVING THE VALUES OF
FEDERALISM BEYOND GEOPOLITICAL LINES . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Measuring Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Experimentation and Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Spurring Policy Risk Taking and
Coordinating Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Innovative Measures for Integrating
Renewable Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Maintaining Grid Reliability in the Face of
New Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Enhancing “Real” Policy Experiments . . . . . . . . . .
3. Avoiding the Externalities of
Uncoordinated Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Efficient Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Diverse Governance Packages for Footvoters . . .
a. Regional Footvoting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Federal Control and Varied Regional
Governance Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Reducing the Overhead of Governance . . . . . . . .
D. Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Inclusiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. A Note on Private Regional
Cooperative Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. IMPROVING AND EXPANDING THE BENEFITS OF
REGIONAL COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Enhancing Innovation and Experimentation . . . . . . . . .
B. Expanding Governance Options for Constituents and
Enhancing Efficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Enhancing Accountability Through Improved
Decision-Making Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Transferring the Regional Cooperative Federalism
Model to Other Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. OVERCOMING LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO
REGIONAL APPROACHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

149
159
162
163
169

R

171
173
174

R

176

R

176

R

186
192

R

193
195
196
197

R

200
203
204
205
208

R

213

R

214
215

R

216

R

217

R

219

R

225

R

R
R
R
R

R
R

R

R
R
R

R
R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 3

17-FEB-22

12:31

REG’L COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM & U.S. ELECTRIC GRID

149

A. Nondelegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Status of the Nondelegation Doctrine . . . . . .
2. Nondelegation and Regional “Agencies” . . . . . . .
B. The Tenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

225
226
228
232
235

R
R
R
R
R

INTRODUCTION
The allocation of authority among different levels of government
rarely occurs on a blank slate. Indeed, the Founders faced entrenched
interests in the form of states with individual constitutions and semiautonomous control.1 The prospect of forming a federal government
that would directly and solely control individual constituents was
null.2 Nor were the states likely to accede to an arrangement whereby
they would act as mere administrative units of the federal government.3 The states, therefore, played a predictably prominent role in
the constitutional drafting debates, and obtained an important sovereign status within the nascent U.S. federalist system.4
Regional institutions, too, operated at the time of the Founding
and were contemplated by the Framers.5 The Compact Clause, written
1 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821) (“The framers of the
constitution would naturally examine the state of things existing at the time, and their work
sufficiently attests that they did so.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 235–36 (James Madison)
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (discussing the need for the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause by expounding the problems that would have ensued if “the supremacy of the
state constitutions had been left complete”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 252–55 (James
Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (examining the separation of executive, judicial, and legislative power under various state constitutions in defending the structure of
the U.S. Constitution); Gregory E. Maggs, A Guide and Index for Finding Evidence of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution in Early State Constitutions and Declarations of Rights, 98
N.C. L. REV. 779, 781 (2020) (observing that state constitutions “proved very influential in the
formation of the United States Constitution”).
2 This was a product of the Framers’ concerns about avoiding the perpetuation of an
English-style monarchy and their acute awareness of the need to balance state sovereignty with
greater national control. See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 122 (2009).
3 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,
1313 (1997) (observing that when the Framers drafted the Constitution, “[s]tates were much
more than mere field offices of the national government; nor were they simply the instruments
of decentralized administration”).
4 See Maggs, supra note 1, at 781. The states’ sovereign authority under the Constitution
was, however, weaker than it had been under the Articles of Confederation. BEEMAN, supra
note 2, at 99–199 (describing a view among the Founders that the Articles of Confederation had
been insufficient in providing for “common defence [sic], security of liberty, and general welfare” and that “no . . . treaties among the whole or part of the States, as individual Sovereignties,
would be sufficient” in remedying the Articles’ deficiencies).
5 See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 760
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in part to address state coordination that had occurred prior to 1787,6
requires congressional consent for states to reach an “Agreement or
Compact.”7 This incorporation of regionalism within the very structure of American government makes clear that there is more to federalism than the federal government and states.8 The historical context
surrounding the Compact Clause suggests a recognition among the
Framers that in some cases, states would continue to band together to
address policy issues that arose between the state and federal levels.9
What the drafters of our Constitution did not foresee, however, were
the complex forms of regionalism that would later develop. And indeed, courts have since allowed extensive regional collaboration without the need for congressional approval pursuant to the Compact
Clause.10
Since the Founding, legal doctrine and scholarship have recognized a variety of new combinations of jurisdictional authority—many
of them regional. For example, states implement federal policy
(2010) (noting the existence of “four interstate boundary agreements” under the Articles of
Confederation that followed from a long tradition of British colonies entering into “intercolonial
agreements to settle conflicting territorial claims under their respective charters”). There were
also proposals at the Constitutional Convention for more widespread regionalism, including one
by Edmund Randolph under which the executive branch would have been comprised of three
members, each representing one part of the country. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 379 n.6 (2018) (citing James Madison, Proceedings of Committee of
the Whole House, May 30–June 19, in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 88 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
6 R.H. Leach, Interstate Compacts and American Federalism, 2 AUSTRALIAN J. POL. &
HIST. 196, 196 (1957) (explaining that the Founders added the Compact Clause to the Constitution because they “recognized the existence of the practice” of interstate compacts at the time of
the Founding).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
8 There was apparently no discussion of the Compact Clause at the Constitutional Convention. Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by
“Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 454 (1936). Yet scholars and courts have
concluded that the Framers had specific intent with respect to this Clause—notably, to allow for
the peaceful resolution of disputes among states, as had occurred prior to the Founding. See, e.g.,
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725–26 (1838) (describing the background
of the Compact Clause and explaining that it was intended “to guard against the derangement of
[states’] federal relations with the other states of the Union”); Felix Frankfurter & James M.
Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE
L.J. 685, 692 (1925) (suggesting that the Compact Clause recognized the “[n]egotiation between
the contending colonies” over previous border disputes).
9 See supra note 55.
10 See Hollis, supra note 5, at 743 (noting that the Supreme Court has allowed “the states
to conclude whole categories of agreements with no congressional consent whatsoever”); U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978) (requiring congressional approval under the Compact Clause only for interstate agreements that enhance “state power
quoad the National Government”).
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through what is now known as cooperative federalism, the federal
government operates regional and local offices, and state and federal
actors serve coequally on certain regional commissions.11 But through
a largely unrecognized form of governance, the federal government
also enlists nonfederal regional entities to carry out its policies.12 The
major recent scholarship exploring regional governance in the United
States largely omits mention of the most widespread use of regional
cooperative federalism: regional transmission organizations
(“RTOs”), which govern much of the U.S. electric grid.13 In 2021,
11 For a discussion of states implementing federal policy, see, for example, David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental
Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1811–13 (2008) (defining cooperative federalism
approaches and comparing those approaches with other forms of federalism), and William W.
Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism’s Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 98 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (exploring and critiquing cooperative federalism). For a discussion of dispersed federal governance, see generally Dave Owen, Regional
Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016) (analyzing the dispersion of federal authority within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with respect to the Corps’ regional field offices),
and Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1119 (2018) [hereinafter Wiseman & Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy] (analyzing experimentation by regional branches of federal agencies). For a discussion of different
forms of regionalism arrangements, see generally, Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8, at
695–754 (exploring interstate compacts and other forms of regional governance); Patricia S.
Florestano, Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the United States, 24 PUBLIUS
13 (1994) (exploring interstate compacts); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 384–94 (identifying
and analyzing three forms of regionalism—interstate collaborations, federal administrative divisions, and joint federal-state organizations); Owen, supra, at 113–16 (exploring how the existence of regional offices of federal agencies creates opportunities for regional governance efforts
between federal, state, and local governmental entities); Dave Owen & Hannah J. Wiseman,
Coequal Federalism and Federal-State Agencies, 55 GA. L. REV. 287 (2020) [hereinafter Owen &
Wiseman, Coequal Federalism] (exploring the practice and promise of joint federal-state action
through independent regional agencies).
12 See infra Section I.B.
13 RTOs and independent system operators (“ISOs”) are essentially the same types of
entities, although they were formed under different Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) orders. Compare Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6,
2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (authorizing and encouraging the formation of RTOs), with
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 385) (authorizing and
encouraging the formation of ISOs). This Article refers to RTOs and ISOs interchangeably. For
the focus of the regionalism literature and its omission of RTOs, see, for example, BulmanPozen, supra note 5, at 415–27 (describing states working together through regional compacts
and less formal mechanisms, and federal agencies operating at the regional level); Yishai Blank
& Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1895, 1899, 1920 (2018) (describing “[m]ore than one hundred” federal agencies with regional offices and briefly noting other
regional configurations); Owen, supra note 11 (exploring in depth federal agencies’ use of regional offices); Florestano, supra note 11 (discussing compacts among states); Frankfurter &
Landis, supra note 8 (same). The one exception of which the author is aware is Owen & Wise-
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RTOs entered common parlance, as millions of Texans and residents
in neighboring southern states were left in the dark and cold during
the cold snap.14 Much of the state and national blame for this catastrophe fell—whether fairly or not—on the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas (“ERCOT”), which is an RTO.15
In many respects, regional cooperative federalism—on display
most prominently in the RTO context—matches the core values of
federalism more closely than state-led policy or traditional cooperative federalism, in which states implement federal law.16 Many federalism accounts point to policy experimentation and innovation by states
as a key virtue.17 Yet experimentation by states, even with federal direction through a cooperative regime, can be haphazard, and state
man, Coequal Federalism, supra note 11, at 326 (citing Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky,
Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 184–88 (2016))
(noting RTOs and the potential promise of a regional approach for transmission siting).
14 See, e.g., Ike Brannon, Will the Southeast Import the Texas Energy Model?, FORBES
(Feb. 19, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2021/02/19/will-the-south
east-import-the-texas-energy-model/?sh=5be4bf8be18a [https://perma.cc/Z36D-4T34] (discussing RTOs in the context of the February 2021 Texas cold snap crisis).
15 See, e.g., Bob Sechler, Grid Pricing Glitch May Have Played Role in Texas Electricity
Shortage, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Feb. 27, 2021, 9:17 AM), https://www.statesman.com/story/
business/2021/02/26/ercot-grid-pricing-glitch-texas-electricity-shortage/6837201002/ [https://
perma.cc/4E5G-UD69] (noting Texas Senate hearings in which senators focused on problems
with ERCOT’s electricity pricing model, which failed to create high enough prices to incentivize
available peak generators to come online during the outage); Reese Oxner, Mitchell Ferman &
Julián Aguilar, Catastrophic Texas Power Outages Prompt Finger Pointing and Blame Shifting at
Legislative Hearings, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/25/texashouse-senate-ercot/ [https://perma.cc/4Q9K-QC66] (“There’s this very carefully curated discussion of blame by the governor that always speaks to ERCOT . . . .” (quoting Rafael Anchı́a, Tex.
House of Rep.)). Other RTOs that cover single states are the California Independent System
Operator (“CAISO”) and the New York Independent System Operator (“NYISO”). See RTOs
and ISOs, FERC (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/electric/power-sales-and-markets/rtosand-isos [https://perma.cc/J2MW-Q8MS] (showing CAISO’s and NYISO’s territories on a larger
map). They are “regional” because they control the grid in a relatively large geographic area
with diverse generation sources; it just so happens that the large geographic area falls within the
political boundaries of one state. For further discussion of the 2021 cold snap in Texas, as well as
analysis of how multistate RTO policies might have impacted the crisis, see infra Section
II.B.1.b.
16 This Article employs the values of federalism, such as enhancing policy innovation and
experimentation, improving efficiency, and enhancing accountability, as normative metrics because they serve as a direct means of contrasting regional cooperative federalism with other
federalism approaches. Other scholars have used broader metrics, including these and other federalism values, for assessing the merits of other types of regionalism. See, e.g., Blank & RosenZvi, supra note 13, at 1944–66 (framing a long list of merits and drawbacks of regional units of
the federal government, some of which overlap with the federalism values explored here).
17 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional
Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–76 (2004) (discussing Justice Brandeis’s vision of states as
laboratories and the subsequent application of this vision by the Supreme Court and legal schol-
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governments are often loath to take the risk of innovating.18 Implementation of federal policy by an actor situated between the federal
government and states allows for coordinated experimentation toward
a more clearly defined federal goal.19 This regional implementation
can support more innovation than might otherwise occur by states acting on their own or implementing federal directives. This is because
both the individual members of regional entities—states and (in some
cases) private entities—and the federal government sometimes all
push for innovative policies, providing top-down and bottom-up impetus for policy change.20
Regional bodies’ coordination of policies among states has also
supported state based innovation, thus compounding their effects.21
Further, regional cooperative federalism addresses the negative spillover effects of state-by-state experimentation.22 But within such arars); Wiseman & Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, supra note 11, at 1121 (cataloging
common assumptions about federalism and experimentation).
18 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 610–11 (1980); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1351, 1355
(2009).
19 See infra Section II.B.
20 See infra Section II.B.1.a (describing FERC’s encouragement of RTOs to develop “innovative” policies and contrasting this innovative push with traditional cooperative federalism
approaches). In three of the four RTOs that cover more than one state, states are nonvoting
members and are relegated to attempting to influence RTO decisions through the courts and as
nonvoting stakeholders. See also CHRISTOPHER A. PARENT, KATHERINE S. FISHER, WILLIAM R.
COTTON & CALI C. CLARK, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES IN THE FERC-JURISDICTIONAL ISOS/RTOS (2021), https://yq5v214uei4489eww27gbgsu-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/ISO-RTOGovernanceStructureandPractices_19Feb2021.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MMB5-F8ZB] (showing that states are voting members only in the Midcontinent ISO
(“MISO”)); Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 258, 268 (2021) (noting that “states have been left with merely an advisory role
in RTO policy-making in most regions,” but noting that MISO gives states membership and a
substantial voting bloc); CHRISTINA SIMEONE, PJM GOVERNANCE: CAN REFORMS IMPROVE
OUTCOMES? 26 (2017), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/forums/stakeholderprocess/2017/20170724-stakeholder/20170724-kleinman-center-paper-pjm-governance-reforms.ashx [https://perma.cc/2GJG-U8XH] (noting the limits on state participation in one RTO,
the PJM Interconnection LLC (“PJM”)); cf. JENNIFER CHEN & GABRIELLE MURNAN,
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV’T POL’Y SOLS., DUKE UNIV., STATE PARTICIPATION IN RESOURCE
ADEQUACY DECISIONS IN MULTISTATE REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2019),
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
state_participation_in_resource_adequacy_decisions_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEZ9-SSXG]
(“Every multistate RTO has a Regional State Committee (RSC) that provides the collective
input of the states on RTO proposals.”).
21 The best planning and building of transmission lines for wind energy has occurred
within midwestern RTOs, where most states have requirements for renewable energy generation. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Section II.B.3. This is perhaps best highlighted by the challenge of addressing
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rangements, the federal government, states, and private interests
sometimes hamper innovative regional efforts due to conflicting goals
that are difficult to reconcile.23 And clear challenges of integrating innovative policies to address important goals, such as the expansion of
renewable generation and maintenance of grid reliability—i.e., the
ability to keep the electric grid operational—remain, as evidenced by
the events in Texas in 2021.24
Beyond supporting innovation and experimentation, regional cooperative federalism encompasses another oft touted virtue of federalism—the efficiency accomplished when smaller governments closer
to constituents offer varied policies.25 State lines are artificial political
dividers. Many neighboring states share benefits and challenges with
respect to physical features, climate, and political culture.26 Allowing
regional entities to address national issues with an eye to the peculiar
local instantiations of these issues can better address the demands of
constituents for governmental goods and services within those regions.
Indeed, in the transmission grid context, some RTOs have spurred the
construction of major new transmission networks that support renewable energy, in an era in which building interstate transmission infrastructure is critical yet exceedingly difficult.27 And through another
interstate air pollution under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q, which relies on traditional cooperative federalism. See infra notes 41, 67, and accompanying text.
23 One example of this is FERC’s Minimum Offer Price Rule, which resulted from the
divergence of policy priorities among the federal government, an RTO, and the states that RTO
served. See infra notes 306–08 and accompanying text.
24 See generally HOBBY SCH. OF PUB. AFFS., UNIV. OF HOUS., THE WINTER STORM OF
2021, at 1 (2021), https://uh.edu/hobby/winter2021/storm.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ83-3KWJ]
(describing the events); ENERGY INST., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, THE TIMELINE AND
EVENTS OF THE FEBRUARY 2021 TEXAS ELECTRIC GRID BLACKOUTS (2021), https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin%20%282021%29%20EventsFebruary2021Texas
Blackout%2020210714.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EGP-9MFA] (same).
25 See infra Section II.C.
26 See, e.g., Peter J. Rentfrow, Samuel D. Gosling, Markus Jokela, David J. Stillwell,
Michal Kosinski & Jeff Potter, Divided We Stand: Three Psychological Regions of the United
States and Their Political, Economic, Social, and Health Correlates, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 996, 996–98 (2013) (exploring how regions within the United States are “characterized in
terms of the political, economic, social, and health characteristics that are shared by neighboring
states”); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 380 n.12 (collecting sources exploring “regional culture,
identity, and psychology” within the United States).
27 See infra notes 169, 231, and accompanying text (describing the cost savings associated
with MISO’s “Multi-Value Projects” (“MVPs”) that resulted in the construction of new interstate transmission infrastructure); see also, e.g., MISO, REGIONALLY COST ALLOCATED PROJECT
REPORTING ANALYSIS (2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/MVP%20Dashboard%20Q3%2020
21117055.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LPJ-Y269] (showing seventeen completed MVPs as of the third
quarter of 2021); Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing
MISO MVPs, which were designed in part to allow for the construction of more wind energy
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type of efficiency—administrative efficiency—regional cooperative
federalism makes the process of governing less costly by centralizing
employee training and providing a coordinated planning and decisionmaking system at the subfederal level.28
A final, frequently cited attribute of traditional federalism is accountability—governments’ responsiveness to stakeholders.29 Here,
too, regional cooperative federalism offers some advantages over
traditional or cooperative federalism.30 One might assume that individual states implementing federal policy will better respond to and
incorporate constituents’ concerns. But regional institutions somethroughout the Midwest); cf. DAVID HURLBUT, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, STATE
CLEAN ENERGY PRACTICES: RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 2–3, 14 (2008), https://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/43512.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FQP-FTTB] (describing adequate
transmission capacity as an essential element for states to impose successful renewable portfolio
standards (“RPS”) and concluding that “[t]he effectiveness of an RPS in any particular state
often depends on regional coordination”). But see Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The
Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 36
YALE. J. ON REGUL. BULL. 106, 113–19 (2019) (describing PJM’s and ISO New England’s problematic proposals to restructure capacity markets, which would make it more difficult for states
to achieve renewable energy generation mandates); Welton, supra note 20, at 246–48, 258 (arguing that RTOs have impeded efforts to promote clean energy).
28 See infra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.
29 For the panoply of definitions of accountability, see, for example, Edward Rubin, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073
(2005) (“Accountability can be roughly defined as the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on
the basis of its performance or its explanation.”). See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 499
(2003) (arguing that accountability “requires elected officials to make policy decisions because
they are subject to the check of the people if they do not discharge their duties in a sufficiently
public-regarding and otherwise rational, predictable, and fair manner”).
30 Many have rejected “accountability” as a useful or well-defined value, but federalism
commentators nonetheless repeatedly cite to this value. For critiques of the usefulness of accountability as a metric, see, for example, Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 360–61 (2000)
(describing critiques that portray the conception of accountability as a virtue of federalism as
“theoretically simplistic and empirically dubious” and analyzing the merits of such critiques);
Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–209 (1995) (doubting that accountability can “be used as a structural mechanism aimed at achieving direct responsiveness to public
opinion” in the context of executive branch decision making); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real
Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1181 (2000) (arguing that “accountability” is not “a value that stands on its own” in the context of separation of powers law).
For accounts connecting federalism to accountability, see, for example, Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 929–30 (1997) (concluding that allowing the federal government to commandeer
state officials diminishes the accountability of federal or state officials); Deborah Jones Merritt,
Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1580 &
n.65 (1994) (concluding that federal commandeering of the states “confuses the lines of political
accountability”).
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times create unusual collaborations among stakeholders who do not
typically group together, thus upending traditional political economic
dynamics and opening up new policy dialogues that are more responsive to diverse stakeholder demands.31 Yet regional cooperative federalism also has substantial limitations with respect to accountability.
This is particularly the case for RTOs, which are private organizations
comprised entirely of private members performing a public governance role.32 Several scholars and interest groups have critiqued RTOs
for inadequate attention to the demands of the public at large and
certain minority stakeholders.33 Indeed, the fact that states—which
are forging ahead with aggressive clean energy goals—are not even
members of most RTOs potentially presents a major accountability
problem.34 Regional cooperative governance does not have to involve
an independent private entity.35 But the fact that the major example of
this governance form involves corporations that make critical governance decisions—and do so beneath somewhat limited agency review36—requires close attention to these accountability limitations.
In light of the overall promise of regional cooperative federalism,
Congress and agencies should consider this governance form when designing statutes and regimes for implementing them. Indeed, in the
31 See infra Section II.D. (exploring how RTOs bring diverse groups of constituents together through member and stakeholder participation in RTO decision making); see also, e.g.,
Stephanie Lenhart, Natalie Nelson-Marsh, Elizabeth J. Wilson & David Solan, Electricity Governance and the Western Energy Imbalance Market in the United States: The Necessity of Interorganizational Collaboration, 19 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 94, 95 (2016).
32 See, e.g., infra notes 276–82 and accompanying text (discussing private RTO membership and stakeholder groups); Welton, supra note 20, at 233 (observing that RTOs functionally
“operate as policy-making bodies”).
33 See, e.g., Welton, supra note 20, at 258 (“States are largely powerless within RTO governance processes to do anything about the fact that RTOs are undermining their lawful state
policies . . . .”); Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the
Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28
ENERGY L.J. 543, 546 (2007) (“[T]he administration of wholesale markets and transmission
should routinely consider the larger public interest . . . .”).
34 See sources cited supra note 20; infra Section III.C (exploring ways in which RTOs can
improve accountability to the public). State membership is not a necessary prerequisite to RTOs’
representing state goals, however. MISO—an RTO in which states are not voting members—has
arguably done the most to support state-based renewable energy goals. See MISO Region Engagement, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/stakeholder-engagement/miso-engagement/
[https://perma.cc/G2PU-BTCB ] (showing “state regulatory entities” as nonmember sectors). For
discussion of MISO’s successful multi-value transmission projects to support renewable energy,
see infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
35 See infra Section I.B (describing some purely public forms of regional cooperative
federalism).
36 For a discussion of the legal developments that have limited FERC’s review of RTO
decisions, see Welton, supra note 20, at 232–37.
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midst of the COVID-19 global pandemic, numerous states hastily
formed regional agreements and councils to address economic reopening efforts.37 But these efforts would likely be far more effective
if guided by the unifying voice of a federal agency, or if they at least
involved federal agency review and input. Health experts have repeatedly called for a more uniform response to COVID-19,38 and these
calls appear to be based at least partially on the fact that the disease
can spread quickly across political boundaries. As early as 1893, the
Supreme Court recognized the fundamental importance of regional
compacts for addressing highly contagious and deadly diseases, holding that these types of compacts do not need congressional preapproval under the Constitution.39 But a federal-regional response to
COVID-19 would better allow states to address their shared economic
and social challenges in the context of the pandemic while also incorporating important uniform, scientifically informed federal guidelines.
Some existing regimes might also merit modification to encompass aspects of regional cooperative federalism. Take the case of the
Clean Air Act,40 in which states individually tasked with achieving national air quality mandates consistently send pollution to other states,
37 See Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor, New York, Governor Cuomo, Governor Murphy, Governor Lamont, Governor Wolf, Governor Carney, Governor Raimondo Announce Multi-State Council to Get People Back to Work and Restore the Economy (Apr. 13,
2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-governor-murphy-governor-lamontgovernor-wolf-governor-carney-governor-raimondo [https://perma.cc/4D6A-Q6WK]; Press Release, Gretchen Whitmer, Governor, Michigan, Midwest Governors Announce Partnership to
Reopen Regional Economy (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90640-526088—,00.html [https://perma.cc/T7R6-Q2QZ]; Press Release, Gavin Newsom,
Governor, California, Colorado & Nevada Join California, Oregon & Washington in Western
States Pact (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/04/27/colorado-nevada-join-californiaoregon-washington-in-western-states-pact/ [https://perma.cc/AF7B-FLSU].
38 Lauren Leatherby & Rich Harris, States that Imposed Few Restrictions Now Have the
Worst Outbreaks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/18/
us/covid-state-restrictions.html?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_20201119&instance_id=24248&nl=the-morning&regi_id=61655712&segment_id=44896&te=1&user_id=2c3a17e3f84f0be8ebfbf96b5b298eda
[https://perma.cc/GFT5-RBVU] (“One of the biggest problems in the United States so far has
been the lack of a coherent, cohesive national response, said Wafaa El-Sadr, an epidemiologist at
Columbia University. ‘It’s been piecemeal,’ Dr. El-Sadr said. ‘It’s been largely delegated to a
subnational level, to the states, for example, and municipalities to figure it out themselves.’ ”).
39 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893) (“[I]n case of threatened invasion of
cholera, plague, or other causes of sickness and death, it would be the height of absurdity to hold
that the threatened States could not unite in providing means to prevent and repel the invasion
of the pestilence, without obtaining the consent of Congress, which might not be at the time in
session.”).
40

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
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causing those states to violate the Act.41 The result has been the
expost formation of somewhat haphazard regional efforts to address
cross-state air pollution, with decades of litigation and unresolved disputes among the states.42
Despite its promise in some policy areas and its prominence in
the energy space, regional cooperative federalism lacks an adequate
framework for normative analysis. This Article constructs a framework using three central attributes of federalism—policy innovation
and experimentation, governmental efficiency, and accountability—as
guideposts. It then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of regional
cooperative federalism within this framework using examples from
the electric grid governance context, where regional cooperative federalism is most prominent.
In undertaking these objectives, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part I situates regional cooperative federalism within the U.S. federalist system and the existing regionalism literature. This Part uses the
RTO example to define the contours of this underexplored governance approach. Part II then examines how regional cooperative federalism achieves and constrains three of the core values ascribed to
traditional federalism—innovation, efficiency, and accountability. Part
III explores alternative approaches that could address some of the
weaknesses of regional cooperative federalism beneath these three
metrics. Finally, Part IV explores potential legal impediments to the
regional cooperative approach. The nondelegation doctrine is one
concern, particularly in light of a reshuffled Supreme Court that has
hinted at a willingness to apply this largely forgotten principle.43 But
41 See, e.g., Clean Air Act Section 126 Petitions, HARV. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/clean-air-act-section-126-petitions/ [https://
perma.cc/FX6A-47HU] (cataloging numerous petitions regarding interstate pollution problems).
42 See, e.g., Clean Air Act—Cost Considerations—EPA v. EME Homer City Generation,
L.P., 128 HARV. L. REV. 351, 352–53 (2014) (describing and cataloging the D.C. Circuit’s repeated rejection of the EPA’s and states’ efforts to address interstate air pollution). The federal
government has, however, created some exceptions to this generally haphazard response. Congress initiated a ground level ozone trading program, which, under the guidance of a regional
organization called the Ozone Transport Commission, has resulted in a somewhat successful
regional cap and trade program to address interstate smog pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a)
(forming an ozone transport region, comprised of northeastern and mid-Atlantic states and
Washington, D.C.); OZONE TRANSPORT COMM’N, EPA, NOX BUDGET PROGRAM 1999–2002
PROGRESS REPORT (2003), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P1002LY4.txt
[https://perma.cc/55TG-SJCL] (describing the Commission and its facilitation of the regional cap
and trade program). This ground level ozone cap and trade program was modeled off the EPA’s
successful acid rain trading program, but that effort was national, not regional. See id.
43 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that a federal child sex offender statute impermissibly delegated congressional authority to
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RTOs are likely to survive even a relatively rigorous application of the
doctrine and other challenges, such as those rooted in the Tenth
Amendment.44
The nationwide experiment in grid governance offers an important window of opportunity to compare the successes and failures of
regional cooperative federalism with alternative governance structures. RTO governance of the electric grid is the most widely used
form of regionalism—affecting the provision of electricity to approximately two-thirds of the U.S. population45—and this policy area is a
critical one. The availability of electricity is directly tied to economic
growth and human wellbeing.46 Lessons about the merits of regional
cooperative federalism in the electric grid context will be increasingly
important in the many policy areas with effects that are simultaneously local, state, regional, and national, such as COVID-19 and the
ongoing opioid crisis.47 These types of policy areas call for a multilevel
approach that accommodates distinct localized needs while also addressing spillovers from a top-down perspective.
I. A REGIONAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
Regional governance, broadly defined, is a governmental approach in which an institution addresses policy issues that are common
“a single executive branch official” such that this official could effectively “write his own criminal code”). Of course, the Justices who have indicated a desire to revive the nondelegation doctrine are likely less concerned about delegation to private entities such as RTOs than they would
be about delegation to actual public regional agencies. Cf., e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s
Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 718–19 (2010) (arguing that policymakers have privatized
numerous government functions not just for efficiency, but also to alter policies in substantive
ways).
44 See infra Part IV.
45 Electric Power Markets, FERC (July 10, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/electric-power-markets [https://perma.cc/FN8X-QXCH] (noting that “two-thirds of the nation’s electricity load is
served in RTO regions”).
46 An unreliable grid can cause billions of dollars in economic damage and higher death
rates. See, e.g., U.S.–CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST
14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1
(2004), https://www3.epa.gov/region1/npdes/merrimackstation/pdfs/ar/AR-1165.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E8JH-Q2QK] (noting between $4 billion and $10 billion in economic costs associated
with the 2003 blackout that extended through parts of the United States and Canada); G.
Brooke Anderson & Michelle L. Bell, Lights Out: Impact of the August 2003 Power Outage on
Mortality in New York, NY, 23 EPIDEMIOLOGY 189, 191 (2012) (concluding that “power outages
can immediately and severely harm human health” and noting increased mortality in New York
caused by the 2003 blackout).
47 See sources cited supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing loosely coordinated
regional action on COVID-19 issues); see infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text (describing a
regional governance approach that has been used in response to opioid trafficking).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

160

unknown

Seq: 14

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

17-FEB-22

12:31

[Vol. 90:147

to multiple geopolitical units of government, or that cross boundary
lines between the units.48 The regional governing body itself can include a collection of representatives from these geopolitical units, a
federal agency that operates outside of the nation’s capital, or an independently formed government that operates between the state and
federal levels—or between the local and state levels, in the case of
counties or municipalities that form intrastate regional governing organizations. Some regional governance is quite informal, with states
creating uniform law commissions that recommend adoption of similar rules;49 other regional governance arrangements can, subject to
some limitations, produce mandates that carry the full force of law.
A long running regionalism literature has explored these many
governance forms.50 But this literature largely overlooks regional cooperative federalism, in which regional entities implement federal policy and, in the case of RTOs, also address bottom-up demands from
private entities, local governments, and states.51 The Table below summarizes the many types of regional governance arrangements described here.

48 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 383 (describing regional governance as a system that “departs from established state and federal jurisdictional lines to form a suprastate yet
subnational area” and that involves “a subnational area encompassing all or part of multiple
states”). Although counties address issues common to municipalities, this Article’s definition of
regionalism excludes them.
49 Id. at 387–88 (describing these types of regionalism arrangements).
50 See sources cited supra note 13 (summarizing the literature).
51 For example, many stakeholders have demanded more RTO recognition of state renewable energy policies, and some RTOs have positively responded. See infra notes 160–61 and
accompanying text (describing MISO’s multi-value transmission planning project). Others, however, have impeded these state policies in problematic ways. See Welton, supra note 20, at
248–52.
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U.S. REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

Regional federal
administration52
Description The federal government implements its policies
through regional
offices populated
with federal employees.

Examples

unknown

Environmental
Protection Agency, Army Corps
of Engineers,
federal circuit
courts, Federal
Reserve Banks,
North American
Electric Reliability Corporation55

Joint federalstate governance54
Independent
States or local
regional agengovernments,
or both, join to cies comprised
of representagovern a partives from the
ticular policy
state and federarea largely
free of federal al levels govern.
oversight.

Horizontal collaboration53

Regional development
agencies, climate and
COVID-19
compacts56

Regional cooperative federalism
The federal
government
enables the formation of independent regional agencies that
carry out federal
directives and
respond to state
and local needs.
High Intensity
River basin
Drug Traffickcommissions,
airport authori- ing Areas, regional transmisties57
sion organizations58

52 Professor Dave Owen coined this term in a 2016 article exploring regionalism and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See Owen, supra note 11, at 62–64; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra
note 5, at 388–89 (referring to this approach using the term “[f]ederal [a]dministrative
[d]ivisions”); Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 13, at 1899–1900 (describing this form of governance as involving “federal regions”).
53 In describing the prevalence of interstate compacts as a form of regionalism, Professor
Jessica Bulman-Pozen calls this approach “[i]nterstate [c]ollaboration.” Bulman-Pozen, supra
note 5, at 384–85.
54 See Owen & Wiseman, Coequal Federalism, supra note 11, at 299–307 (exploring “joint
federal-state governance”). Professor Bulman-Pozen describes this as “[j]oint [f]ederal-[s]tate
[o]rganization.” Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 392–93.
55 Circuit courts are not regional divisions of a federal court but are federal entities that
operate at the regional level. They should, therefore, fit within a different subcategory of regional federal administration. See Court Role and Structure, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure [https://perma.cc/HPB8-P8QJ] (describing circuit
courts as presiding over “regional circuits” that “sit below the U.S. Supreme Court”). The other
examples here involve federal agencies, with home offices in Washington, D.C., that oversee
regional branches throughout the United States. See Owen, supra note 11, at 62–63 (describing
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as a prominent example of regional federal administration);
Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 13, at 1899 (“More than one hundred federal departments, agencies, offices, and bureaus . . . operate through a system of regional offices strategically located
across the country.”); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 389–90 (noting many other examples). The
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) is a complex example of regional
federal administration because NERC is a 501(c)(3) entity, and its standards and enforcement
actions all must be approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. FERC, RELIABILITY PRIMER 34-35 (2020), https://www.ferc.gov/media/2135 [https://perma.cc/U3A3-XPFU].
NERC enlists six regional entities to do much of its work, including enforcing reliability stan-
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A. Federal, State, and Local Regionalism
Most forms of regionalism explored in the literature involve only
a single level of government. At the highest level, the federal government simply decentralizes its functions, sending federal agents to farflung parts of the country to govern local or regional affairs.59 The
federal government often accomplishes this decentralization through
the creation of regional offices for entities such as the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers.60 In other contexts, the federal government forms independent regional entities that
are not merely geographic subunits of a higher-level agency, such as
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Federal Reserve Banks, and regional entities that help to maintain the reliability of the electric grid under
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) guidance.61
At the state or local level, many regional institutions are comprised of collections of political entities that cooperate horizontally—
at the same level of government. These include, for example, local
governments that form Regional Development Corporations to jointly
dards. ERO Enterprise Regional Entities, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., https://
www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Pages/default.aspx. [https://perma.cc/9LUK-7X5P].
These regional entities are not merely subunits of NERC, however, and have distinct responsibilities relating to specific reliability challenges within their region. Id. For further discussion of
regional entities, see Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 36–37.
56 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 385–86 (“[M]ore than 150 interstate compacts are in
effect, and the regional form remains dominant.” (footnote omitted)); id. (noting the topics that
interstate compacts cover); sources cited supra note 37 (describing regional COVID-19 agreements); What is the Compact?, SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT, https://southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/about-us/what-is-the-compact/ [https://perma.cc/WEL9-N5VW]
(describing “a partnership between Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach Counties”
that “work[s] collaboratively” on climate change-related matters in Southeast Florida).
57 See Owen & Wiseman, Coequal Federalism, supra note 11, at 293–94; Bulman-Pozen,
supra note 5, at 392–93.
58 See infra Section I.B.
59 See Owen, supra note 11, at 61 (noting that eighty-five percent of federal officials do not
work in Washington, D.C.).
60 Id. at 62 n.21.
61 See supra note 55. The circuit courts were originally merely subunits of a federal entity—the U.S. Supreme Court. From 1789–1801 and 1802–1869, the circuit courts were comprised only of Supreme Court Justices sitting at the circuit level, with occasional participation by
district judges. The U.S. Circuit Courts and the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-circuit-courts-and-federal-judiciary [https://perma.cc/H3DHDSEG]. For a discussion of Federal Reserve Banks and the potential regional governance categories in which they could reasonably reside (including regional cooperative federalism), see
infra note 79. For a description of Regional Entities in the electric reliability context, see supra
note 55.
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tax property and implement economy-enhancing measures.62 States
also enter into compacts or similar sister state agreements to address
issues ranging from climate change to shared bridges and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic.63
In a third form of regionalism, federal and state entities form a
separate governing entity at a new level—one that sits between the
states and federal government. Federal and state representatives act
as equal partners, voting to implement policies that bind both federal
and state members.64 This “coequal federalism” is common for rivers
that run between several states, and which therefore implicate both
state and national interests.65
All of these regional institutions are far more important than
most federalism accounts recognize. They involve collections of states
and local governments, or federal and state officials, that make decisions in the jurisdictional gray areas between state, local, and federal
control, or even independent of this control. Another form of regionalism, which the literature has largely overlooked, involves the federal
government enlisting regional entities to carry out its policies while
simultaneously addressing the interests of local, state, and private
stakeholders, as explored in the following Section.
B. Regional Cooperative Federalism
In a somewhat novel approach to regionalism—the arrangement
at the heart of this Article—the federal government establishes regional entities and sets mandates for those regional entities to implement, thus creating a system of regional cooperative federalism.
Under the classic form of cooperative federalism, the federal government establishes a national policy that states must implement. The
Clean Air Act66 is a prominent example. Through this Act, Congress
directed the Environmental Protection Agency to set national limits
See, e.g., LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, HANDBOOK FOR MINNESOTA CITIES: INTERGOVCOOPERATION 1, 8 (2020) (describing the powers and attributes of Regional Development Corporations under Minnesota law).
63 See, e.g., Florestano, supra note 11, at 20 (providing a table compiling these types of
modern interstate compacts); sources cited supra note 37 (describing states’ multilateral efforts
in the COVID-19 context).
64 See Owen & Wiseman, Coequal Federalism, supra note 11, at 293 (explaining that joint
federal-state agencies can “issue rules and orders that b[ind] federal and participating-state officials and private actors”).
65 See id. at 326–30 (providing in-depth analysis of the Susquehanna and Delaware River
Basin Commissions); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 392–94 (describing “hybrid” federal-state
entities).
66 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
62
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on the concentration of pollution in the air and required states to
write plans to achieve these limits.67
Cooperative federalism does not always involve simple mandates
issued by the federal government to states. It can also include arrangements in which the federal government allows states to design their
own policy approach such as a state-operated healthcare exchange,
within the confines of federal standards, or to alternatively default to
a federal approach.68 Some cooperative federalist approaches alternatively involve the federal government working with states and local
governments to accomplish a national policy goal, albeit with the federal government setting the conditions of the grants that it dispenses
to state and local governments.69
Regional cooperative federalism involves the federal government
forming or sanctioning the formation of an agency that is not itself a
federal branch—unlike regional federal administration. The agency is
therefore “independent” from the federal government, although it still
must ultimately obtain approval of its actions from a federal agency.
This independent agency can be comprised of local, state, and federal
entities serving on executive boards—as is the case for High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas (“HIDTAs”)—or of private entities operating
as a board of directors or managers, as with RTOs.70 The federal government issues direct orders to the regional agency or approves the
actions of this agency, essentially delegating federal work. The agency
also spends much of its time responding to demands of the local and
state governments within its jurisdictional territory while still hewing
to federal requirements.
The HIDTA program was created by Congress and is administered by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and regional ex67 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a), 7411(b); David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism When
Numbers Matter More than Size, 32 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 238, 246 & n.26 (2014) (describing the Clean Air Act as a classic form of cooperative federalism and citing authority supporting
that proposition).
68 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 585–88 (2011)
(describing several forms of federal-state relations under the Affordable Care Act, none of
which fit neatly within the traditional definition of cooperative federalism but all of which involve federal-state collaboration to implement a statute).
69

See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., HIDTA, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/operations/hidta
[https://perma.cc/6NFS-8DC9] (describing HIDTA Executive Boards). See generally PARENT ET
AL., supra note 20, at 5–7 (describing RTO governance boards, including their structures and
roles).
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ecutive boards.71 The federal government issues top-down directives
to a federally approved regional agency comprised of states or local
governments and federal officials working together.72 This program allows counties in regions that experience large amounts of drug trafficking to form regional groups called HIDTAs. To establish a
HIDTA, “a coalition of law enforcement agencies” from counties located within the proposed HIDTA must petition the federal government for approval.73 The federal government then determines whether
the HIDTA may be formed based on four statutory criteria.74 Once
established, each HIDTA engages in five main activities: (1) assessing
the drug trafficking problem and its effects, such as opioid addiction
and deaths; (2) developing a strategy; (3) identifying specific initiatives to carry out the strategy; (4) requesting funding for these initiatives; and (5) reporting on performance.75 Each HIDTA has
“discretion” to select the strategies and initiatives that best address
the problems in its region,76 but HIDTAs must meet federally estab-

71 See Office of National Drug Control Policy, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/ [https://perma.cc/5CXP-WHMN] (describing the HIDTA program
as “support[ing] collaborative Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and public health
efforts to . . . disrupt drug trafficking and production”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2019 BUDGET
AND
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY: DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 2, https://
www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1033151/download [https://perma.cc/4C6C-ZHL9] (explaining that
in 2019, the President transferred control over the HIDTA program from the Office of National
Drug Control Policy to the Drug Enforcement Administration); HIDTA, supra note 70 (observing that Congress established the HIDTA program and that “[a]t the local level, the HIDTAs are
directed and guided by Executive Boards composed of an equal number of regional Federal and
non-Federal” law enforcement officers).
72

See HIDTA, supra note 70.

R

R

EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AR(HIDTA) PROCESS FOR DESIGNATION—AN OVERVIEW 1 (2019).
73

EAS

74 KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45188, HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING
AREAS (HIDTA) PROGRAM 2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45188.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YHK4-2C8Z]. The statutory criteria include the extent to which (1) the proposed area “is a
significant center of illegal drug” production and/or trafficking; (2) local “law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area”; (3) the
drug-related activities are causing harm to the public; and (4) the “allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond” to the drug trafficking problems in the area. Id. (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 1706(d)).
75 Id. at 2–4 (describing the HIDTAs and their roles). There are currently thirty-three
HIDTAs in operation in the United States. ONDCP Recognizes Outstanding Counter-Drug Efforts by the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/ondcp-recognizes-outstanding-counter-drug-efforts-high-intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program/ [https://perma.cc/
K66Y-SQG6].
76

FINKLEA, supra note 74, at 4.
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lished conditions to receive funding.77 The federal government also
works directly with HIDTAs. For example, federal law enforcement
officers assist local and regional police in addressing trafficking, and
federal law enforcement officials sit on HIDTA executive boards.78
In another approach to regional cooperative federalism, the federal government delegates responsibilities to subfederal entities, but
the subfederal agents are federally sanctioned, independent, and private regional institutions rather than groups of state and local governments or independent agencies comprised of federal and local
government representatives. Regional transmission organizations that
govern the operation of the electric grid appear to be the only example of this public-private form of regional cooperative federalism—
albeit a prominent example.79 In the grid context, the federal government strongly encourages the formation of RTOs that implement federal policies for the planning and operation of the grid and address
state and electric utility demands for grid governance.80 In order to
form, the entities must meet a federally established set of conditions,
77 See, e.g., id. at 9 (explaining that “there are specific restrictions on how HIDTA funding
can be used for prevention and treatment activities” and noting other funding specifications).
78 See id. at 4 (noting that “there must be an equal proportion of federal and nonfederal
representatives” on a HIDTA Executive Board); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 71, at 2
(“DEA currently participates in and coordinates with the various HIDTAs.”).
79 Although RTOs appear to be the only public-private regional cooperative entity, they
need not be. Take the HIDTA example from above. Imagine a scenario in which the federal
government authorized the formation of independent opioid control organizations, led by individuals within nongovernmental organizations who are experts in crime control, drug trafficking,
addiction, drug treatment, and emergency response. Other governance arrangements come very
close to the RTO model, such as the Federal Reserve System’s regional Federal Reserve Banks.
These banks seem somewhat closer to the federal regional administration model than the regional cooperative federalism model, in that they are in a sense branches of the Federal Reserve
Board. See About the Federal Reserve System, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-system.htm [https://
perma.cc/FW5Y-Y972] (explaining that there are “three salient features” of the Federal Reserve
System: “(1) a central governing Board, (2) a decentralized operating structure of 12 Reserve
Banks, and (3) a combination of public and private characteristics,” but noting that the Reserve
Banks are under the direct supervision of the Board of Governors).
80 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541, 21,549–50 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35, 385) (reiterating a policy of encouraging the formation of regional entities similar
to RTOs and issuing a final rule requiring public utilities to offer services on an open basis with
respect to grid access because “consumers are demanding access to lower cost supplies . . . and
access to the newer, lower cost generation resources”); Regional Transmission Organizations, 65
Fed. Reg. 810, 831 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (stating that FERC, “as a
matter of policy, . . . strongly encourage[s] transmission owners to participate voluntarily in
RTOs”).
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and they must carry out specific federal directives.81 RTOs cover a
territory that serves more than two-thirds of U.S. electric customers.82
As required by FERC, they must operate the grid on an open access
basis, allowing any generators to use the grid’s transmission infrastructure—i.e., electrical wires—on a first-come, first-served basis until
space in the wires runs out.83 They also must ensure that the rates
charged for the use of the wires are just and reasonable, and they must
regionally plan for the expansion and financing of new wires.84 In order to carry out these federal policies, FERC issues a variety of orders
that apply to RTOs and other grid operators. For example, RTOs and
other grid operators must grant nontraditional generators access to
the grid and to energy markets enabled by the grid.85
RTOs highlight the extent to which regional cooperative federalism involves an “agency” that simultaneously addresses federal, state,
and local policy demands.86 Indeed, FERC orders require RTOs to
address state policies, including, for example, state mandates that a
81

See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.

R

Electric Power Markets, FERC (July 20, 2021) https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/market-assessments/overview/electric-power-markets [https://perma.cc/K2TJ-YH8W].
82

83 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,540–45.
84 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
85 See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organic Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg.
64,100, 64,103 (Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring that demand response resources are granted “participation in organized energy markets” on effectively equal
terms as other resources); Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,659 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring improved compensation for demand response providers). For another example of a directive,
see, Interconnection for Wind Energy, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,993, 34,994–96 (June 16, 2005) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring transmission line operators to establish uniform criteria
for the grid interconnection of large wind energy). Demand response is nontraditional because it
is energy nonuse, as opposed to generation, and it can be utilized by grid operators to directly
displace generation by incentivizing consumers to use less electricity. See Demand Response
Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,659 n.2 (“Demand
response means a reduction in the consumption of electric energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive
payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy.” (citing 18 C.F.R.
§ 35.28(b)(4) (2010))); id. at 16,659 n.3 (“Demand response resource means a resource capable
of providing demand response.” (citing 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(5))).
86 RTOs are nonprofit organizations, not agencies, but they function in a manner similar to
agencies. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 33, at 552–53. Some sources describe them as
“quasi-governmental organizations.” See, e.g., SIMEONE, supra note 20, at 2; Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 33, at 555–56 (noting that RTOs can be conceived of as “quasi-governmental
organizations”).
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certain percentage of electricity generated or consumed within the
state must come from clean energy.87
In some respects, the electric grid is a natural fit for regional cooperative federalism. The grid is physically interconnected and defies
state lines, yet the owners of the grid are utilities governed by states.
To further complicate matters, the federal government has jurisdiction
over the operation of the electric grid, while the states regulate the
siting of electric transmission lines and the generators that use the regionally shared grid.88 This mishmash of state, regional, and federal
involvement essentially requires an alternative to pure top-down or
bottom-up control. Indeed, early regionalism scholars projected that
electric transmission would be one area in which regional governance
would be necessary.89 And nearly sixty years later, formally organized
regional institutions began to emerge and now cover the bulk of the
United States.90

87 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,845–46, 49,849 (Aug. 11, 2011) (requiring regional planning for transmission lines and specific consideration of “transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements,” such as state renewable energy mandates).
88 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (“The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all [interstate]
facilities for such transmission or sale of [wholesale] electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local
distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce . . . .”); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy:
A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1814–15 (2012) (describing state authority over
transmission line siting under the Federal Power Act).
89 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8, at 714 (“[T]he problems of transmission are not
capable of being drawn completely within the area of solution by Congress . . . .”). Frankfurter
and Landis further observed that “some co-ordination of policy between these State-wide transmission systems and interstate transmission will call for a mechanism of control regional and not
merely State-wide in its operation” would be needed “in order to secure interconnection, exchange and distribution of power.” Id.
90 FERC began to strongly encourage the formation of institutions similar to RTOs as
early as 1993 when it issued its “Regional Transmission Group Policy Statement,” and it reiterated that encouragement in FERC Order No. 888 in 1996. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities;
Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540,
21,549 (May 10, 1996) (“In the RTG Policy Statement, the Commission announced a policy encouraging the development of RTGs.”); id. at 21,548 n.82 (defining an RTG as “a voluntary
organization of transmission owners, transmission users, and other entities interested in coordinating transmission planning (and expansion), operation and use on a regional [basis]” (quoting
Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (Aug. 5,
1993))). FERC further encouraged the formation of RTOs in early 2000. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 831 (Jan. 6, 2000).
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C. Choosing Among Regional Governance Forms
One might argue that RTOs are an anachronism, and that regional cooperative federalism is unlikely to extend beyond this unique
context. RTOs are, after all, somewhat unique in that they involve
regionally connected wires over which the federal government and
states have jurisdiction.91 But there are many areas with similar features. Take the opioid context—one of the few other areas in which
regional cooperative federalism already exists.92 Here, the federal government has strong jurisdictional authority over activity such as opioid
trafficking that occurs over shared highways.93 Yet states and local
governments have similarly powerful authority and policy interests in
the areas of emergency response, hospital funding and operations, and
welfare, all of which are affected by the opioid crisis.94
There are several characteristics of a particular policy area that
point to regional cooperative federalism as a superior governance approach to address that area, as compared to the many other potential
regional governance forms. As identified in other accounts investigating regional governance regimes, these include powerful jurisdictional
interests of both federal and state governments, and policy challenges
shared across state borders.95 But additional characteristics of a given
policy area make regional cooperative federalism, in particular, a potentially better fit. These include: (1) negative spillovers among states,
which are likely best addressed by a top-down federal entity influencing the regional agency’s work; (2) the need for specific, collective
technical expertise in formulating policy, which will often call for the
inclusion of individuals working outside of government who possess
that expertise, rather than just federal and state representatives; and
91 See Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarbonization, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1079–80 (2018) (describing the varying geographical reach of RTOs and
federal governmental involvement in RTOs); Welton, supra note 20, at 231–32 (describing
RTOs’ and the states’ role in transmission policy); Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 55, at 47–54
(describing RTOs as “hybrid” organizations that bridge local, state, regional, and federal lines of
authority).
92

See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.

R

R

See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing various
cases and noting that the Supreme Court has characterized interstate highways as a channel of
interstate commerce subject to federal authority).
93

94 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions
and the Presumption Against Preemption, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 95, 123–41 (2016) (describing state
and federal authority with respect to hospitals, providers, public health, and other health related
areas, and noting a substantial regulatory role for the states).
95

See Owen & Wiseman, Coequal Federalism, supra note 11, at 323.
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(3) the importance of providing a federal “check” or backstop on the
actions of the agency due to important federal authority in the area.
With some qualifications, these factors are present in the policy
spheres in which regional cooperative federalism governance arrangements predominate. In the case of HIDTAs, opioid trafficking among
states has clear spillover effects, tackling this trafficking is a complex
endeavor, and federal oversight is needed simply because the federal
government provides the majority of funding for the policies carried
out within HIDTAs.96 In the case of RTOs, electricity physically
crosses state lines through interconnected wires,97 the constant balancing of supply and demand required to maintain a specific voltage
within these wires is technically challenging, and FERC operates
under a mandate from Congress to govern the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce. It is unlikely that FERC could fully
delegate its authority to a regional agency and thereby forfeit its ability to review the agency’s action.98
That said, FERC’s review of RTOs is somewhat limited. Take, for
example, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in NRG Power Marketing v.
FERC.99 In that case, the RTO PJM Interconnection (“PJM”) had
proposed a specific design for its capacity auctions, which are competitive markets in which generators bid to provide generation infrastructure, or alternatives to generation, if electricity is needed in the
future.100 As part of this design, PJM set a minimum price at which
generators were required to bid into the auction.101 This was purportedly an attempt to prevent artificially low bids—by generators that
receive state subsidies and can afford to bid at a very low price, for
example—that could crowd out other market entrants.102 Based on
consensus from stakeholders, PJM proposed two modifications to the
96 See FINKLEA, supra note 74, at 4–6 (describing the federal funding structure for
HIDTAs).
97 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 2 (2002) https://
www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/transmission-grid.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6UE-NBG6]
(describing the major U.S. grid interconnections).
98 See 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(4) (requiring FERC to authorize any “proposed disposition,
consolidation, acquisition, or change in control” of transmission facilities by a public utility “if it
finds that the proposed transaction will be consistent with the public interest”); id. § 824b(b)
(“The [FERC] may grant any application for an order under this section in whole or in part and
upon such terms and conditions as it finds necessary or appropriate to secure the maintenance of
adequate service and the coordination in the public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction
of the [FERC].”).
99 862 F.3d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
100 See id. at 111–12.
101 Id. at 112.
102 See id. at 111–12.
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minimum offer price rule, including creating categorical exemptions
from the rule for certain generators and an extension of the time for
which the rule applied to generators.103 PJM sought FERC approval of
this rule, and FERC proposed modifications to the rule, including a
requirement that some generators be able to avoid the rule through
individual approval, called “unit-specific review.”104 FERC also proposed to eliminate the extension of the application of the rule.105 PJM
agreed to these changes, and FERC approved the rules.106
Several generators sought judicial review, arguing that FERC had
impermissibly set a new rate rather than approving a rate, which was
impermissible under FERC’s governing statute. The D.C. Circuit, in
an opinion authored by then-Judge Kavanaugh, agreed, concluding
that the statute does not allow FERC to impose an “entirely different
rate design” on an RTO.107 Notably, the court viewed FERC as setting
a new rate despite the fact that FERC allowed PJM to maintain the
categorical exemptions that it had originally proposed.108 While the
need for federal influence in the electricity grid context is no less present after NRG Power Marketing, it is worth noting the limits on that
influence that apply within the RTO regional cooperative federalist
sphere.
An in-depth analysis of RTOs—the most prevalent form of regional cooperative federalism—allows for a more concrete understanding of the design and operation of regional cooperative
federalism and the strengths and weaknesses of this governance form.
II. FUNCTIONAL FEDERALISM: ACHIEVING THE VALUES
FEDERALISM BEYOND GEOPOLITICAL LINES

OF

By and large, federalism scholars view states as the essential bearers of federalism values.109 This intense focus on political subunits igId. at 112–13.
Id. at 114.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 115 (quoting W. Res., Inc. v. FERC, 9 F.3d 1568, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
108 Id. at 116 (concluding that “FERC’s modifications expanded the exemptions by layering
the two new exemptions on top of unit-specific review, and by exempting certain new generators
from the price floor after one year instead of after three years” and categorizing the modifications as an entirely new rate, which FERC could not impose on the RTO despite the RTO’s
agreeing to the rate).
109 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1550
(2012) (noting that federalism scholars “typically divide into camps,” but in describing the
camps, observing that all camps favor some form of state power). Some accounts pull in local
governments, too. See generally, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local
103
104
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nores the functionalist undertones of most federalism values. Many of
the purported benefits of federalism arise simply from decentralization, which diffuses governance responsibilities to a lower level.110 The
smaller the entities, and the more numerous these entities are, the
more likely it is that they will respond more effectively to diverse
stakeholder demands, offer varied policies from which voters may
choose, experiment with a wider variety of policies, and better represent varied constituent interests.111 But the formation of numerous
governmental institutions operating below the national level does not
require any one particular form of political subunit—or even a political unit at all, as evidenced by private nonprofit RTOs that govern
much of the electric grid.112 In other words, federalism, in which a
governmental entity separate from the federal government exercises
some degree of independent sovereign authority, is not a prerequisite
to decentralization.113
Rather than rely on states to implement national policies, the federal government can simply enlist large numbers of federal agents to
make localized policy decisions, through regional or even smaller offices.114 But there is a further step toward decentralization, in which
the government relies on independently formed regional entities to
implement national policies. RTOs, which are private, nonprofit governing entities, and which owe their existence to approval by a federal
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 59 (2007) (discussing the roles of
the federal government and local governments in policy areas of national concern); Laurie Reynolds, A Role for Local Government Law in Federal-State-Local Disputes, 43 URB. LAW. 977
(2011) (citing Davidson, supra).
110 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20 (2008).
111 This concept of decentralization is also described as subsidiarity. E.g., Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought,
89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 382 (2004) (“[S]ubsidiarity maintains that all governmental tasks are best
carried out at the level closest to those affected by them.”).
112 The economist Charles Tiebout has written that “fiscal federalism” can be theoretically
analyzed to “neutralize political variables” by “arrang[ing] governments solely on the basis of
economic efficiency.” Charles M. Tiebout, An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentralization, in
PUBLIC FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES, AND UTILIZATION 79, 79 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch. ed.,
1961). Tiebout theorized a world in which “no states, counties, metropolitan authorities” and the
like had yet formed, faced with the new task of organizing “the provision of public goods.” Id. In
light of differences in the benefits of public goods, Tiebout explored the size of the governing
units that would likely emerge to provide these goods. Id. at 80.
113 See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 110, at 20–21 (distinguishing federalism from decentralization); cf. Lobel, supra note 111, at 382 (describing decentralization, rather than mere federalism, as promoting “diversity, competition, and experimentation”).
114 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 5, at 388–92 (providing examples of federal government
operations at the regional and local levels); Owen, supra note 11, at 65–67 (same).
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agency (e.g., FERC), highlight the government’s ability to skirt the
confining boundaries of existing political subunits when decentralizing
governance.115 As explored here, in some respects these subunits better achieve the purported benefits of federalism than states or a traditional cooperative federalist regime would. In other respects,
however, there are weaknesses in the RTO model of regional governance that constrain its current ability to achieve the traditional benefits of federalism.
A. Measuring Benefits
The effort to construct a framework for normative analysis of regional cooperative federalism systems requires, of course, defining virtues. The sections below use the oft-cited virtues of federalism—
experimentation and innovation, efficiency, and accountability—as
means of comparing regional cooperative federalism with other approaches. As explored in this Part, the case studies of regional cooperative federalism approaches point to several factors that suggest that
regional cooperative federalism achieves some of the core, commonly
cited benefits of federalism more clearly than traditional federalism or
cooperative federalism would. The primary mode of analysis deployed
here is to compare RTO action to that of individual states operating
under the “pure federalism” model, or individual states implementing
a federal mandate, as they do under the cooperative federalism
model. This comparison is possible because only two-thirds of the U.S.
population lives within an RTO area, so for a given issue area, one can
compare grid governance approaches in RTOs with approaches in
states.116
In some respects, individual states operating under something
closer to a pure federalism model have been more innovative, accountable, and efficient—in terms of addressing diverse demands of
constituents—than RTOs, as discussed below. But RTOs generally
perform quite well in comparisons between RTOs and traditional cooperative federalism. For example, as explored further below, FERC
requires all utilities to engage in regional and interregional planning
for new transmission lines that are needed for reliability and for ad115 RTOs are nonprofit organizations and are thus private, not public entities. See supra
note 86. Yet in nearly all senses of the word, they set policy. See Welton, supra note 20, at 233
(noting that RTOs are effectively “policy-making bodies”); see also supra Section I.B (describing
the purpose of RTOs and their general activities).
116

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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dressing state policies, including renewable energy policies.117 Utilities
in many areas outside of RTOs have performed abysmally in this area,
whereas some RTOs have planned for and spurred the construction of
substantial new interstate transmission line mileage.118
Comparing the performance of one type of regional cooperative
federalist arrangement—the RTO—to other existing governance arrangements is somewhat limited, however, in that it fails to address
how a governance regime could perform even better in terms of providing innovative, responsive, diverse policies for the electric grid.
This Part addresses both strengths and some deficiencies in the RTO
governance model, while Part III explores how RTOs or alternative
governance approaches could better achieve these values.
B. Experimentation and Innovation
Proponents of federalism frequently argue that the devolution of
authority to subfederal governments spurs innovation and experimentation in the policy sphere.119 When a federal government gives lowerlevel authorities the space to achieve a policy goal, the assumption is
that these authorities will develop more creative, diverse, and potentially effective approaches than would one centralized entity.120
There are many holes in this “laboratory of the states” theory.121
These include, for example, the fact that state and local government
117 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011).
118 See infra note 181 and accompanying text.; cf. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF
THE ELECTRIC GRID 43 (2011), https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/MITEI-TheFuture-of-the-Electric-Grid.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQL5-MFQN] (commending MISO for a regional planning process that could serve as a model for effective interregional planning); Paul L.
Joskow, Transmission Policy in the United States 48–49 (Oct. 1, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
https://economics.mit.edu/files/1178 [https://perma.cc/LH7U-QSC3] (concluding that PJM has a
“reasonably good system . . . for supporting merchant transmission projects that enhance interconnection capacity between PJM and neighboring control areas,” unlike other parts of the
United States, but noting a lack of a systemic process in PJM or other RTOs to identify needed
interregional connections). But see MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra, at 84 (noting that the Western
Electricity Coordinating Council (“WECC”), which is not an RTO or ISO, has “long been a
leader in wide-area transmission planning”). The existence of an RTO or ISO, in other words, is
not a necessary precondition to the success of broad scale transmission planning. What does
seem to be essential is the existence of some sort of umbrella organization that spans states and
coordinates the planning. In the case of the West, the WECC is a federally regulated entity
responsible for ensuring the reliability of the transmission grid. Id.
119 For a collection of authorities propounding this view, see, for example, Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1663 n.1 (2014).
120 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
121 Justice Louis Brandeis first popularized the term “laboratory of the states” in 1932. See
infra note 223 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of the deficiencies of the the-
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officials are often risk averse and unlikely to innovate.122 Government
officials might simply copy each other rather than develop diverse approaches. Indeed, any official that innovates produces a nonexcludable, nonrival public good that is easily stolen by other governments,
thus dampening incentives to be a first mover in the policy space.123
Even if government officials do take the plunge and experiment with
new policy, this innovation is nothing close to a coordinated experiment, but rather creates a haphazard patchwork of policies.124
As to the latter problem of a lack of real experimentation, diverse
policy efforts to address one centralized mandate or goal would be
more effective if conducted in a manner that tested possible alternative approaches and measured the results, producing lessons for all
governments to build from.125 Furthermore, haphazard experimentation by local governments or states can lead to problematic externalities that cross state or local lines.126 The highly varied state and local
response to the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the massive social
costs of messy experimentation by individual, relatively uncoordinated governments in a policy area that is simultaneously local, regional, and national in scope.127
Regional cooperative federalism addresses many of these
problems in the policy experimentation sphere, including spurring inory and citations to many other of its critics, see Wiseman & Owen, Federal Laboratories of
Democracy, supra note 11, at 1122 n.5, 1136–45, and Wiseman, supra note 119, at 1664–68.
122 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 18, at 594; Galle & Leahy, supra note 18, at
1360–61 (concluding that the assumption that subfederal entities are unlikely to innovate due to
free riding is largely supported by the evidence, with some exceptions).
123 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 18, at 605. But see id. at 605 n.20 (noting some general
caveats to this conclusion).
124 See infra notes 169–70, 178, and accompanying text. Some might argue that Justice
Brandeis did not intend for “real” or rigidly scientific experiments, but his language implies at
least some expectation of a scientific approach to policy experimentation. See Althouse, supra
note 17, at 1751.
125 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288, 345 (1998) (proposing design elements for rigorous policy
experimentation through a federalist system); Wiseman & Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, supra note 11, at 1161–67 (exploring the design features of more effective policy
experimentation).
126 Cf. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (propounding the race to the bottom theory in which states refrain from adopting potentially societally beneficial regulations for fear of losing “industry and commerce” to other states).
127 See, e.g., Sarah Mervosh, How West Virginia Became a U.S. Leader in Vaccine Rollout,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/west-virginia-vaccine.html
[https://perma.cc/757D-5R2E] (noting that “many states are struggling to hand out the shots that
the federal government has provided to them” and “widespread logistical problems” in the rollout of vaccines).
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novation, coordinating policy experimentation, and avoiding some of
the cross-state externalities of individual experiments.
1. Spurring Policy Risk Taking and Coordinating Experiments
Two recent energy challenges highlight the distinct ability of regional cooperative federalism to spur innovation. First, there is growing demand for grid operators to integrate larger amounts of
renewable energy on the grid.128 Second, and relatedly, operators must
maintain grid reliability despite the presence of more variable, intermittent resources on the grid, meaning that they must supply enough
power to match demand at all times and avoid outages.129 The need to
enhance reliability measures has become more urgent as regions increasingly experience extreme weather and other events, such as
wildfire.130
a. Innovative Measures for Integrating Renewable Energy
With regards to the imperative of integrating large amounts of
renewables to address climate change, air pollution, and other impacts
of fossil fuels, individual states have, in some respects, been more innovative than regional organizations or the federal government. Take
the example of Texas, which has its own nonregional RTO.131 Texas
leads the nation in the production of wind energy; it accomplished this
by mandating the construction of transmission lines leading from
windy areas to large population centers.132 And other states, acting
within their individual authority to control the energy generation mix,
have promoted renewable electricity generation by requiring the con128 See, e.g., DSIRE, RENEWABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY STANDARDS (2020), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/ncsolarcen-prod/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/RPS-CES-Sept2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SU7K-BBVQ] (summarizing state clean energy standards that mandate that 100 percent of energy in the state come from clean (zero-carbon) energy within several decades).
129 N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2021 ERO RELIABILITY RISK PRIORITIES REPORT
22 (2021), https://www.nerc.com/comm/RISC/Documents/RISC%20ERO%20Priorities%20Report_Final_RISC_Approved_July_8_2021_Board_Submitted_Copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAZ22M5G].
130 Id. at 26.
131 See Electric Power Markets, supra note 82 (describing ERCOT as “an independent system operator, managing the flow of electrical power to 24 million customers in the state of
Texas”).
132 See Texas Ranks First in U.S.-Installed Wind Capacity and Number of Turbines, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 31, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40252
[https://perma.cc/ZGD6-ALWU]; JULIE COHN & OLIVERA JANKOVSKA, TEXAS CREZ LINES:
HOW STAKEHOLDERS SHAPE MAJOR ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 12–13 (2020), https://
www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/eb251d15/ces-pub-texascrez-111720.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2S2X-UP6D].
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struction of large amounts of clean energy capacity.133 But most of
these latter states have not yet succeeded in individually ensuring that
there will be adequate transmission infrastructure to support this new
clean energy; multistate RTOs such as the Midcontinent ISO
(“MISO”) and Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) have had more success
in this area by planning for the construction of transmission infrastructure across state lines.134 Indeed, to support the net-zero carbon emissions goals that a growing number of states have committed to, the
existing mileage of U.S. transmission lines would have to expand dramatically.135 Without some regional coordination and planning—as
has occurred through RTOs—it seems unlikely that states will accomplish this. Indeed, although Congress has created a formal option for
states to enter into transmission siting compacts to plan for the siting
of transmission infrastructure across state lines, no states have taken
up this option.136
The challenges of relying on individual states, under a traditional
federalism framework, to plan for and approve a massive new net133 See DSIRE, supra note 128 (showing states with policies setting standards that require a
certain percentage of the state’s electricity to come from renewable or other low-carbon energy
sources).
134 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy
Transportation, 41 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 423, 464–70 (2017) (discussing states’ blocking of the
Plains & Eastern Clean Line transmission project and federal efforts to overcome these barriers); Jeff St. John, 7 Transmission Projects that Could Unlock a Renewable Energy Bounty,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/9-transmission-projects-laying-the-paths-for-cross-country-clean-energy [https://perma.cc/J5AU-D6YD]
(describing one successful transmission line project to support renewable energy that would extend from Wyoming to the West Coast and state based hurdles faced by other major projects);
JOSEPH H. ETO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, BUILDING ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION
LINES: A REVIEW OF RECENT TRANSMISSION PROJECTS (2016), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/
sites/default/files/lbnl-1006330.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5VH-ABQJ] (summarizing barriers to
transmission lines that cross state lines); infra notes 160–78 and accompanying text (describing
relatively successful planning for new transmission lines by SPP and MISO).
135 See ERIC LARSON ET AL., PRINCETON UNIV., NET-ZERO AMERICA: POTENTIAL PATHWAYS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IMPACTS 17 (2020), https://environmenthalfcentury.princeton.edu/
sites/g/files/toruqf331/files/2020-12/Princeton_NZA_Interim_Report_15_Dec_2020_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AW38-ZK3Y] (showing eleven states that have committed to attaining net-zero
carbon emissions by the year 2050); id. at 106 (noting the need to expand existing transmission
infrastructure by approximately sixty percent by the year 2030 and expand even further by 2050
in order to reach zero-carbon goals in the United States).
136 See Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to
Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1946 (2015) (“[The Energy Policy
Act of 2005, § 216(i), 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i),] allows three or more contiguous states to enter into
interstate compacts to establish regional siting authorities to determine the need for future transmission facilities within those states and carry out the transmission siting responsibilities of those
states.”); id. at 1947 (“To date, no states have entered into such compacts and there is currently
no real incentive for them to do so.”).
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work of transmission lines arise from several sources. Beyond the
most obvious hurdle in the form of transaction costs of coordinating
across state lines, there are high barriers to state innovation—perhaps
in particular when one state’s decision to implement more transmission lines could simply be thwarted by a neighboring state’s decision
not to continue those lines within its territory.
Indeed, despite the assumption that decentralization naturally
spurs innovation and experimentation in the policy realm, there is
strong evidence suggesting that government officials are hesitant to
innovate. In addition to the free rider potential noted above, taking a
risky and unusual stance on a particular policy issue could pay off in
terms of reelection, but it could also backfire if the policy approach
proved to be suboptimal—or optimal, but unpopular with voters.137
Innovation also requires resources in the form of funding, staff, and
time, which simply are not available to many governments—especially
smaller governments.138 Governments need safe spaces to innovate,
and regional cooperative governance can create these spaces and provide the coordination among innovators that is necessary in the transmission planning context.
Indeed, FERC, which oversees RTOs, sometimes requires innovation as part of its delegation of authority to these regional institutions, albeit not always successfully. For example, in the transmission
context, FERC—the federal entity in charge of regulating the reliability and use of the U.S. interstate transmission system—has set a federal policy requirement of ensuring a reliable grid through regional
and interregional transmission planning.139 Under this mandate—
called Order No. 1000—entities that operate transmission lines must
plan for new transmission lines to ensure that adequate generation
will be available for customers and that all customers will benefit from
new wires.140 Regional planning entities also must address individual
state generation policies, such as requirements that large percentages
of energy in a state come from renewable energy, by, for example,
137 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 18, at 605, 614 (noting that insecure incumbent politicians in a system of monolithic government—assuming no potential movement of state politicians to a federal political positions—may be willing to take higher risks that might pay off with
large voter net benefits, whereas secure incumbents are unlikely to do so).
138 See id. at 611 (explaining that voters “have no reason to support a local government that
spends large amounts of money on risky [policy] projects”); Galle & Leahy, supra note 18, at
1349.
139 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011).
140 See id. at 49,845.
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considering the need to plan for and finance new transmission lines to
support renewable energy.141 Beyond mandating that transmission
plans address new state policies, this federal directive also encourages
policy innovation by aiming to ensure that transmission lines selected
in the planning process are “the more efficient or cost-effective solutions available.”142.
This is not to say, however, that Order No. 1000, mandating interregional transmission planning, has met uniform success. Indeed, recent commentators observe that the large regional and interregional
transmission projects envisioned by Order No. 1000 were largely built
before the order’s promulgation.143 They conclude that the order may
have even stifled these types of projects—the very type that the order
hoped to expand—by imposing “bureaucratic planning requirements
on the national transmission system.”144
Despite the significant limitations of Order No. 1000, FERC also
explicitly encourages RTO policy innovation in several other areas.
Constructing new transmission lines is important in terms of allowing
more renewable energy to come online, decreasing wholesale electricity costs by further diversifying the generation mix, and improving reliability.145 When FERC pushed for the formation of RTOs through
Order No. 2000, it expressly “encourage[d] RTOs to develop and propose innovative ratemaking practices” to finance the construction of
new transmission lines.146 In supporting this type of policy, FERC created an approval process for “innovative transmission rate treatments” that would authorize RTOs to depart from the agency’s
traditional transmission pricing requirements.147 Through this process,
FERC aimed to allow for more flexible strategies, in part to improve

141 See id. at 49,857 (noting the need for regional planning requirements arises in part because “regional transmission planning could better identify transmission solutions for reliably
and cost-effectively integrating location-constrained renewable energy resources needed to fulfill . . . the renewable portfolio standards adopted by many states”).
142

Id. at 49,846.

See, e.g., Tony Clark, Order No. 1000 at the Crossroads: Reflections on the Rule and Its
Future 1 (2018), wbklaw.com/uploads/file/Articles-%20News/2018%20articles%20publications/
WBK-%20TC-Order%201000%20whitepaper%20Final.pdf (“[M]ajor transmission projects of
the kind that many thought the order would spur came out of a pre-Order No. 1000 world.”).
143

144

Id.

See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,851.
145

146

Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 913 (Jan. 6, 2000).

147

Id. at 913–14.
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policy, but also largely to lure new transmission line owners into
RTOs, thus expanding their reach and benefits.148
Within Order No. 2000, FERC additionally both required and encouraged new RTOs to adopt certain principles into their approved
rate tariffs, required RTOs to offer the transmission lines on an open
access basis, and included other service-based and rate-based requirements. The principles required by Order No. 2000 are among the
transmission pricing practices labeled as relatively “innovative” by
FERC.149 These principles included, among others, a prohibition
against RTOs adopting tariffs that result in “rate pancaking.”150 This
phenomenon “occurs when electricity is scheduled across more than
one transmission provider’s borders and each provider assesses full or
partial transmission charges for the use of the transmission facilities
they manage”; it results in inefficient “duplicate transmission fees” being charged to a single customer.151 Similar to prohibiting rate pancaking, FERC also encouraged RTOs to waive charges that typically
apply when electricity crosses a border between two RTOs.152 This was
designed to improve the ability of utilities and generators to more easily send electricity long distances, over lines operated by different
RTOs.153
Pure cooperative federalism, in which the federal government allows states to innovate while working to accomplish a federal goal,
can and sometimes does spur policy innovation, too.154 But the inclusion of a regional entity also provides coordination among individual
jurisdictions that can avoid other problems associated with experimentation and innovation, such as interstate spillovers. Furthermore,
148 See id. at 914 (explaining that FERC was not attempting “to ‘bribe’ transmission-owning utilities to join an RTO,” but was aiming “to capture significant net benefits from promoting
competitive generation markets”).
149 See id. at 913–14 (encouraging “RTOs to develop and propose innovative ratemaking
practices” and providing incentives for “innovative transmission rate treatments”).
150 Id. at 915.
151 SW. POWER POOL, RATE PANCAKING AND UNRESERVED USE STUDY 3 (2019), https://
www.misostates.org/images/stories/Seams_Coordination_Efforts/Market_Monitor_Study_on_Rate_Pancaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ5H-ECXM].
152 Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 916.
153 Id.
154 See generally, e.g., Adelman & Engle, supra note 11 (noting state leadership in climate
policy innovation). Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman has also identified ways in which independent innovation can occur. For example, she has explored the promise of federal intervention in
the form of prizes or other monetary incentives for lower-level governments to innovate within
the pure cooperative federalism model. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 18, at 615–16. As described above, cooperative federalism can provide both federal mandates and incentives for
innovation.
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states working together through regional entities might develop more
effective policy solutions, particularly when the policy problem they
address is not state specific. This is the case with electric transmission
because the transmission network crosses multiple state lines, and
electricity is not confined to state borders.155 Indeed, in the case of
RTOs, many of the key stakeholders are multistate corporations that
would prefer to operate beneath uniform policies that apply across
state lines.156 This tends to drive RTOs toward decisions that transcend artificial boundaries and the externalities that state-by-state policies—such as limitations on the construction of interstate
transmission lines—can create.
Effective innovation and risk taking within regional cooperative
federalism are perhaps best demonstrated by recent RTO-led planning processes for the construction of massive new transmission networks.157 Because regionalism is critical in the electricity transmission
context, in parts of the country where RTOs operate, these RTOs
have led the regional and interregional planning process mandated by
FERC.158 A limited number of RTO initiatives have been even more
ambitious than the planning requirement demands, although typically
only within each RTO’s region, not between regions. For example,
MISO, which covers a territory spanning fifteen states and one Canadian province,159 proposed and is now implementing a regional plan of
“Multi-Value Projects” (“MVPs”).160 The projects are “multi-value”
because, by expanding transmission lines in targeted areas, they improve the reliability of the electricity system and allow more wind energy to come online, thus helping states meet renewable energy
Electric Power Markets, supra note 82 (showing regional electricity markets).
The presence of such large, multistate stakeholders, however, risks capture of the process. See Welton, supra note 20, at 256, 270–71 (noting how the existence of “mega-holding
companies” in the energy industry allows for corporate energy conglomerates to hold large voting sway in RTO governance and predicting that “heavyweight corporations with holdings that
cut across . . . sectors will continue to have the ability to manipulate votes toward their best
interest”).
157 See infra notes 160–69, 175–78, and accompanying text.
158 See Order Instituting Section 206 Proceedings, 169 FERC ¶ 61,054, at 1–3 (Oct. 17,
2019) (preliminary) (noting that RTOs must demonstrate compliance with Order No. 1000).
159 See Interregional Coordination, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/planning/interregional-coodination/ [https://perma.cc/P3VF-H4J3] (showing a map of the areas in which MISO
operates).
160 See generally Multi-Value Projects (MVPs), MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/plan
ning/planning/multi-value-projects-mvps/#nt=%2Fmultivalueprojecttype
%3AMVP%20Triennial%20%20Reviews&t=10&p=0&s=FileName&sd=desc [https://perma.cc/
KGT8-V8TH] (describing MISO’s MVPs and the process for reviewing and implementing
them).
155

R

156

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

182

unknown

Seq: 36

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

17-FEB-22

12:31

[Vol. 90:147

mandates and allowing for the delivery of low cost wind energy to
more customers.161
When MISO began the process of regional planning, it did so primarily because many of the individual MISO states had renewable
energy mandates.162 Some states also had—and continue to maintain—specific clean energy or carbon standards that limit carbon
emissions within the states.163 In other words, states within MISO’s
territory were experimenting with renewable energy policy, putting in
place diverse requirements that impacted the demand for construction
of new renewable energy generation capacity in each state, how much
of that renewable energy had to be “local,” i.e., in state, and so on.
States likely would not have achieved their renewable and clean energy goals without the help of regional grid planning. This is because
new renewable generation typically requires new transmission lines to
carry the generation to areas with large numbers of electricity centers,
or “load centers” in industry parlance.164
MISO could have simply identified the new generation resources
required by states’ renewable portfolio standards and conducted a
straightforward mapping effort to identify areas where new transmission lines would connect to planned renewable generation. Instead,
MISO carefully analyzed the tradeoffs of building more wind generation infrastructure close to customers versus less generation infrastructure—and more transmission infrastructure—farther from
customers in windier areas.165 MISO used sophisticated data to help
161 MISO describes these three values as encompassing “reliability, public policy and economic benefits.” MISO, MULTI VALUE PROJECT PORTFOLIO RESULTS AND ANALYSES 1, 64–65
(2012), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2011%20MVP%20Portfolio%20Analysis%20Full%20Report117059.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9HF-B5Z2].
162 See MISO, MTEP17 MVP TRIENNIAL REVIEW 12 (2017), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/
MTEP17%20MVP%20Triennial%20Review%20Report117065.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QXMFYE6] (“[T]he adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) . . . across the MISO footprint
drove the need for a more regional and robust transmission system . . . .”).
163 See, e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 915–16 (8th Cir. 2016) (describing
Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act, MINN. STAT. § 216H (2021)); MISO, supra note 161,
at 10 (“Twelve of thirteen states in the MISO footprint have enacted either RPS requirements or
renewable energy goals which require or recommend varying amounts of load be served with
energy from renewable energy resources.”).
164 See HURLBUT, supra note 27, at 3 (noting the need for a “regional transmission system
[that] is sufficiently robust to move renewable power from resource-rich areas” to load centers
across multiple states, which requires “multistate institutions to coordinate transmission planning and expansion”).
165 MISO, supra note 161, at 64–65; ADITYA JAYAM PRABHAKAR, LAURA RAUCH,
LIANGYING HECKER & JOHN LAWHORN, BUSINESS CASE JUSTIFICATION FOR MULTI-VALUE
PROJECTS IN THE MISO MIDWEST REGION 2 (2013), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.
jsp?tp=&arnumber=6672745 [https://perma.cc/42P2-PSD8].
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states identify the windiest areas in the region that were likely to produce the most renewable energy in the least costly way.166 Based on
the data, MISO, in coordination with the states, selected energy zones
scattered throughout the Midwest, creating a regional map of the areas where new generation would best be built.167 The planned transmission lines that resulted from the process were based on the
location of these zones as well as careful consideration of how new
lines would improve the reliability of electricity service, prevent the
construction of new wires where possible, and reduce the loss of electricity as it flows through wires, among other benefits.168
MISO estimates that the regional approach, as opposed to simply
planning for instate generation close to customer bases, required
eleven percent less wind infrastructure than otherwise would have
been built, resulting in $1.4 to $2.5 billion in estimated savings.169 It is
unlikely that states, without the assistance of a regional organization,
would have produced such a map, in which low cost generation to
support multiple states’ standards was organized in discrete clusters
throughout the region.170
166 See MISO, supra note 161, at 2 (collecting data on the voltage that could be generated
by renewables in various states along with the estimated costs of constructing associated transmission lines).
167 See id. at 10, 22–41.
168 See id. at 52–61.
169 Id. at 65.
170 See supra note 116; cf. Joskow, supra note 118, at 49 (noting the lack of any process for
“systematically . . . evaluat[ing] opportunities to expand transmission capacity” across RTO borders). With the help of regional convening institutions, some states have engaged in regional
transmission planning efforts to work with federal entities to build needed transmission infrastructure. See State Voluntary Agreements to Plan and Pay for Transmission Facilities, 86 Fed.
Reg. 33,700, 33,701 (June 25, 2021) (noting New Jersey’s efforts—working through the RTO
PJM Interconnection—to initiate a voluntary coordinated planning process for transmission
lines needed to support offshore wind). FERC’s policy supporting this type of process allows
voluntary transmission agreements, including agreements between two or more states, and
agreements between FERC and individual states, regarding the construction and cost of new
transmission lines, among other entities. See id. Through organizations such as the Western Governors’ Association, states have also produced somewhat less sophisticated maps of the most
productive areas to build renewable generation within a region. See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N &
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES—PHASE 1 REPORT (2009),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/WREZ_Report.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/Q9JB-U6UD]. Although these zones did not create any direct siting or permitting
authority, they influenced states in approving several new transmission line projects. See Daniel
Getman & David Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab’y, Greening the Grid: Implementing
Renewable Energy Zones for Integrated Transmission and Generation Planning Presentation
46–47 (Dec. 1, 2015), https://cleanenergysolutions.org/sites/default/files/documents/gtg_rez_web
inar_draft_30nov2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EYP-997K] (noting “[n]o direct link to transmission
authority,” but observing that several transmission projects were “in permitting”).
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Despite the positive MISO example, the fact that an RTO performed better than individual states attempting to coordinate renewable planning does not, by itself, suggest that regional cooperative
federalism is the best mode for innovation. Indeed, even RTOs have
largely failed at interregional transmission planning to address
“seams” that separate transmission at their borders. This failure persists despite the existence of agreements to address the need for interregional lines.171 Here, again, SPP and MISO are an exception. In 2020
they commenced a joint effort to identify transmission lines needed to
support the new interconnection of low-cost renewable sources that
benefit both RTOs.172
Despite the limits of RTO planning, there is some evidence that
the RTO approach is superior to other regional governance options
with respect to achieving the transmission expansions needed for a
cleaner, more reliable grid. For example, the Federal Power Act173 allows states to form regional compacts for transmission line siting, but
none have taken up the call.174 In the MISO example, the existence of
a public-private regional entity with generator members who needed
new transmission lines might have spurred action that a purely federal-state or state-coordinated regional approach would not have.
171 For descriptions of RTOs’ interregional planning efforts and associated formal agreements for such planning, see, for example, Interregional Planning, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/
planning/interregional-planning [https://perma.cc/2M7Z-FTUT], and MISO, supra note 161. For
a description of the limits on RTOs’ interregional planning, see, for example, Joskow, supra note
118, at 49 (noting that despite PJM having expanded the territory in which it operates, “transmission investment planning appears to continue to be balkanized across the individual PJM regions” and concluding that “[i]nadequate attention to opportunities to expand inter-control area
transmission capacity . . . is a continuing problem”). But see JOSEPH H. ETO & GIULIA GALLO,
INTERREGIONAL TRANSMISSION COORDINATION: A REVIEW OF PRACTICES FOLLOWING FERC
ORDER NOS. 890 AND 1000 22, 32–33 (2019), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/
interregional_transmission_coordination_final_oct2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPJ9-ASQF] (noting planned interregional transmission projects in the Western Interconnection and interregional
cost allocation for new transmission projects spanning MISO and PJM).
172 See generally SPP-MISO JOINT STUDY TEAM, SPP-MISO 2021 JOINT TARGETED INTERCONNECTION QUEUE STUDY: SCOPE OF WORK 1 (2021), https://spp.org/documents/64101/sppmiso%20jtiq%20detailed%20scope%2002192021%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4JM-3FFW]
(“This document presents the scope and schedule of work for the SPP-MISO 2021 Joint Targeted
Interconnection Queue (JTIQ) study.”).
173 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828c.
174 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (“[Authorizing] three or more contiguous States to enter into an
interstate compact, subject to approval by Congress, establishing regional transmission siting
agencies . . . .”); see AVI ZEVIN, SAM WALSH, JUSTIN GUNDLACH & ISABEL CAREY, BUILDING A
NEW GRID WITHOUT NEW LEGISLATION: A PATH TO REVITALIZING FEDERAL TRANSMISSION
AUTHORITIES 65 n.118 (2020), https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/buildingnew-grid-without-new-legislation-path-revitalizing-federal-transmission-authorities [https://
perma.cc/XWU7-GQSJ] (noting that § 824p(i) “has never been used”).
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At least one other RTO operating under the same FERC directives as MISO has formed similarly innovative policies in the renewable energy context. For example, SPP, which borders MISO and
extends farther south, established priority transmission projects similar to MISO’s MVPs. This innovative process was the result of a multistakeholder “Synergistic Planning Project Team” made up of state
regulators and SPP members.175 These stakeholders focused on the
need for a “robust, flexible and cost-effective transmission system”
that spanned the SPP region.176 Like MVPs, the priority lines supported states’ policies for renewable generation and other generation
and improved reliability.177 The team that produced the priority transmission project idea also suggested other innovative policies, including
a new way of sharing the costs of constructing new transmission
lines.178
Individual states and utilities might similarly innovate if required
to do so by FERC. But in many cases this innovation would be uncoordinated, and it would lack most attributes of an actual policy experiment.179 Indeed, outside of RTOs, FERC’s required regional planning
process for new transmission has been “stalled, and at worst, ineffective in identifying valuable projects.”180 In contrast, MISO’s regional
planning process requires transmission providers—the entities responsible for actually building new power lines—to “coordinate or consolidate, where possible, individually defined transmission projects into
more comprehensive cost-effective developments.”181 MISO and SPP
have successfully planned for billions of dollars of new transmission
investments needed to support new wind energy projects.182

175 See Priority Projects, SW. POWER POOL, https://www.spp.org/engineering/transmissionplanning/priority-projects/ [https://perma.cc/2P3W-QN8Z].
176

Id.

177

See id.

178

Id.

See Wiseman & Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, supra note 11, at 1137–45
(describing the ways in which states do not experiment with policy in the traditional sense of
experimentation).
179

R

180 SCOTTMADDEN, INC., INFORMING THE TRANSMISSION DISCUSSION 288 (2020), https://
www.scottmadden.com/insight/informing-the-transmission-discussion/ [https://perma.cc/BM4TYXD3].

MISO, FERC ELECTRIC TARIFF ATTACHMENT FF: TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLANPROTOCOL 27 (2021), https://www.misoenergy.org/legal/tariff/ [https://perma.cc/HQK8R7WY].
181

NING

182

See supra notes 160–78 and accompanying text.
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b. Maintaining Grid Reliability in the Face of New Challenges
The combination of FERC pushing for innovative regional planning, and states within RTO territories providing bottom-up impetus
for change, appears to have been an important factor driving effective
grid planning to support renewable energy. But one challenge of the
modern grid—regardless of the amount of renewable energy penetration—is reliability in the face of extreme weather and other events
partially exacerbated by climate change.183 This challenge was highlighted by the Southern freeze and blackout in 2021. By and large,
grid operators have kept the lights and heat on for customers.184 But
several incidents have demonstrated the immense difficulty of the task
of maintaining grid reliability regardless of exogenous extremes.
One recent incident that challenged grid reliability occurred in
2014, when MISO’s territory experienced an unusually long cold snap
caused by the polar vortex.185 This resulted in “the coldest temperatures in twenty years” in early January, with an extended period of
subzero temperatures.186 MISO had a total of thirty-two incidents of
“[o]perating [r]eserve scarcity” during this period, meaning that the
power plants that were supposed to provide backup resources during
periods of peak demand, such as periods of extreme cold or heat, were
not fully available.187 This was in part because natural gas plants were
183 See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2021 ERO RELIABILITY RISK PRIORITIES
REPORT 26 (2021), https://www.nerc.com/comm/RISC/Documents/RISC%20ERO%20Priorities
%20Report_Final_RISC_Approved_July_8_2021_Board_Submitted_Copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7MUX-QEX5] (listing “extreme events” as a priority reliability risk to address in 2021).
184 See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POLAR VORTEX REVIEW, at iii, 2 (2014)
(noting widespread generation outages due to cold weather but very little loss of power to customers due to effective management of the grid). Notable exceptions are historic cold weather
events. These include, for example, Texas in February 2021, when blackouts—triggered primarily
by fuel supply disruptions for natural gas and the lack of winterization of all forms of power
plants—caused deaths and major economic damage. See THE PERRYMAN GRP., PRELIMINARY
ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE FEBRUARY 2021 TEXAS WINTER STORM 1 (2021);
Power Struggle: Examining the 2021 Texas Grid Failure: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 117th Cong. 3–4, 30–31,
40–41 (2021) [hereinafter Power Struggle: Examining the 2021 Texas Grid Failure Hearing]. A
similar cold snap that enveloped the Southwest and Texas in 2011 affected millions of power
customers. FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., REPORT ON OUTAGES AND CURTAILMENTS DURING THE SOUTHWEST COLD WEATHER EVENT OF FEBRUARY 1–5, 2011, at 1 (2011),
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/08-16-11-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU3ZWJVZ].
185 MISO, MISO 2013–2014 WINTER ASSESSMENT REPORT: INFORMATION DELIVERY AND
MARKET ANALYSIS 3 (2014), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2014%20Winter%20Assessment%20Re
port103560.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFT5-NNW7].
186 Id.
187 Id. at 4.
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limited in the amount of gas that they could receive due to frozen
equipment at gas wells.188 Despite these challenges, customers did not
experience widespread electricity outages.189
MISO has subsequently taken steps to prepare for future cold
snaps. In 2019, when the MISO region experienced even colder temperatures than in 2014, the demand reduction measures that MISO
had implemented helped to mitigate stress on the grid during “[p]eak
electricity loads.”190 That said, during the extreme cold weather event
in 2021, MISO and SPP, like ERCOT, had to force rolling blackouts
(short term power outages) in small portions of their footprints that
experienced the same temperatures as Texas in 2021.191 MISO’s and
SPP’s blackouts were not as extensive or long, however.192 While the
2021 episode demonstrates that no electric grid can be perfectly reliable in every circumstance, the proactive steps that RTOs have taken to
enhance the reliability of their grids suggest that these such unreliable
circumstances may continue to be somewhat rare.
RTOs in the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions—ISO New
England and PJM, respectively—have also implemented measures to
prepare for future events and have successfully navigated several extremely cold periods.193 Additionally, FERC has approved several
Id. at 16.
See id. at 3 (noting that MISO was “able to reliably manage the power grid” and only
limited curtailments of power exports during the extreme cold).
190 April Lee, Extreme Cold in the Midwest Led to High Power Demand and Record Natural Gas Demand, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38472 [https://perma.cc/BWV3-DBGB] (noting MISO’s “deployment of load-modifying resources”).
191 OFF. OF CYBERSECURITY, ENERGY SEC., & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EXTREME COLD & WINTER WEATHER UPDATE #1, at 1 (2021), https://www.energy.gov/
sites/prod/files/2021/02/f82/TLPWHITE_DOE%20Situation%20Update_Cold%20%20Winter%20Weather_%231.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3M6F-86FZ] (noting that ERCOT, MISO, and SPP “have implemented controlled
power outages across portions of their systems to manage load”).
192 See SW. POWER POOL, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SOUTHWEST POWER POOL’S RESPONSE TO THE FEBRUARY 2021 WINTER STORM: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2021)
(describing directions to reduce energy consumption “by about 1.5% for 50 minutes Feb. 15 and
again to lessen [regional energy consumption] by about 6.5% for a little more than three hours
Feb. 16”); MISO, THE FEBRUARY ARCTIC EVENT, FEBRUARY 14–18, 2021: EVENT DETAILS,
LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MISO’S RELIABILITY IMPERATIVE 5–6 (2021), https:/
/cdn.misoenergy.org/2021%20Arctic%20Event%20Report554429.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8VRGPAF] (describing forced load reductions that lasted just several hours, for the most part, although one instance in Eastern Texas spanned a day).
193 See, e.g., Andrew Gillespie, ISO New England, Winter Reliability Program Updated:
Restructuring Roundtable (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/
09/final_gillespie_raab_sept2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/V98D-3WRL]; PJM INTERCONNECTION,
PJM’S EVOLVING RESOURCE MIX AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY (2017), https://www.pjm.com/~/me188
189
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ISOs’ proposed changes to their capacity markets—markets for generation available in the future—to more closely address “fuel assurance,” which ensures that electricity generators will actually have the
fuel necessary to run during periods of peak demand, including cold
snaps when some types of fuel are in short supply.194 As an example of
capacity market changes to enhance reliability during cold periods,
FERC approved ISO New England’s “pay for performance” capacity
market modification, “paying capacity resources more when they deliver energy or reserves during reserve shortages and penalizing capacity resources that fail to perform during such events.”195 FERC
also required ISO New England’s ancillary services market—the market for instantaneous services provided to the grid for reliability purposes—to have higher penalties for resources that fail to provide
backup generation reserves during energy shortages.196 FERC also
“clarified” an ISO New England tariff to confirm that generators providing capacity “may not take ‘economic’ outages, including outages
based on economic decisions not to procure fuel or fuel
transportation.”197
Contrast these requirements with those in Texas in 2021, when
ERCOT, the RTO that governs the grid throughout most of the state,
forced massive “load shedding”—i.e., outages caused by the grid operator—in order to avoid a catastrophic system failure. Unlike other
RTOs, ERCOT is not governed by FERC.198 During the February
2021 freeze, ERCOT cut off power to customers for limited periods—
with outages lasting up to three days—to avoid more widespread

dia/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170330-pjms-evolving-resource-mix-and-system-reliability.ashx [https://perma.cc/XRF4-DR9D] (noting PJM’s, ISO-NE’s, and MISO’s steps taken
after the 2014 Polar Vortex to improve preparedness for cold weather events).
194 See Centralized Capacity Markets in Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 149 FERC ¶ 61,145, at 1, 5 (Nov. 20, 2014) (preliminary).
195 Id. at 5.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 ERCOT, FERC (July 13, 2020), https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/electric/electricpower-markets/ercot [https://perma.cc/32NZ-HEQL].
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blackouts.199 Millions of Texans were cold and without power, and
freezing pipes in buildings caused lasting damage.200
It appears that in the ERCOT footprint, with just one state pressuring innovation from the bottom-up and no formal FERC oversight,201 ERCOT did not do as much as other RTOs in preparing for
weather extremes, as exemplified by its lack of measures such as fuel
assurance penalties.202 This is not to say, however, that FERC oversight caused uniformly better RTO performance. Indeed, after the
major Southern cold snap in 2011—in which ERCOT forced rolling
blackouts for 3.2 million customers—FERC and NERC issued a report advising, among other measures, that Texas and other states in
the Southwest consider requiring that power plants adopt winterization plans and accurate reporting of the temperatures at which generating units and associated equipment could operate.203 The Texas
Legislature required power plants to report on weatherization efforts
and allowed the Public Utility Commission of Texas to make “recommendations” for improvements, but did not issue substantive mandates.204 Neighboring RTOs that operate under FERC jurisdiction,
199 Power Struggle: Examining the 2021 Texas Grid Failure Hearing, supra note 184, at 28
(statement of Bill Magness, President and CEO, ERCOT); id. at 27–28 (noting “load shed[s]”
beginning on February 15 and reductions in some load sheds beginning on February 17); Russell
Gold, Why Is Texas Experiencing Power Outages?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2021, 12:31 PM), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/texas-weather-power-outage-11613425923 [https://perma.cc/3ZT9AXAB] (describing “three straight days of widespread blackouts” in Texas).

R

200 Power Struggle: Examining the 2021 Texas Grid Failure Hearing, supra note 184, at 4
(statement of Rep. Diana DeGette, Chairperson, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
201 See Bill Magness, Review of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event—ERCOT
Presentation 3 (Feb. 24, 2021) (“The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) has complete
authority over ERCOT’s finances, budget and operations, with oversight by the Texas
Legislature.”).
202 Compare id. at 21 (listing the measures that ERCOT took after the 2011 Texas cold
snap), with PJM INTERCONNECTION, STRENGTHENING RELIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY
PERFORMANCES 1–2 (2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/capacity-performance/20180620-capacity-performance-analysis.ashx [https://perma.cc/R2RR-EVJX] (noting
the success of the Capacity Performance incentives instituted after the 2014 Polar Vortex event
in improving “overall generator performance” during instances of grid stress); SW. POWER POOL,
supra note 192, at 93–97 (documenting measures taken by SPP following the 2011 cold snap,
including, for example, specific power plant “testing requirements” with “seasonal parameters”).
203 FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 184.
204 S. 1133, 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011), https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/82R/billtext/html/
SB01133F.htm [https://perma.cc/BZ7M-QADC]; see James Osborne & Eric Dexheimer, Texas
Grid Fails to Weatherize, Repeats Mistake Feds Cited 10 Years Ago, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 17,
2021, 2:25PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Texas-grid-againfaces-scrutiny-over-cold-15955392.php [https://perma.cc/7Q3T-XCZ5] (noting the 2011 weatherization plan reporting requirement). While power plant owners submit their weatherization
plans to the Texas Public Utility Commission, ERCOT’s ability to confirm whether any power

R
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although taking a variety of measures to address cold weather conditions, also failed to mandate plant winterization and rather issued
guidelines providing how plants “should” winterize.205
Beyond the lack of power plant winterization mandates, during
the 2021 Texas crisis some generators initially failed to provide power
because the prices were not high enough to incentivize them to do so;
they lacked the “economic outage” prohibitions such as those spurred
by FERC in ISO-NE.206 It is unclear, however, whether such prohibitions would have made much of a difference when there was simply
too little natural gas available.207 Perhaps more importantly, unlike
RTOs regulated by FERC, Texas lacks capacity markets that ensure
adequate generation reserves for periods of high demand, including
cold snaps.208 In this case, a capacity market likely would have spurred
the construction of more reserves, but still not enough to cover demand during the cold snap. Approximately half of all available generating plants in Texas were not operational during the peak of the
crisis, and demand—i.e., load—would have exceeded available generation by approximately fifty percent but for ERCOT having forced
plant within its territory is limited. See Magness, supra note 201, at 17 (“While [ERCOT] request[s] and review[s] detailed plant records, the only entity that can confirm that a plant is
‘weatherized’ to any particular standard is the entity that owns or operates the plant.”).

R

205 MISO, MISO WINTERIZATION GUIDELINES (2018), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/
4.%202018%20MISO%20Winterization%20Guidelines287888.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KRKDN2D]; cf. Final Report on February 2021 Freeze Underscores Winterization Recommendations,
FERC (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/final-report-february-2021freeze-underscores-winterization-recommendations [https://perma.cc/5DSB-W8Y4]
(“[P]rotecting just four types of power plant components from icing and freezing could have
reduced outages by 67 percent in the ERCOT region, 47 percent in the Southwest Power Pool
(SPP) and 55 percent in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator South (MISO)
regions.”).
206 See supra text accompanying note 197; Sechler, supra note 15 (noting testimony from
ERCOT’s CEO that some generators in Texas initially did not run because prices were artificially low due to problems with ERCOT’s pricing system, but also noting that many generators
could not have run even if they wished because the cold weather had incapacitated many power
plants).
207

ENERGY INST., THE UNIV.

OF

TEX.

AT

AUSTIN, supra note 24, at 9.

See Stephanie Kelly, Tim McLaughlin & Swati Verma, Explainer: Texas’s One-of-aKind Power System Raises Questions During Price Spike, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2021, 4:43 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-weather-power-prices-explainer/explainer-texass-one-of-a
-kind-power-system-raises-questions-during-price-spike-idUSKBN2AG2KD [https://perma.cc/
ZF7H-YJVF] (noting that “ERCOT does not have a capacity market . . . to handle events like” a
cold snap); THOMAS JENKIN, PHILIPP BEITER & ROBERT MARGOLIS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, CAPACITY PAYMENTS IN RESTRUCTURED MARKETS UNDER LOW AND HIGH PENETRATION LEVELS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 4 (2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/
65491.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWY8-JWG3] (summarizing RTOs with capacity markets).
208

R
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blackouts.209 This load far exceeded typical backup reserves ensured
by other RTO markets, which tend to provide a “reserve margin” of
approximately fifteen percent more generation than forecasted peak
load.210 But Texas’ relative isolation of its grid, as compared to truly
regional RTOs, also meant that there were fewer reserves to draw
upon in other parts of the country.211 Indeed, portions of neighboring
RTOs that also experienced extreme cold fared better largely because
they were able to import electricity from other parts of their regions
and from other regions.212
The outages in Texas resulted from numerous factors beyond
pricing and the lack of capacity markets and reserves—electricity failures that incapacitated natural gas compressors and pumps at natural
gas storage sites, a failure of natural gas compressors to be designated
as critical resources that should receive power even during outages,
and frozen equipment and materials at natural gas well sites, to name
just a few.213 ERCOT’s and the state public utility commission’s management of generators prior to the crisis, however, such as failure to
directly mandate weatherization of plants, also played an important
role.
In summary, there are some weather events that are likely to
cause outages in even the most well-planned and well-run grids. But in
contrast with ERCOT, FERC-regulated RTOs’ relative resilience despite the extreme events of 2021 and earlier years highlight the importance of top-down FERC action and organic, reliability-enhancing
measures voluntarily implemented by RTOs such as MISO, ISO New
209 Magness, supra note 201, at 10 (“Approximately 48.6% of generation was forced out at
the highest point due to the impacts of various extreme weather conditions.”). See id. at 15 (at its
peak, showing nearly 50,000 megawatts of available generation and more than 75,000 megawatts
of load if load had not been shed).

R

210 See, e.g., PJM, 2019 PJM RESERVE REQUIREMENT STUDY 8 (2019), https://
www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/subcommittees/raas/20191008/20191008-pjm-reserverequirement-study-draft-2019.ashx [https://perma.cc/UAD3-NQW4] (recommending reserve
margins between fourteen and fifteen percent over four consecutive “Delivery Year[s]”); M-1
Reserve Margin, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ri/Pages/
PlanningReserveMargin.aspx [https://perma.cc/82B4-DNKL] (“[R]eserve margin is the difference between available capacity and peak demand . . . .”).

See Power Struggle: Examining the 2021 Texas Grid Failure Hearing, supra note 184, at

R

212 MISO, supra note 192, at 23 (noting intra- and interregional transfers of power to address the deficit caused by the cold); SW. POWER POOL, supra note 192, at 9 (noting significant
reliance on imports during the cold snap).

R
R

See Power Struggle: Examining the 2021 Texas Grid Failure Hearing, supra note 184, at

R

211

58–59.

213

38, 104.
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England, and SPP.214 Policy innovation does occur within regional cooperative federalist regimes—in some cases more than in traditional
federalist or cooperative federalist regimes—in part due to the combination of top-down and bottom up pressures to improve policy.
2. Enhancing “Real” Policy Experiments
The assumption that federalist regimes will produce innovation is
closely intertwined with the pervasive belief that such regimes encourage experimentation by subfederal actors. A central flaw of the
“organic” experimentation that judges and scholars tend to assume
will naturally flow from federalism is its haphazard nature. If the federal government simply sets a policy mandate and tells states to experiment, with few or no guidelines, the result will be a flurry of loose
activity that lacks most attributes of a true policy experiment.215 States
are unlikely to overcome coordination barriers to produce a hypothesis to test, a scenario with a control, carefully selected digressions from
the control, a uniform method of collecting and reporting results, and
mechanisms for repeating experiments and testing results.216 Indeed,
even the most basic aspects of experimentation, such as data collection and reporting, are unlikely to arise from the experimentation that
may occur under pure federalism.217 State policy officials might trumpet positive results but carefully hide negative ones, and even the positive results are likely to be reported using different metrics of
success.218
Regional cooperative federalism, if designed properly, can create
a policy experiment that more closely resembles a real experiment.
The federal government potentially could, for example, require or at
least strongly incentivize different regional entities to take different
approaches and compare the success of these approaches.219 The fed214 Top-down reliability standards from NERC has also helped, although NERC has not
yet mandated winterization. See Alexandra Klass, Joshua Macey, Shelley Welton & Hannah
Wiseman, Grid Reliability Through Clean Energy, 74 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 52), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900194 [https://perma.cc/2GQD-QXKU].
215 Wiseman & Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, supra note 11, at 1141–42.
216 For these and other design features of “true” policy experiments, see, for example, Dorf
& Sabel, supra note 125, at 340–56 (describing the roles of Congress and administrative agencies
in facilitating and organizing policy experimentation), and Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres &
Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 945–46 (2011) (noting the benefits that
follow “when governmental institutions have sponsored . . . research by supporting the
randomization of policy”).
217 See Wiseman, supra note 119, at 1722–23.
218 See Galle & Leahy, supra note 18, at 1354.
219 Wiseman & Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, supra note 11, at 1184–85.

R
R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 47

17-FEB-22

12:31

REG’L COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM & U.S. ELECTRIC GRID

193

eral government has not gone this far in the transmission policy context. Nor has it established a hypothesis or a “control” policy. But in
encouraging innovative ratemaking to spur transmission line owners
to join RTOs, FERC has created somewhat of a structured experiment. For example, in its order encouraging the formation of RTOs
and promoting innovative ratemaking practices to spur more transmission owners to form or join RTOs, the agency developed a menu of
acceptable ratemaking practices designed to allow flexibility and encourage experimentation within parameters that will—the agency believes—prevent unreasonable rates.220 RTOs proposing to implement
these practices had to explain to FERC how and why the practices
would likely meet the policy goals at which FERC aims, including, for
example, “efficient use of and investment in the transmission system”
and rate impacts that fare well under a cost benefit analysis,221 among
others.
In addition to spurring innovation within a more clearly defined
experiment, FERC also requires the sharing of RTOs’ “experimental”
results. For example, under FERC Order Nos. 890 and 1000 for regional transmission planning, RTOs and all other utilities required to
conduct regional transmission planning must make their transmission
planning processes transparent and include progress reports from
transmission operators.222
3. Avoiding the Externalities of Uncoordinated Experimentation
Beyond producing something closer to a real experiment—and a
more coordinated one—regional cooperative federalism also avoids
many of the externalities that result from more decentralized experimentation. It achieves this result by grouping together local governments and states and creating a policy formation process that
overarches state and local lines.
When introducing the “laboratory of the states” concept in the
1930s, Justice Brandeis observed that states could “try novel social
See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 915–27 (Jan. 6, 2000).
Id. at 913.
222 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,907–08 (Aug. 11, 2011) (requiring “identification and
joint evaluation of interregional transmission facilities” and that transmission providers in neighboring planning regions, in their FERC compliance filings, describe “the type[s] of transmission
studies that will be conducted” in identifying the potential efficiencies or cost benefits of “interregional transmission facilities”); id. at 49,908 (describing FERC Order No. 890’s additional requirement that transmission providers report on progress toward transmission upgrades planned
within the regional planning process).
220
221
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and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”223
But a great deal of state policy experimentation can generate externalities that flow beyond state borders. This is the case even with pure
cooperative federalism, in which the federal government sets a national policy goal and gives states leeway in trying to achieve it. For
example, despite federal standards requiring relatively similar state
controls on large air pollution sources, there is a substantial problem
with air pollution traveling across state lines and causing violations of
air quality standards in downwind states.224
The MISO MVP process for electric transmission planning once
again provides a helpful example of how regional cooperative federalism can avoid some of the externalities of less coordinated state experimentation. Within MISO, all states, with the exception of Kentucky,
have renewable generation requirements,225 and newly built renewable generation typically requires thousands of miles of new, unsightly
transmission lines that fragment wildlife habitat and disrupt landscapes.226 These lines often cross through states in which the residents
strongly object to hosting the lines.227 Furthermore, many residents
object to the generation infrastructure itself, arguing that wind farms
are unsightly, loud, destructive of wildlife, and dangerous if improperly decommissioned.228
Regional planning for the location of new generation to meet
multiple states’ policy requirements can lead to generation infrastructure to be located in the most productive areas—those with the most
223

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

For ongoing problems with interstate transfers of air pollution, see, for example, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, New Jersey v. Wheeler, No. 1:19-cv-03247, (D.D.C.
Oct. 29, 2019), 2019 WL 5595247, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-10/documents/
newjersey_1.19cv3247_complaint_10292019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E9Q-6S4K] (showing continued litigation by states affected by upwind states’ air pollutant emissions, with the affected suing
for EPA regulatory action against nearby polluting states).
224

225 MISO, supra note 161, at 3, 10 (showing the states within MISO’s footprint that have
renewable energy mandates and clean energy goals).

R

226 See, e.g., MANITOBA HYDRO, FURS, FEATHERS, FINS & TRANSMISSION LINES: HOW
TRANSMISSION LINES AND RIGHTS-OF-WAY AFFECT WILDLIFE 47–48 (3d ed. 2010) (describing
the habitat and landscape effects of transmission lines).
227 See Klass & Rossi, supra note 134, at 440–41 (describing state opposition to interstate
lines needed to support renewable energy development); Klass & Wilson, supra note 88, at
1803–04; MISO, supra note 161, at 3.
228 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON BLM-ADMINISTERED
LANDS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 5-20 to -27 (2005) (documenting the noise impacts of
wind generation infrastructure and noting complaints of nearby residents); id. at 5-53 to -75
(impacts on wildlife); id. at 5-90 to -95 (visual impacts); id. at 5-77 (decommissioning impacts).
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sun and wind, for example—and can result in the construction of less
generation infrastructure and fewer transmission lines, avoiding an
overlapping, duplicative web of wires.
The MISO MVP process avoided the construction of unneeded
wind farms and wires—which can create substantial cross-state externalities—by regionalizing the planning process and identifying transmission routes that individual states might not have considered.229
Planning by individual clusters of states could have resulted in duplicative, needlessly costly infrastructure, with the costs shouldered by
the utilities using the wires in those states. Further, the process reduced “reserve margin” requirements, which are requirements for
utilities to have adequate backup generation in the event of an emergency or a sudden spike in demand.230 When utilities have access to
generation throughout a region—generation that is connected to these
utilities by transmission lines—they can more easily share reserves
and avoid having to build their own. MISO estimates that the lower
reserve margin planning as a result of the MVP process produced $1
to $5.1 billion in savings.231
In sum, regional approaches, by coordinating the process of planning for innovative policy, avoid the many spillovers that can arise
from state-by-state planning—overlapping, duplicative, or conflicting
policies that spur the construction of too much generation and
transmission.
C. Efficient Governance
In addition to innovation and experimentation, one of the most
commonly cited attributes of federalism is that devolving authority to
governmental units situated below the federal level enhances the efficiency of governance.232 Efficiency, as used in this context, refers to
the ability of a government to provide services at the level and price
demanded by constituents, thus avoiding a situation of too much governance at too high a cost, or too few services and too low of an associated tax burden.233 Additionally, the cost of providing a given unit of
229 See, e.g., MISO, supra note 161, at 10 (noting avoidance of overbuilding of wires as a
result of regional planning).
230 Id. at 57.
231 Id.
232 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 614 (2007); Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND
EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 65 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
233 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
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governance—government “overhead,” in other words—can be lower
or higher depending on whether governments are more or less centralized.234 This latter form of efficiency is typically referred to as administrative efficiency.235
1. Diverse Governance Packages for Footvoters
Federalism can create efficiencies by diversifying policies and
thus providing a greater range of policy options for constituents to
choose from. Economics and political science literatures have tended
to focus on state and local governments providing this diversity, but as
explored here, regional institutions can offer an even broader array of
policy options that more effectively address distinctive local and regional needs.
As Charles Tiebout famously observed in the 1950s, it is difficult
for governments to accurately assess individuals’ preferences for
goods and services and the taxes needed to pay for these goods and
services.236 But when subfederal governments offer different levels of
services and taxes, individuals reveal their preferences through “footvoting”—by moving to the jurisdiction that best matches their
preferences.237
In many cases, full devolution of governance authority—say, to
the local level—might be the most efficient approach in terms of providing an adequate diversity of governance packages and costs to
match individual preferences. This may be the case for land use regulation, for example. People have strong and highly divergent preferences for the type of place they live at, in terms of how urban or rural
it feels, what neighbors may or may not do with their property, and
417 (1956) (describing “the government’s revenue-expenditure pattern for goods and services”
and explaining that “[t]he consumer is, in a sense, surrounded by a government whose objective
it is to ascertain his wants for public goods and tax him accordingly”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (praising federalism for “assur[ing] a decentralized government that will be
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society” and for “mak[ing] government
more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”).
234 Past efforts to encourage or discourage the regionalization of federal agencies have explored this form of efficiency. See, e.g., Blank & Rozen-Zvi, supra note 13, at 1940 (noting assumptions under the Clinton Administration that regional federal administration was less
efficient than a centralized approach due to potentially redundant actions by different regional
offices of a federal agency).
235 See, e.g., id. at 1983 (describing an agency head’s rejection of regional implementation
of a federal statute on the grounds of “administrative efficiency” (quoting Drummond Coal Co.
v. Hodel, 610 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d, 796 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir 1986))).
236 See Tiebout, supra note 233, at 417 (noting the difficulty of forcing consumer-voters to
“reveal their true preferences for public goods”).
237 Id. at 418.
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the extent to which property values stay low or high.238 Footvoting
principles also apply in the regional context, however, as explored
here.
a. Regional Footvoting
Tiebout developed the footvoting hypothesis in the local government context, but in many cases, regional differentiation of policy is
the superior means of offering diverse governance packages while also
ensuring that governance is effective. Indeed, regional grid governance has enhanced policy diversity in the electricity context—often
beyond the diversity offered by the few states that have restructured
their electricity markets. Regional planning for the construction and
financing of new wires provides the backbone for more types of generation resources.239 RTOs also offer competitive markets—designed
and governed somewhat differently within each RTO—that are unavailable in states with traditionally regulated markets.240 This leads to
the interesting scenario of some electricity customers living in traditionally regulated states with respect to retail electricity, where generation, transmission, and distribution are still treated as natural
monopolies,241 and also within competitive wholesale markets for
electricity.242
This diversity of policy approaches within RTOs allows footvoting
by individual electricity consumers—in the unlikely event that they
care enough to move solely on the basis electricity policy. But more
importantly, generators, transmission line owners, other members of
the electricity industry, and even states can engage to some degree in
the footvoting game.
An interesting, somewhat unique aspect of footvoting in the RTO
context, as highlighted by the example of electricity consumers in traditionally regulated states embedded within regional competitive
wholesale markets, is that it offers opportunities for policy shopping
238 See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 3 (2009) (noting homebuyer
concerns about “neighborhood ambience and community composition”—values that extend beyond the home itself).
239 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 812–17 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(describing the progress toward competition and diversity of generation enabled by RTOs and
the need for further progress).
240 See Electric Power Markets, supra note 82 (describing the variety of markets offered by
RTOs and traditional vertically integrated utilities in non-RTO areas).
241 See Joshua C. Macey, Zombie Energy Laws, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1087 (2020).
242 See Electric Power Markets, supra note 82 (describing the footprints of the RTOs and
ISOs and their coverage of traditionally regulated states).
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without exit.243 And this shopping is different from mere “voice”; it
involves importing a desired policy regime to one’s doorstep. This is
quite important because one notable constraint within Tiebout’s footvoting model was its assumption of perfect mobility,244 which many
Americans lack. It is difficult to move in order to seek out certain
policies, particularly because policies are “lumpy,” and one must accept the good with the bad when moving to a new jurisdiction.245 Furthermore, many individuals are constrained by ties to family or jobs,
or simply lack the financial resources to move in search of a rosier
package of goods and services.
In the RTO context, some utilities can avoid these footvoting
constraints altogether because they can join RTOs without moving.
Provided the utility is within the geographic territory of the RTO,
when the utility voluntarily joins the RTO, the RTO can fold the utility into its markets and practices without the utility having to move an
inch.246 RTOs can also expand their territories to cover new utilities
that wish to join, as MISO has done several times, thus bringing the
government to those who want it.247 The ability of utilities outside
RTO regions to join RTOs led consumers in traditionally regulated
states like South Carolina—which recently experienced billions of
dollars in ratepayer losses for a failed nuclear power project—to de243 See U.S. Electricity Grid & Markets, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://19january2021snapshot.epa.gov/greenpower/us-electricity-grid-markets_.html [https://perma.cc/QLQ8KRGE] (showing that RTOs such as MISO, which have competitive wholesale electricity markets, cover many states that do not have competitive retail electricity).
244 See Tiebout, supra note 233, at 419 (noting the assumption that “[c]onsumer-voters are
fully mobile and will move to that community where their preference patterns . . . are best
satisfied”).
245 See, e.g., Daniel E. Walters, Lumpy Social Goods in Energy Decarbonization: Why We
Need More Than Just Markets for the Clean Energy Transition, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(focusing on a the lumpiness of energy infrastructure, such as the simultaneous need for new
renewable generation and transmission lines to support that generation, and the importance of
coordinated policies in this area); FENNELL, supra note 238, at 12, 72 (describing the numerous,
often conflicting preferences of homeowners within a neighborhood, which are lumped together
due to the proximity of homes within a physical community).
246 See, e.g., Market Participation, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/markets-and-operations/market-participation/#t=10&p=0&s=fileName&sd=asc [https://perma.cc/B6R6-XK5C]
(showing how utilities in the MISO footprint can apply to participate in MISO’s energy market).
247 See, e.g., Navigating MISO, SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT, https://sustainableferc.org/
navigating-miso/ [https://perma.cc/TXR6-2JF8] (“MISO expanded significantly into the middle
South in 2013, with the addition of the Entergy utilities and other electricity companies in parts
of Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.”); see also SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT, UNDERSTANDING ENERGY: PJM EXPLAINED 2, https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/mediauploads/pjm_explainer_-_sustainableferc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KH7-GEY7] (“One by one, utilities opted into PJM’s territory to take advantage of competitive energy markets.”).
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mand admission to an RTO, despite the state not bordering any RTO
region.248 Indeed, even utilities not directly contiguous to existing
RTO regions can join certain RTO markets, such as the markets for
certain energy services offered by SPP and California’s RTO.249 And
states can require their utilities to join an RTO—indeed, some have.250
There are some limits to RTO expansion. RTOs must have some
physical regionalism, meaning they cannot have too many spot territories that are separated from the primary RTO area.251 But some RTOs
increasingly look like a gerrymandered political map, thus demonstrating the RTOs’ flexibility in terms of folding in new utilities that
wish to benefit from competitive markets and access more wires.252
In the other direction, some states are so upset by RTO policies—
which they view as impeding essential progress toward renewables,
particularly in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast—that they have
threatened to exit.253 Indeed, utilities have in some cases exited RTOs
over objections to policies, such as some of MISO’s ambitious trans248 See, e.g., Kristi E. Swartz, Talk of Forming Grid Operator Erupts in Regulated Carolinas, ENERGYWIRE (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060208513 [https://perma.cc/
A24H-WPRK] (describing discussions for the formation of a regional grid authority in the Carolinas); Mengqi Sun, The $4.7 Billion Nuclear Bill That No One Wants to Pay, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-4-7-billion-nuclear-bill-that-no-one-wants-to-pay1535194801 [https://perma.cc/8KA2-HRFQ] (describing the economic damage from the failed
plants).
249 Western Energy Imbalance Service Market, SW. POWER POOL, https://spp.org/weis
[https://perma.cc/WYK6-3JJ2] (“SPP will administer the WEIS on a contract basis beginning
February 2021. Utilities do not have to be a member of the SPP regional transmission organization (RTO) to participate.”); About, W. ENERGY IMBALANCE MKT., https://
www.westerneim.com/Pages/About/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8DNQ-HJ4L] (showing active
participants and planned entrants not contiguous with the California ISO’s (“CAISO”)
territory).
250 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 815 (Jan. 6, 2000) (describing several states’ requirements for utilities to join FERC-approved ISOs and RTOs); Jason
Plautz, Nevada Passes Clean Energy Bill Requiring State to Join RTO, Accelerating $2B Transmission Project, UTIL. DIVE (June 2, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nevada-passesclean-energy-bill-requiring-state-to-join-rto-accelerating/601106/ [https://perma.cc/KS6C-855Z]
(describing a new Nevada requirement for utilities to join RTOs).
251 The specific FERC requirement for approving an RTO is that the RTO region be “of
appropriate scope and configuration.” Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810,
860 (Jan. 6, 2000). While FERC leaves the responsibility of proposing initial boundaries to the
parties seeking to form or join an RTO, Order No. 2000 counsels that “an appropriate region is
one of sufficient scope and configuration to permit the RTO to effectively perform its required
functions and to support efficient and nondiscriminatory power markets.” Id. at 860–61.
252 See About, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/F7A3-URAS]
(showing the ISO’s territory, which covers a broad swath of states and partial areas of states).
253

See Welton, supra note 20, at 258–59.
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mission plans and proposals to equally allocate costs among all utilities to pay for that transmission.254
In summary, RTOs offer somewhat unique opportunities for the
real types of footvoting envisioned by Tiebout, at least for utilities,
because there are real entry and exit options. RTOs even compete for
utility “customers” through policy packages. For example, SPP and
the California ISO (“CAISO”) both offer submarkets—i.e., “energy
imbalance markets”—for nonmember utilities that need extra electricity during periods of peak demand and would benefit from a competitive market for such energy.255 But the policy diversity spurred by
footvoter shopping in the RTO context is not an inherent feature of all
forms of regional cooperative federalism. It is the design of RTOs, in
particular, that allows it. The regional jurisdiction of the organization
must be somewhat malleable, as it is with RTOs, for this type of meaningful footvoting to occur, and for maximum policy diversity to arise—
and hence afford efficiency for constituents.
b. Federal Control and Varied Regional Governance Models
Adding layers of governance to a particular policy area can further improve the diversity of policies—and hence opportunities for
footvoting. In the context of regional cooperative federalism, regional
entities govern a policy area under the direction of the federal government. Adding federal control to regional governance does not necessarily enhance the diversity of regional approaches, but it can. This is
perhaps the case in the RTO context, where FERC both explicitly requires and encourages innovation and allows entities to select from a
menu of innovative approaches to planning and fees for electricity
transmission.256 Furthermore, when constituents of regional organizations are dissatisfied with the policy options available to them, they
can—and often do in the RTO context—complain to the federal
agency. In the context of RTOs, members regularly sue FERC for approving or disapproving a particular RTO tariff (“policy”) element,
and it is not uncommon for them to prevail.257 The threat of federal
intervention enhances constituents’ voice, potentially producing a
more meaningful diversity of policy approaches.
See Klass et al., supra note 214, at 41.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
256 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., infra note 329 and accompanying text (describing states’ successful lawsuits
against FERC for approving PJM’s equal allocation of costs for new transmission line to all
utilities).
254
255
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Yet another element that enhances the diversity of policies—and
thus the likelihood that policies will better match constituents’ preferences—is that the federal entity overseeing regional cooperative governance can require or encourage different policy approaches in
different regions. In the case of RTOs, FERC produced a diversity of
policies inadvertently—and even unwillingly. FERC likely would have
preferred to mandate RTOs throughout the United States, but, recognizing political resistance to this approach among some states, the
agency instead opted to spur regional diversity in grid governance by
strongly encouraging the formation of RTOs, rather than requiring
their formation.258 Some parts of the country still follow very traditional, state-centric governance of utilities and the transmission lines
that they build, eschewing regional markets.259 Other parts of the
United States are within the territories of innovative RTOs that have
pushed for aggressive new regional grid policies to support renewable
energy.260 Still others fall within regions that have taken a middle
ground, relying upon integrated grid governing entities to regionalize
some grid functions, but avoiding the formalization of regional governance through an RTO.261
The Western Interconnection provides a useful example of this
middle ground approach. The Western Interconnection covers an expansive territory encompassing the West Coast and much of the
Rocky Mountain region and Southwest, including territory in Canada
and parts of Mexico.262 In the Western Interconnection, utilities coor258 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,549–50 (May 10, 1996) (noting FERC’s policy of
“encouraging the development” of Regional Transmission Groups, a predecessor of RTOs, to
facilitate heightened access and competition in transmission markets); Regional Transmission
Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 831–34 (Jan. 6, 2000) (noting FERC’s policy of “strongly encourag[ing] transmission owners to participate voluntarily in RTOs,” but noting the considerations, including state resistance, that led FERC to conclude that “a voluntary approach to
participation in RTOs” was appropriate).
259 KATHRYNE CLEARY & KAREN PALMER, US ELECTRICITY MARKETS 101, at 1–3 (2020),
https://media.rff.org/documents/US_Electricity_Markets_101.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7SQ-5L8V]
(describing traditional regulated markets and showing the areas outside of RTOs). But see id. at
4 (noting that even some states with traditional regulated markets are members of an RTO, thus
combining state-centric decisions about the construction of new generation infrastructure with
regional, competitive markets for trading the electricity generated by that infrastructure).
260 See, e.g., supra notes 160–68, 174–77, and accompanying text (describing successful efforts by MISO and SPP to site and implement new networks of transmission lines, which accommodated the integration of new renewable electricity production resulting from state renewable
energy policies).
261 See infra notes 262–64 and accompanying text.
262 See The Western Interconnection, W. ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL, https://

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

202

unknown

Seq: 56

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

17-FEB-22

12:31

[Vol. 90:147

dinate a number of functions to make it easier for generators to send
electricity long distances over numerous utilities’ wires, and to reduce
the need for individual utilities to maintain separate backup generation reserves in emergencies.263 But utilities have so far opted out of
the formation of an RTO—albeit with an expectation that they will
eventually move to this more formal regional approach, or at least
something closer to it.264
The ability of utilities to both shop among RTOs and choose
whether or not to join an RTO, form a more loosely coordinated entity, or “go it alone” produces an added layer of policy diversity that
could better address constituents’ preferences. This is particularly true
as RTOs work to convince utilities in places like the Western Interconnection that (1) it is worth joining an RTO, and (2) it is worth
joining a particular RTO, such as CAISO or SPP. In this sense, regional cooperative federalism produces more of a diversity of policy
approach than pure federalism or cooperative federalism, in which
governed entities cannot opt out of state governance altogether, for
example. In the context of RTOs, governed entities can choose to rewww.wecc.org/epubs/StateOfTheInterconnection/Pages/The-Western-Interconnection.aspx
[https://perma.cc/H2ME-Q82B].
263 See Craig L. Williams, Presentation on the Overview of WECC System Operations 1,
220 (Apr. 22–23, 2015), https://www.wecc.org/Administrative/WECC-System-Overview-2-slidesper-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JQM-SB64] (noting reserve sharing groups through the Western
Electricity Coordinating Council); VARIABLE GENERATION SUBCOMM. MKTG. WORKGROUP, W.
ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL, ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND VARIABLE GENERATION INTE1, 12–13 (2011), https://www.wecc.org/Reliability/WECC%20Whitepaper%20GRATION
%20Electricity%20Markets%20and%20Variable%20Generation%20Integration.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J4BJ-NE2F] (noting a “two-year pilot program that eliminates transmission rate pancaking” for some transactions, thus easing the transmission of electricity over wires owned by
different utilities that would typically charge different rates for the use of the wires).
264 See, e.g., NEXT 10, A REGIONAL POWER MARKET FOR THE WEST: RISKS AND BENEFITS
1, 6 (2018) (noting the benefits of enhanced competition and reduced utility bills if the western
states were to form an RTO and estimating billions in savings to California utility customers if
California were to join it); Allen Best, Why Unification of the Western Electric Grid is Probably
Inevitable, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (July 24, 2018), https://energynews.us/2018/07/24/west/whyunification-of-the-western-electric-grid-is-probably-inevitable/ [https://perma.cc/BE5Z-XCTG]
(observing that “many regard a unification of the Western grid as inevitable,” but noting the
difficulties expected if the region were to attempt to create a full scale RTO). But see Michael
Brooks, Western RTO or Bust? Not So, Says Industry, RTO INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2018), https://
rtoinsider.com/mountain-west-western-power-issues-roundtable-western-rto-98017/ [https://
perma.cc/SV3R-MTWZ]. Several western utilities have chosen to join limited parts of RTOs.
This might be the model of the future, as these utilities are wary of giving up certain aspects of
their relative independence. See Robert Walton, Xcel, 3 Other Colorado Utilities Choose California’s Imbalance Market Over Southwest Power Pool, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 18, 2019) (noting how
four Colorado utility companies chose to join the Western Energy Imbalance Market, a submarket operated by CAISO).

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 57

17-FEB-22

12:31

REG’L COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM & U.S. ELECTRIC GRID

203

ject regional governance altogether, or opt for a looser regional governance form than RTOs.
2. Reducing the Overhead of Governance
Another form of government efficiency, beyond policies that provide constituents with the level of services that they demand at a cost
that they prefer, involves the actual cost of governing. Each “unit” of
governance provided—say, a government’s review and approval of a
proposal to interconnect with transmission lines—can be cheaper or
more expensive depending on how efficiently the government operates. Centralization of governance within a regional entity overseen
by the federal government can enhance this type of efficiency, albeit
with limitations.
Relying on numerous individual governments to perform one
function often involves needless duplication of effort, such as technical training of staff in multiple offices.265 The failure to centralize governance also requires hiring more staff and renting or owning more
offices and equipment than would be required in a more coordinated
regime.266 In view of these concerns, relying on regional cooperative
federalism to implement policy, as opposed to the states, enhances efficiency. Past critiques of regionalism in the context of federal agencies with regional offices have focused on redundancy and
inefficiency,267 yet the option of relying on states to implement federal
policy is even worse in this sense, as there are more states than regional federal offices.
Here, regional cooperative federalism can offer an important
compromise between excessive integration or diffusion of governance
responsibilities. In the electric grid context, regional entities acting
under federal supervision have relatively centralized physical offices;
one or two sets of complex computer technology required to schedule
the flow of electricity through the grid; one well-developed and frequently updated model for predicting the benefits and costs of various
grid configurations; and a well trained staff housed in one or just a few
locations, which builds up critical knowledge over time and passes this
265 Cf. Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 887–88 (2012)
(noting the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, allows federal agencies to “tap into each other’s
expertise and infrastructure without having to waste money building up their own duplicative
expertise and infrastructure”).
266 See, e.g., Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 13, at 1963 (noting the potential for “duplicate
costly overhead such as office space, machines, and purely administrative positions”).
267 See id. at 1962.
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knowledge directly to new staff hired into the same office.268 In this
sense, RTOs reduce the overhead costs of governance as compared to
individual utilities and states planning for and overseeing the electric
grid.
Despite these benefits, excessive integration through regionalism
can create a governance unit too distant from those who are governed.
The cost of identifying and addressing diverse needs throughout the
governed area can become high and can offset the efficiencies of
avoided duplicative training and hiring. Furthermore, a regional entity
can become so large that it is simply overloaded—struggling to address a range of diverse issues that arise within a massive territory.269
Indeed, this appears to be a challenge for some RTOs, such as PJM
and MISO, that span very distinct regions of the country.270
Regional governments sometimes do become too large and unwieldy to offer the benefits of administrative or service-based efficiency; after all, the larger the RTO, the less likely it is that the
policies that it sets within a FERC-approved tariff (policy) will respond to the cost and service-based demands of its diverse constituents. But these efficiency losses might be partially offset by innovation
gains: the sprawling RTOs that must meld highly divergent preferences of state and utility stakeholders might ultimately produce the
most innovative—and potentially feasible—policies.
D. Accountability
Beyond efficiency and innovation, another factor often cited in
favor of federalism is government accountability to constituents—the
extent to which a government includes stakeholders within governance processes and listens and responds to constituent input.271 The
268 See, e.g., Locations, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/about/contact-us/locations/
[https://perma.cc/X32D-38K9] (describing MISO’s—the largest RTO—three office locations for
an RTO that covers parts of fifteen states); MISO Model Manager, MISO, https://
www.misoenergy.org/markets-and-operations/MSE/miso-model-manager/
#t=10&p=0&s=Updated&sd=desc [https://perma.cc/5HB3-DPGG] (describing updates to
MISO’s computer modeling system).
269 See, e.g., SIMEONE, supra note 20, at 2 (“Policy setting over a large geographic region
presents challenges to regional markets, as states may have inconsistent or conflicting electricity
sector priorities.”).
270 See, e.g., Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 474–75 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing
the opposition of utilities located in Midwestern states to paying a uniform, pro rata share for
new transmission facilities rather than an individualized share based on benefits received from
those facilities because the bulk of the new infrastructure was to be built in the eastern portion
of the RTO).
271 See supra note 29 for accountability definitions.
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assumption is that smaller governments perform better beneath this
metric because representatives are more accessible and more closely
attuned to their constituents’ preferences. Furthermore, when decisionmakers elected by the people directly make decisions, they cannot
pass the blame for unpopular decisions to others.272 Regionalizing
governance, and adding a federal layer on top of this regionalism,
could exacerbate these concerns. But despite these accountability
problems, agglomeration of grid governance through RTOs also enhances accountability in some cases, as explored here.
1. Inclusiveness
The extent to which the entities affected by governance decisions
are included within the decision-making process is an important component of a government’s accountability to its members. RTOs are
more inclusive of stakeholders than are alternative grid-based decision-making processes—although this by no means suggests that they
are adequately inclusive. In areas without regional grid governance,
the utility that owns and operates transmission lines applies to FERC
for a tariff in which all of the utility’s rates and terms of service are set
out.273 Concerned constituents may only participate in this proceeding
by formally intervening in the FERC proceeding—a somewhat technical endeavor.274 And intervenors typically must travel to Washington,
D.C. if they wish to participate in a proceeding in person because
FERC’s few regional offices address only hydropower projects.275
272 With respect to federalism principles, the blame shifting concern tends to arise in the
anticommandeering context. See supra note 30. For critiques of the blame shifting account, see,
for example, Levinson, supra note 30, at 360 (noting commentator’s conclusion that the argument is “theoretically simplistic and empirically dubious”).
273 Cf. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088, 12,096–97 (Mar. 8, 2000)
(explaining that within RTOs, the RTO files a tariff representing all transmission owners within
its territories, but that transmission owners retain limited filing rights to ensure that the particular rates that they receive under the RTO tariff are fair).
274 See FERC Responds to Certified Questions on Standing: Retail Ratepayers Have the
Right to File Complaints with FERC Against Wholesale Sellers, FERC PRAC. & PROC. MANUAL
NEWSL., Jan. 2016, at 2 (noting that, in order to participate in a FERC proceeding, “retail ratepayers may file complaints and protest transmission rates . . . before the Commission” (quoting
FERC)); FERC Online, FERC (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/ferc-online/overview [https://
perma.cc/L2RS-B5TY] (noting that providing comments on FERC proceedings via “eComment” is limited to only certain proceedings and that an “eRegistration account” is required for
certain types of FERC filings, including motions to intervene); 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (describing
intervention procedures).
275 See Contact Us, FERC (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/contact-us [https://
perma.cc/HM7W-PTXA] (discussing how regional offices focus on hydropower projects). For
broader FERC policies that apply to all transmission operators, including those within RTOs,
stakeholders may comment on the proposed policies through typical notice-and-comment proce-

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

206

unknown

Seq: 60

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

17-FEB-22

12:31

[Vol. 90:147

In contrast with the relatively centralized and formal FERC process, stakeholders are included in RTO decision making by design.
RTOs contain several built-in features for participation by entities impacted by grid policy. First, RTOs have members, which typically can
include anyone who is an electricity customer within the RTO region
or a transmission line owner, provided such parties pay the initial and
then annual fees to become and maintain membership.276 Members
influence RTOs by voting on the composition of the board of directors
in addition to voting on substantive policies ultimately decided by the
board of directors.277 For those who do not meet the membership criteria or who cannot afford the sometimes steep cost of membership,
there are also participatory options as “stakeholders.”278
RTOs require the formation of stakeholder committees, which include specific “sectors” with different stakeholder groups.279 The extent of stakeholder inclusion varies among RTOs because RTOs
follow one of two primary decision-making structures, in which stakeholders directly vote on policies or merely advise the board of directors on policies.280 In the direct vote models, stakeholders must
approve and recommend a particular grid policy before the board of
directors may vote on it and send it to FERC for approval.281 Under
dures. See FERC Responds to Certified Questions on Standing: Retail Ratepayers Have the Right
to File Complaints with FERC Against Wholesale Sellers, supra note 274. However, FERC is in
the process of establishing an Office of Public Participation, which may improve some access by
stakeholders to FERC proceedings. See FERC, THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (2021),
https://www.ferc.gov/media/ferc-report-office-public-participation [https://perma.cc/B6W274FB].
276 See Guide to MISO Region Engagement, MISO, https://cdn.misoenergy.org//
Guide%20to%20MISO%20Region%20Engagement476181.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T38-SLQC]
(showing membership criteria).
277 Id. (showing members as voting on the composition of the MISO Board of Directors as
well as advisory committee matters and other stakeholder committee matters).
278 Id.
279 See, e.g., Kyungjin Yoo & Seth Blumsack, Can Capacity Markets Be Designed by Democracy?, 53 J. REGUL. ECON. 127, 130 (2018) (describing sectors and their membership).
280 See id. at 128 (explaining that some RTOs “develop policies and rule changes through a
process intended to be highly democratic” while others “seek stakeholder input, but final decisions on filings to FERC are made by the RTO staff and Boards”); MARK JAMES, KEVIN B.
JONES, ASHLEIGH H. KRICK & RIKAELA R. GREANE, R STREET, HOW THE RTO STAKEHOLDER
PROCESS AFFECTS MARKET EFFICIENCY 4 (2017), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/112.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PMB-T9SL] (also including a third governance model of
“governor-appointed boards”); PARENT ET AL., supra note 20, at 2-2 to 2-7 (explaining that
“CAISO employs a public, advisory-only stakeholder process that provides input to CAISO and
the CAISO Board” and describing similar advisory processes for RTOs such as ISO-NE).
281 Christina E. Simeone, Reforming FERC’s RTO/ISO Stakeholder Governance Principles,
34 ELEC. J. 1, 3 (2021) (“Proposed solutions must be majority vote-approved up through the
chain (if applicable) of lower-level committees then forwarded to the higher-
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the second model, stakeholder groups do vote on policy, but only in
an advisory capacity; the board of directors takes this advice into consideration, but it makes an independent decision about the content of
the policy that it sends to FERC for approval.282
Under both the advisory and direct voting stakeholder models,
constituents are automatically included within RTO decision-making
processes, unlike the FERC model that requires individual intervention. Not all stakeholders are represented, however, and this is a major area for improvement. Indeed, a common objection is that some
RTOs do not include states as members, and most do not provide
dedicated representatives of the general public with a formal vote.283
There are also concerns that suppliers—the producers of electricity
and transmission—are overrepresented within RTOs, at the expense
of consumers. In several RTOs, there is only one “end user” in the
stakeholder sector (i.e., electricity consumer), and the majority of the
other sectors are on the supply side.284 Despite these concerns, however, RTOs do give many stakeholders, including some members of
the public, a direct seat at the decision-making table—and typically a
vote. This gives constituents a cheaper, less formal means of participating in grid-based decision making than they have at the federal and
often the state levels.
Take the example of MISO, which until recently had ten distinct,
sector-specific stakeholder advisory groups on its Advisory Committee. These sectors formally vote on MISO policy and make recommendations to the MISO Board of Directors, and they include,
beyond supply side interests, public nonprofit organizations that advocate for electricity consumers, state utility regulatory authorities, “Environmental/Other Stakeholder Groups,” customers who purchase
electricity from utilities within MISO, “Coordinating Members,” and
level. . . . Depending on which governing documents is being amended by the proposal . . . the
PJM Board must vote on the proposal before it is filed with FERC.”).
282

See Yoo & Blumsack, supra note 279, at 128.

R

See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 33, at 581–82, 595 (noting “the public’s interest
in RTO decision-making is extremely difficult to particularize” because it is only represented
through the divergent interests of other stakeholders and suggesting the possibility of a “regional
public advocate program within the [RTO] stakeholder process”); Welton, supra note 20, at 258
(noting states’ weak role within RTOs).

R

284 See, e.g., Yoo & Blumsack, supra note 279, at 130 (describing how supply side sectors
dominate PJM’s “sector-weighted voting” model of stakeholder participation); cf. Welton, supra
note 20, at 255–56 (describing how the union of supply and demand side entities and interests
under “mega-holding companies” in the highly consolidated energy industry has subjected many
RTO member and stakeholder decision-making processes to industry capture).
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entities that build and develop transmission lines.285 Current representatives within the “Environmental/Other” sector include, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council—a leading national
environmental nonprofit—and organizations such as Clean Grid Alliance and The Sustainable FERC Project, both of which fight for
MISO policies that will support more low-carbon generation.286
Another interesting aspect of these stakeholder committees representing a range of interests is their fluidity with respect to inclusiveness. When stakeholders feel that they lack enough of a distinct voice,
RTOs sometimes change the structure of stakeholder advisory committees to include them. For example, interest groups for the coal industry had long requested the creation of a new stakeholder sector to
represent coal and mining interests.287 MISO accordingly approved
the formation of an eleventh sector, the “Affiliate Sector,” primarily
so that groups with views largely divergent from the environmental
sector could have an independent voice on the Advisory Council.288
The most vocal group that pressed for this separate sector—and which
is now a member of it—was the lignite coal industry, but other entities
may now also choose to join this sector.289 Indeed, as of late June 2021,
the “Affiliate Sector” stakeholder group had twenty-one members,
nearly all of which represent coal, mining, and other business
interests.290
2. Influence
The debate regarding voting rights for a newly created stakeholder sector highlights another important strand of accountability—
285 MISO, MISO STAKEHOLDER
GOVERNANCE GUIDE 9 (2021), https://
cdn.misoenergy.org/Stakeholder%20Governance%20Guide105455.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL9BREHM].
286 MISO, STAKEHOLDER GROUP PARTICIPATION (2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Stakeholder%20Group%20Participation95902.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TGW-DJC8]; See About, CLEAN
GRID ALL., https://cleangridalliance.org/about [https://perma.cc/QFS5-HCXH] (noting the many
members of the alliance, all of which “support renewable energy”); About the Project, SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT, https://sustainableferc.org/about-the-project/ [https://perma.cc/776TRDLG] (noting the project’s mission).
287 See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Approves New “Affiliate Sector” on the
MISO Advisory Council, Gives Lignite Energy Council a Role on the Advisory Committee, LIGNITE ENERGY COUNCIL (July 29, 2020), https://lignite.com/news/federal-energy-regulatory-commission-approves-new-affiliate-sector-on-the-miso-advisory-council-gives-lignite-energy-councila-role-on-the-advisory-committee/ [https://perma.cc/AL5L-Q6MY] (noting the years-long effort
of the Lignite Energy Council to become a stakeholder in MISO’s Advisory Council).
288 Id.
289 See MISO, supra note 286.
290 See id.
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the extent to which stakeholders’ voices are heard and ultimately influence substantive decisions. Decision-making processes can include
stakeholders but leave them largely mute and powerless, or they can
give them a meaningful voice. The extent of stakeholder influence
largely depends on processes for stakeholder comments and voting on
proposed and final policies, and the accessibility of these processes to
voters.
The assumption in federalism literature is that delegating decision-making authority to the state level enhances accountability and
ensures that policies are more likely to capture voter preferences because the decision-making process is “closer” to the people.291 Recent
critiques expertly cast doubt on this common assumption—arguing
that state and local processes are by no means automatically more
“democratic” or accessible than alternative decision-making fora.292
Indeed, James Madison’s concerns about the tyranny of a local majority faction have taken a real life form in some state-based decision
making.293
Although state-based grid decision-making processes are physically closer to the people, they are far less accessible, and potentially
less susceptible to meaningful influence by a wide range of stakeholders, than the RTO alternative.294 In states that follow traditional regu291 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure of
joint sovereigns . . . increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes.”);
Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
107, 146–47 (2018) (noting that “scholars, courts, and policymakers” all “tend to agree that states
are closer to the people in some way that matters” and disputing then this claim).
292 See, e.g., David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 784,
787 (2017) (observing that the national-level political affiliations of state voters affect the outcomes of state elections, leaving “no reason to believe that [state] policies will be made according to local preferences” and creating “less [policy] variation across jurisdictions”); Timothy
Meyer, Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation,
and the New Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 889 (2007) (arguing that some federal legislative
or administrative proceedings may better encompass “accountability” than state litigation challenging federal legislation).
293 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (noting the risk of majority factions
carrying “into effect schemes of oppression”). See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare
Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 552, 554–55 (1999) (“[T]he risk that negative but popular biases against welfare recipients—particularly racial biases—will color policy decisions appears to heighten as decisions are
moved closer to the people. This risk of a ‘tyranny of the majority,’ by which local prejudices go
unchecked by any outside forces, was a key concern animating James Madison’s vision of a twotiered system of national and state government.”).
294 MISO—the largest RTO—covers fifteen states and approximately 65,000 miles of transmission lines, and has only three offices in Indiana, Arkansas, and Minnesota. Locations, supra
note 268; MISO, MISO OPERATING CONDITIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2020),
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lation of the electricity sector, state public utility commissions
(“PUCs”) approve utilities’ decisions about investing in new transmission lines or adding new generation units to supply electricity.295 Individual electricity consumers, or members of the public wishing to
advocate for more accessibility to green energy, for example, may intervene, but their voices are often drowned out by utilities, which are
notoriously influential within PUCs.296 Indeed, some utility regulators
view grassroots advocates as “ill informed, irresponsible, and obstructionist.”297 Furthermore, as noted with respect to inclusiveness, state
PUCs lack the types of stakeholder committees offered by RTOs, and
thus limit many groups to the relatively difficult option of intervening
in PUC proceedings or advocating for their goals with state legislatures.298 Many states fund a public governmental entity to represent
ratepayers within utility proceedings, but this entity tends to be limited in its mission—such as only seeking low rates for consumers—and
is often underfunded.299
RTOs are, in many ways, also more likely to accommodate stakeholder preferences than FERC is—albeit with the very important cahttps://cdn.misoenergy.org/FAQ%20Emergency%20Operations%2010-2020318049.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KM8P-F5AS].
CLEARY & PALMER, supra note 259, at 1–2 (describing traditional regulated markets).
See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 129
(1983) (finding that utility commissioners tend to agree with utilities’ preferred policies over
those of grassroots groups); see also Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation
of Low-Income Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 647–48
(1990) (noting the unique skills needed to effectively intervene on behalf of clients in a PUC
proceeding, which involves an “inherently political” decision-making process that considers divergent interests); id. at 650 (“Utilities and many industrial and commercial intervenors have
substantially greater funding sources than consumer groups.”).
295

R

296

297 William T. Gormley, Public Advocacy in Public Utility Commission Proceedings, 17 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 446, 449 (1981).
298 See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 296, at 677–78 (noting the difficulty of effectively intervening in PUC proceedings for “low-income intervenors” and describing the arduous processes of
some public interest groups to effect change via protests, “direct . . . actions at [PUC] rate hearings,” and lobbying efforts in state legislatures).
299 See, e.g., Karen Uhlenhuth, Missouri Consumer Advocate: Stop Funding Efficiency During Pandemic, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 9, 2020), https://energynews.us/2020/04/09/missouri-consumer-advocate-stop-funding-efficiency-during-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ6C4A4Z] (noting the Missouri Office of Public Counsel’s urging that energy efficiency programs in
Missouri be suspended due to the pandemic, despite minimal utility bill savings for customers,
which renewable energy proponents criticized as a pretextual argument used to disguise the
Office’s desire to end energy efficiency programs it “has long been critical of”); Darryl G. Stein,
Perilous Proxies: Issues of Scale for Consumer Representation in Agency Proceedings, 67 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513, 524 (2012) (noting that there are ratepayer “proxy advocates” in fortyfive states); id. at 569 (“Alabama’s proxy advocate has a statutory budget of $250,000 whereas
other states fund their proxy advocates in excess of two million dollars.”).
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veat that traditionally public entities, such as states, are not members
of some RTOs and must find channels other than formal votes for
influencing RTO behavior.300 Under some models of democratic accountability, any delegation of a federal agency’s authority to a regional entity erodes accountability and responsiveness because this
increases the amount of separation between the democratically
elected President and the exercise of administrative power.301 But
there are grounds for skepticism of this “presidential control” model
of agency accountability, particularly because, as Dave Owen has observed, it is to some degree paradoxical.302 On the one hand, “standard federalist theory” holds that devolving decision-making authority
to the states, and thus allowing states to respond to people’s diverse
needs, enhances accountability.303 But on the other hand, the theory
also suggests that allowing agency divergence from the federal executive’s unitary directives under federal regional administration erodes
accountability.304
If one follows the assumption that giving federal agencies some
discretion to depart from a unitary executive command enhances accountability, then FERC’s delegation of some decision-making authority to RTOs appears to be beneficial when it comes to
stakeholders influencing policy outcomes. Take the example of the
controversial Minimum Offer Price Rule (“MOPR”). FERC, operating beneath the watchful gaze of a President who vowed to revive the
U.S. coal industry,305 insisted that PJM—an RTO in the Mid-Atlantic
region—force state-subsidized, new renewable energy resources to bid
into PJM’s capacity market auctions at an artificially high price in order to protect existing resources such as coal and natural gas from
300

See supra note 20.

See Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 13, at 1964–65 (citing Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001)) (describing how federal agency delegation of authority to regional federal offices erodes accountability under prominent accounts of
executive power, and citing to arguments such as those of now-Justice Elena Kagan); see also,
e.g., Owen, supra note 11, at 76 & n.107 (noting the emphasis on “centralized accountability”
and providing sources); Bressman, supra note 29, at 485–91 (describing the “Presidential Control
Model” of accountability); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (noting that the chief executive is “directly accountable to the people”).
301

302

See Owen, supra note 11, at 76–77.

303

Id. at 77.

304

Id.

See, e.g., Eric Lipton, ‘The Coal Industry Is Back,’ Trump Proclaimed. It Wasn’t., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/us/politics/trump-coal-industry.html
[https://perma.cc/V264-TQUK] (noting then-President Donald Trump’s proclamations that he
would reinvigorate America’s coal industry soon after taking office in 2017).
305
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competitive disadvantage.306 This made it more likely that coal or natural gas—and not subsidized renewables such as wind and solar energy—would clear the auction and receive payments for offering
capacity. Many of the states and stakeholders within PJM vociferously
objected to FERC’s approach.307 And the RTO itself—although
largely angering pro-renewable states through its MOPR actions—has
attempted to moderate this mandate. For example, it has asked for
alternative ways of allowing clean energy to bid into auctions without
damaging the chances that this energy will clear the auction.308
Another interesting aspect of the PJM example is its exposure of
the competing levels of accountability within a regional cooperative
federalist regime. The traditional story is that states must be free to
directly respond to their voters’ preferences—not commandeered by
306 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, at 3 (Dec. 19, 2019) (preliminary) (requiring
PJM to extend its “MOPR to include both new and existing resources . . . that receive, or are
entitled to receive, certain out-of-market payments,” although exempting existing energy resources from this requirement); Catherine Morehouse, FERC Move to Raise PJM Capacity Market Bids Shows ‘Clear Bias’ Against New, Clean Generation: Glick, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-move-to-raise-pjm-capacity-market-bids-shows-clear-biasagainst-new/569483/ [https://perma.cc/2SM5-8C8E] (describing National Mining Association’s
support for FERC’s MOPR ruling because the ruling would assist coal resources that the Association views as having been subjected to “market manipulation”). For further background on the
MOPR, see supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
307 See, e.g., PJM Board Okays Plan to Ease Concerns with MOPR Ruling, NUCLEAR NEWSWIRE (July 14, 2021, 7:59 AM), https://www.ans.org/news/article-3067/pjm-board-okays-plan-toease-concerns-with-mopr-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/BJP2-DATT] (noting states’ threats to withdraw from PJM as a result of the MOPR and stakeholders’ proposed alternatives).
308 The story of the RTOs’ involvement in the MOPR is long and complex, but the case of
PJM provides a useful case study. PJM in part contributed to the problem of the rule by proposing two alternative capacity markets—one of which would have had subsidized resources (including renewables) compete in a separate auction, and one of which would have expanded the
MOPR to subsidized resources. But both rules had relatively broad exemptions for renewable
resources—exemptions that FERC rejected, to the consternation of the PJM. See Gavin Bade,
PJM Files Competing Capacity Market Reforms at FERC, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://
www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-files-competing-capacity-market-reforms-at-ferc/520982/ [https://
perma.cc/4HWK-2Q69] (describing PJM’s initial filings with FERC in April 2018); Request for
Rehearing and Request for Clarification of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Calpine Corp., No. EL
16–49–00, at 3–4 (FERC Jan. 21, 2020) (arguing that FERC’s MOPR order “disrupts the balance
that has successfully worked to accommodate the interests of states and integrated utilities, with
appropriate guardrails, while maintaining the integrity of the market”). For objections to the
MOPR by states within PJM, see, for example, Catherine Morehouse, PJM: MOPR Compliance
Plan Aims to Avoid FERC’s ‘Immense’ and ‘Unreasonable’ Burden, UTIL. DIVE (June 4, 2020),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-mopr-compliance-plan-aims-to-avoid-fercs-immense-andunreasonable/579179/ [https://perma.cc/SL6L-ZKQ9] (quoting the Maryland Public Service
Commissioner’s statement that he was “appalled” by FERC’s subsequent decision to reject a
PJM proposal for implementing the 2019 FERC MOPR order, instead holding that the MOPR
requires that utilities that provide electricity service to customers who have not selected a competitive provider—so-called “default” service—be treated as a subsidized form of generation).
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the federal government—in order to be accountable.309 And the federal executive, which is directly elected by the people, must not excessively delegate its authority and thereby shirk the executive’s
representative duties.310 Placing an institution between these two
levels might confound the fragile federal-state relationship in which
the federal government avoids overly intruding on state officials’ autonomy.311 In other respects, however, regional institutions might better respond to the many voters who fail to find adequate solutions at
either the state or the federal levels, whether that is because they are
in the minority at one of those levels or lack a meaningful way to
influence the decision-making process within either policy space. As
Blank and Rosen-Zvi observe, “regions serve as buffers between the
states and Washington and between crude political pressures and professional expertise” and are not “wholly subordinated to the increasingly polarized politics of Washington and of the states.”312 In the case
of the MOPR, PJM has in some ways attempted to serve as that buffer
with its proposed modifications to the MOPR that would better accommodate renewable energy, but it has failed to adequately appease
either FERC or its state members. The MOPR process has angered
state members to the point that they have threatened to exit, and
FERC wholly rejected PJM’s arguments in its motion for rehearing.313
E. A Note on Private Regional Cooperative Governance
One essential feature permeating the accountability analysis in
this Part is that RTOs are a form of private regional cooperative governance. Unlike HIDTAs in the opioid context, which form regional
entities comprised of government officials, law enforcement, and similar governmental or government-affiliated entities, RTOs are nonprofit organizations whose stakeholders are primarily members of the
electricity industry—generators, power marketers, transmission line
owners, and the like.314 It is possible that some of the beneficial aspects of regional cooperative governance noted in this Part arise both
See Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 13, at 1902.
See supra note 301 (describing executive accountability arguments).
311 See Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 13, at 1963.
312 Id. at 1965.
313 Welton, supra note 20, at 258–59 (describing states’ exit threats); Calpine Corp., 171
FERC ¶ 61,034, at 57–58 (Apr. 16, 2020) (preliminary), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/documents/ferc/orders/2020/20200416-el16-49-001.ashx [https://perma.cc/5EA4-U8C6].
314 See, e.g., Cullenward & Welton, supra note 27, at 110 (describing “RTO members” as
“predominantly utilities and generators”); Members & Market Participants, SW. POWER POOL,
https://www.spp.org/about-us/members-market-participants/ [https://perma.cc/4ZFT-B7ZZ]
(showing primarily industry-based membership in SPP).
309
310
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from the regional and the private nature of this approach. Consider
the example of footvoting and policy innovation. RTOs can perhaps
act more nimbly and quickly in response to stakeholder demands than
a formal governmental entity, and they can more easily offer “a la
carte” governance that allows stakeholders to pick and choose aspects
of a governance regime that best fit their needs.315 Furthermore, the
inclusion of industry actors as stakeholders in a governance regime is
hard to avoid in the area of grid policy. Here, many policy determinations are infused with highly technical questions, such as equipment
and practices needed to ensure proper voltage within wires and to
avoid outages, for which industry has the most expertise and
information.
This is not to say, however, that RTOs must be private. Public
governance regimes incorporate industry knowledge and concerns
through notice-and-comment rulemaking and, in highly technical areas, negotiated rulemaking.316 Further, the private nature of RTOs in
some cases constrains their ability to achieve the values explored
here—particularly in the accountability sphere, as documented by a
growing body of critical scholarship.317 Part III explores these types of
obstacles and means of overcoming them. Part III also analyzes scenarios in which regional cooperative governance might not only be superior to state centric or traditional cooperative federalist approaches,
but also better than other forms of regional governance regimes.
III. IMPROVING

EXPANDING THE BENEFITS
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

AND

OF

REGIONAL

Regional cooperative federalism—a governance approach used
most fully in the electric transmission context—offers great promise.
This governance form performs quite well along the major good governance metrics commonly cited in the federalism discourse. But there
is substantial need for improvement, and this Part explores how federal-regional regimes could be better designed to ensure greater innovation and experimentation, efficiency, and accountability.
See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
See generally Hannah J. Wiseman, Negotiated Rulemaking and New Risks: A Rail Safety
Case Study, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 207 (2017) (explaining that although the use of negotiated rulemaking has declined, the Department of Transportation still uses it relatively regularly, particularly for complex technical issues such as the regulation of train technology to
enhance rail safety).
317 See Yoo & Blumsack, supra note 279; Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 33; see also
Welton, supra note 20, at 256–57.
315
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A. Enhancing Innovation and Experimentation
Within regional cooperative federalism, the presence of a federal
entity pushing for innovation, along with states and other stakeholders
providing bottom-up impetus for change, can generate genuinely ambitious and creative policies. But FERC could require far more innovation than it currently does. Take the example of “clean energy,”
which, judging by the number of state level policies addressing renewable power generation, is one of the highest priority areas in need of
policy innovation.318 The regionalization of the electric grid has already supported a vast expansion of renewables by improving generators’ access to customers and providing a diversity of resources
available at different times of the day, thus helping to balance out
intermittency challenges.319 But RTOs could do even more to integrate higher percentages of renewables by planning both within their
region and with neighboring RTOs to draw from renewable resources
at different geographic locations at different times of day.320 Aggregating a range of solar power generators from east to west can help to
provide solar energy throughout the day, and incorporating wind generation from regions that tend to have different weather pressure systems and elevations can reduce the intermittency of generation.321
FERC could also incentivize or require RTOs to develop better intermittency models and other models projecting generation from
renewables. This would further reduce the need for reserve generation
318 See DSIRE, supra note 128 (showing thirty states and the District of Columbia as requiring some percentage of renewable or “clean” energy); Welton, supra note 20, at 238–40
(noting the “sectoral transformation” of the grid that will be necessary to reduce U.S. carbon
emissions).
319 See, e.g., M. MILLIGAN, B. KIRBY, R. GRAMLICH & M. GOGGIN, IMPACT OF ELECTRIC
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE ON HIGH WIND PENETRATION POTENTIAL 2 (2009), https://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy09osti/46273.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EU5-WT54] (concluding that RTOs and ISOs, which
have “open market structures with large geographic scope, along with day-ahead, hour-ahead,
and sub-hourly market clearing,” best accommodate the integration of wind because they allow
for conventional resources, which can compensate for intermittent periods of low wind generation, to be more maneuverable, and they allow grid operators to draw from areas that tend to be
windy at different times of day, thus further reducing intermittency).
320 See Elaine K. Hart, Eric D. Stoutenburg & Mark Z. Jacobson, The Potential of Intermittent Renewables to Meet Electric Power Demand: Current Methods and Emerging Analytical
Techniques, 100 PROC. IEEE 322, 328–29 (2012) (noting the benefits of “geographical aggregation” of renewable power sources, such as wind and solar generation, which can “reduce forecast
errors associated with portfolios of intermittent generators” and can otherwise “reduce intermittency”; the measure of these benefits “is a function of the resource, distance, terrain, and time
scale”).
321

See id. at 328.
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and would help to break down barriers at the borders between RTOs,
which tend to impede electricity transfer among regions.
In fostering more innovation, FERC could use mandates—as it
did through Order No. 1000, which required regional transmission
planning—or work with the Department of Energy to encourage the
use of grants or competitive prizes. FERC could also take advantage
of its role as a top-down regulator to require regular reporting of RTO
progress within a particular policy area and to synthesize and distribute information about the policies that seem to be most effective.
FERC’s requirement of transparency and reporting with respect to
RTOs’ and utilities’ transmission planning process and progress under
Order Nos. 890 and 1000 is a step in the right direction.322 And indeed,
FERC’s regular analysis of RTOs’ performance after cold-weather
events prior to the winter 2021 event seemed to have inspired real
change, although not enough in some RTOs—particularly ERCOT.323
Enhanced analysis of RTO policies and their effectiveness would
make policy experimentation and innovation more useful because different approaches taken and lessons learned from each RTO could be
synthesized and, where relevant, borrowed and adapted by other
RTOs.
B. Expanding Governance Options for Constituents and
Enhancing Efficiencies
Beyond innovation, regionalism in the electric grid context has
provided an important alternative to state-based grid approaches. In
so doing, it has opened up opportunities for new, cleaner generation
and less expensive forms of energy.324
Additional efforts could further the diversity of the electricity
supply and governance options offered by regional cooperative federalism. One of the most promising options is for regional organizations
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FERC & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 184 (documenting
failures during the 2011 cold snap and making recommendations for improvement); FERC & N.
AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., THE SOUTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES COLD WEATHER BULK
ELECTRIC SYSTEM EVENT OF JANUARY 17, 2018 (2019), https://cms.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/
legal/staff-reports/2019/07-18-19-ferc-nerc-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6FG-G8XZ] (doing the
same for the 2018 cold snap).
324 See, e.g., MISO, MISO TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLAN 44–47 (2011) (noting that
“[p]ublic policy decisions over the last decade have driven changes in how the transmission system is planned” and pointing specifically to state renewable portfolio standards within MISO’s
territory); supra notes 27, 166–69 (describing the success of MISO’s MVPs at implementing new
transmission infrastructure to accommodate increases in renewable generation associated with
state policies).
322
323
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to more regularly offer “a la carte” or retail governance options. Specifically, these organizations could offer up certain governance services to entities who are not their members, as SPP and CAISO have
done for markets that supply real time electricity needs.325 This is a
particularly important option for efficiency because it allows entities
looking for specific governance strategies to avoid paying for unwanted governance services along with services that meet their needs.
For example, if constituents want the efficiencies of a competitive
market for real time energy but believe that longer term generation
capacity planning within the RTO is too cumbersome, they can choose
to join the energy market only. This avoids the “all-or-nothing,”
lumpy attributes of governance that often create inefficiencies. Retail
shopping for RTO services also enhances administrative efficiencies,
allowing utilities and states to rely on an RTO for certain organizational and operational services for markets and grid planning, rather
than duplicating this effort.326
C. Enhancing Accountability Through Improved
Decision-Making Processes
The areas of experimentation, innovation, and efficiency require
mere tweaking for RTOs to vault from being “good” governance options to excellent ones. Accountability, however, represents the single
largest challenge of the regional cooperative federalism model, at
least with respect to RTOs. As noted in Part II, RTOs are private
entities consisting nearly exclusively of private members—utilities,
transmission line owners, and the like.327 As Shelley Welton and
others have argued, one way of enhancing RTO accountability is to
325 These programs create special submarkets within the RTO for those utilities that only
need to purchase limited amounts of electricity at certain times to support their customers’ electricity demand when the utility’s generation capacity is being taxed. See Western Energy Imbalance Service Market, supra note 249 (detailing SPP’s Western Energy Imbalance Services
Market, from which utilities can purchase electricity “on a contract basis” to “balance generation
and load regionally and in real time”); About, supra note 249 (noting that CAISO’s Energy
Imbalance Market, which has many utility members that are not ISO members, “automatically
finds low-cost energy to serve real-time consumer demand across the west” and “improves the
integration of renewable energy”).
326 For an analogous discussion of how federal agencies sometimes rely on other federal
agencies to perform certain functions, see Marisam, supra note 265, at 887–88 (“[T]he vast, yet
unexplored, interagency marketplace can be used to improve decision making, by allowing agencies to better take advantage of each other’s regulatory expertise and experience.”).
327 See supra notes 86, 314, and accompanying text (describing the private nature of RTOs,
as well as the predominance of utilities and other industrial representatives among their
members).
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expand representation of the public within their processes, or even
transform RTOs into public organizations.328
Beyond more directly incorporating public stakeholders, RTOs
need more tools for resolving the inevitable clashes that arise among
many private and public interests affected by regional decisions. It is
common for RTOs to have FERC approve a tariff revision, such as a
plan for new transmission lines and the financing of those lines, only
then to face legal challenges to the approved tariff by stakeholders
within the RTO.329 The challenges often drag on for years, with courts
sending the tariff back to FERC for further revisions, and stakeholders once again challenging the tariff post-revision.330 To some extent,
these challenges are unavoidable. For certain policy decisions, stakeholders will be dissatisfied with the substantive outcome no matter
how many opportunities for engagement are offered. But more effective stakeholder engagement before federal approval of the regional
policy could avoid some of these conflicts. One approach used—albeit
sparingly—in the federal context is negotiated rulemaking, in which
stakeholders formally participate in the drafting of a rule.331 The governance organization makes the final decision about the content of the
rule, but stakeholders have unusually large amounts of input in its formation.332 One goal of this “reg-neg” approach is to reduce later challenges to the rule. There is some evidence that reg-neg achieves this
result, but other studies suggest that reg-neg does not reduce
litigation.333
328 See Welton, supra note 20, at 256–57 (noting the problems of adequately representing
the public interest within an RTO governance structure dominated by industry actors and arguing that even “a well-structured private RTO would still likely have interests out of step with the
pressing and growing public interest in addressing climate change”); Dworkin & Goldwasser,
supra note 33, at 595 (expounding strategies to “ensur[e] representation of the public interest in
RTO decision-making”).

R

R

329 See, e.g., Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 478 (7th Cir. 2009) (agreeing with
stakeholders’ opposition to FERC’s approval of PJM’s cost allocation scheme); Ill. Com.
Comm’n v. FERC, 756 F.3d 566, 564–65 (7th Cir. 2014) (same).
330 See, e.g., supra note 329 (showing two successful stakeholder challenges to PJM’s transmission line financing rule); Ill. Com. Comm’n, 756 F.3d at 556 (“It’s been almost five years since
we remanded this case to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.”).

R

331 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1256–57 (1997) (describing the negotiated rulemaking
process).
332 See id. (describing the influence of “regulated firms, trade associations, citizen groups,
and other affected organizations” in the negotiated rulemaking with federal agencies).
333 See Wiseman, supra note 316, at 207, 210–11 (describing the reduced litigation claim and
scholars who dispute the claim and providing sources).
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Strategies short of formal negotiated rulemaking could help to
reduce conflict and make federal-regional decision making more efficient. In some cases, RTOs should consider establishing subregional
decision-making processes for policies that implicate strong state and
local preferences. For example, committees representing different
groups of states within RTOs could propose policy strategies to the
RTO, and the RTO could propose a tariff to FERC that reflected
these strategies. The resulting tariff could, if needed, provide for different policies within different parts of the region, as already occurs
with license plate rates.334 License plate rates allow a utility to pay one
rate for use of transmission lines throughout the entire region, but the
single rate paid by utilities for use of all of the wires differs depending
on each utility’s location.335 This allows for the recognition of different
conditions within different subregions of the RTO.
There is a delicate balance between allowing and encouraging
RTOs to adopt policies that differ within subregions of the RTO and
requiring a more uniform approach. Too much subregional policy
could defeat the very purpose of the RTO, which is to make it easier
for generators to send electricity over numerous transmission lines
owned by different utilities and for generators to access more customers in a broader variety of locations.336 And at some point, with
enough policy variation within the region, the very purpose of the regional organization—aside from coordinating these policies—might
seem moot. But allowing for some policy diversity within the RTO
encourages more utilities to agree to forming an RTO, thus ensuring
that the overall purpose of RTOs is accomplished.337
D. Transferring the Regional Cooperative Federalism Model to
Other Contexts
Beyond improving the most common form of regional cooperative governance found in the United States, this area is ripe for use in
334 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 915 (Jan. 6, 2000) (noting
one commenter’s point that “a single region-wide rate [for transmission] may not be appropriate
in a large region with legitimate cost differences” and that license plates rates can partially address this problem); id. at 917 (allowing RTOs to charge license plate rates).
335 See id.
336 See, e.g., id. at 811 (noting that RTOs could enhance market performance and competition and “benefit consumers through lower electricity rates resulting from a wider choice of
services”).
337 FERC expressly recognized this in allowing license plate rates, which vary within the
RTO. See id. at 917. The Commission noted its concern that without these rates, “the potential
for cost-shifting could act as an impediment to RTO formation, thereby denying all stakeholders
the benefits that come from RTO membership.” Id.
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other policy areas other than only RTOs. Indeed, as noted in Part I,
regional cooperative federalism is also used in the context of opioid
control, where the federal government approves groups of counties
with high intensity drug trafficking to form regional entities that implement federally approved programs.
Several factors must be present for regional cooperative federalism to work well. Many of these factors apply to all regional approaches, such as regional federal administration and federal-state
joint governance. First, there must be challenges, such as opioid trafficking, or natural or artificial features and infrastructure, such as rivers or transmission lines, that cross subfederal political lines. Second,
regionalism is most needed when state-by-state or local approaches
would create substantial spillover effects if implemented independently. Third, the policy area must implicate strong federal and subfederal interests and authority. For example, for rivers and watersheds
that feed rivers and cross state lines, the federal government has long
regulated navigability and water quality, whereas states regulate water
quantity.338 States, through delegated authority under the Clean Water
Act,339 also have substantial control over water quality issues.340 Federal and state actors, therefore, must both be involved in any regional
approach. Similarly, with respect to transmission lines, the federal
government regulates their operation, whereas states regulate the utilities that connect to the lines and the physical siting of the transmission lines.341
There are at least two additional features that make regional cooperative federalism, specifically, a likely candidate for governance.
One is a distinct need for innovation, and, in some cases, speedy inno338 See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 103, 108
(2004) (discussing federal regulation of water quality under the Clean Water Act and noting that
Congress expressly reserved to the states the ability to regulate water quantity under the Act).
339 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
340 See, e.g., S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. at 107 (noting that, under the Clean Water
Act, “a State may set individualized ambient water quality standards by taking into consideration ‘the designated uses of the navigable waters involved’ ” (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(2)(A))); State Program Requirements; Approval of Application by Oklahoma to Administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program, 61 Fed. Reg.
65,047, 65,047, 65,052 (Dec. 10, 1996) (approving, “pursuant to Section 402 of the [Clean Water
Act],” an Oklahoma water pollution discharge program to “operate in lieu of” a similar federal
program administered by the EPA and listing states with similarly approved delegated
authority).
341 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (“The [FERC] shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such
transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction, except as
specifi[ed] . . . , over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in
local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce . . . .”).
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vation. As explored in Part II, policymakers are often risk averse and
are unlikely to innovate for a variety of reasons.342 There is likely less
risk aversion within regional organizations. When state or county actors coordinate to address a shared issue—with or without a federal
actor within the organization—they might be more willing to take
risks. If the policy ultimately fails, voters might blame the regional
organization, not the individual state or county policymaker within
that organization. Furthermore, officials coordinating within a regional organization partially avoid the free riding problem, in which
neighboring states immediately copy any policies that turn out to be
beneficial. Within regional organizations, the neighboring jurisdictions
are in one room at the decision-making table.
Even with these barriers to innovation lowered in a regional setting, policy innovation might not happen rapidly enough in regional
organizations that lack direct federal oversight. Diverse counties or
states within the regional organization might bicker over the proper
way forward, and they might still fear blame from voters for having
assented to a regional policy that did not fully match local voters’ preferences. In this case, when innovation to address a difficult policy
problem is needed, and needed speedily, a top-down federal actor
driving that innovation might be important.343
Another policy characteristic that uniquely calls for regional cooperative federalism is the need for a substantial infusion of federal
resources and expertise in the policy-making process. The few federalstate hybrid organizations that currently operate benefit from some
federal expertise and funds, but these benefits tend to be relatively
marginal. For example, river basin commissions have only one federal
representative, and most of their money comes from the states that
make up the respective commission’s membership.344 And the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority is self-funded through “fees,
rents, and revenues.”345 Policy areas that call for the expertise of a
large, federal agency with long-term, well-paid staff and an infusion of
See supra notes 15, 123, and accompanying text.
As explored in Part II, FERC has played this precise role in the regional grid governance context, both mandating and encouraging different forms of innovative policymaking by
RTOs for regional grid planning and development. See supra Section II.B.1.a. But FERC has
also stifled states’ creative approaches to subsidizing renewables, as demonstrated by its orders
with respect to the MOPR in PJM. See supra notes 306–08 and accompanying text.
344 See Owen & Wiseman, Coequal Federalism, supra note 11, at 302, 304 & n.63, 326–30
(describing multistate river basin commission composition and funding).
345 MWAA History and Facts, METRO. WASH. AIRPORTS AUTH., https://www.mwaa.com/
about-authority/mwaa-history-and-facts [https://perma.cc/G6HE-Z5J8].
342
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federal grant money and other aid are likely best governed through a
regional cooperative federalism approach.
The electricity transmission and opioid trafficking examples illustrate these features. Both areas demand relatively rapid innovation
and substantial resources and expertise. With respect to innovation,
FERC encouraged the formation of RTOs in the midst of widespread
dissatisfaction over rising electricity rates and increasing demands for
consumer access to more diverse generation sources.346 And the
opioid crisis spread quickly around certain regions as doctors overprescribed drugs and drug companies pumped out large quantities of
relatively cheap painkillers.347 This called for rapid responses as the
crisis ballooned out of control, overwhelming healthcare systems and
leading to deaths, “lost productivity,” family crises, and criminal justice problems, among other serious impacts.348
The electricity transmission and opioid contexts both also benefit
particularly from the infusion of federal expertise. Reliably operating
the transmission grid is a complex and technical task, and assessing
how to best plan for and regulate this grid is an expensive, time-consuming endeavor.349 Having FERC review and approve RTO actions
adds an important layer of expertise and resources to those that already exist at the RTO level. Indeed, the case law limiting FERC’s
review of RTOs to all-or-nothing approval or rejection of energy market design is likely problematic, as it constrains FERC’s ability to partially amend RTO policy in ways that improve the policy.350 In the
346 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,550 (May 10, 1996).
347 See, e.g., Cornelius A. Thiels, Stephanie S. Anderson, Daniel S. Ubl, Kristine T. Hanson, Whitney J. Bergquist, Richard J. Gray, Halena M. Gazelka, Robert R. Cima & Elizabeth B.
Habermann, Wide Variation and Overprescription of Opioids After Elective Surgery, 266 ANNALS SURGERY 564, 564 (2017) (“The majority of patients were overprescribed opioids. Significant prescribing variation exists that was not explained by patient factors.”).
348 See Opioid Data Analysis and Resources, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html [https://perma.cc/EV6XR2TM].
349 See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION, RELIABILITY IN PJM: TODAY AND TOMORROW 1
(2021), https://pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2021/20210311-reliabilityin-pjm-today-and-tomorrow.ashx [https://perma.cc/RPP2-ART7] (“[K]eeping the lights
on . . . involves around-the-clock system monitoring and the dispatch of power by trained operators; real-time coordination with other operating entities and industry sectors; and extensive
planning to ensure the grid is equipped to serve future needs.”).
350 See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (reiterating
that FERC may not “suggest modifications that result in an ‘entirely different rate design’ than
the utility’s original proposal or the utility’s prior rate scheme,” even if an RTO consents to
those modifications (quoting W. Res., Inc. v. FERC, 9 F.3d 1568, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1993))); Gary
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opioid context, many of the regions suffering most heavily from the
crisis tend to be poor and rural, and in particular need of a federal
cash infusion.351
Other policy areas similarly demand rapid, coordinated, innovative solutions and an infusion of federal expertise and resources.
These include, for example, adaptation to climate change, as neighboring counties and states search for ways to address sea level rise.
This area implicates strong local (e.g., land use) and state and federal
(e.g., water-based regulatory and housing) interests and involves substantial spillover effects that are inadequately coordinated.352 If, for
instance, a local government or landowner places protective engineering infrastructure along a coastline, the displaced wave action caused
by such construction can exacerbate coastline loss on neighboring
lands.353 Furthermore, relatively rapid sea level rise is a problem that
calls for similarly rapid, innovative responses, and an infusion of fedD. Bachman & Douglas W. Smith, D.C. Circuit Decision Creates Significant Uncertainty Concerning PJM Capacity Auction Results, VAN NESS FELDMAN LLP (July 12, 2017), https://
www.vnf.com/dc-circuit-decision-creates-significant-uncertainty-concerning-pjm [https://
perma.cc/FK7X-EJCF] (noting practical and legal implications of the ruling).
351 See, e.g., Carmen Heredia Rodriguez, Elizabeth Lucas & Orion Donovan-Smith, Federal Grants Restricted to Fighting Opioids Miss the Mark, States Say, NPR (June 13, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/06/13/731512068/federal-grants-restrictedto-fighting-opioids-miss-the-mark-states-say [https://perma.cc/QA2Y-H37A] (noting that Ohio
and Pennsylvania had acute opioid problems and needs for federal funding, which “enabled
them to invest significantly in programs like training medical providers . . . [and] offering more
points of access for treatment”).
352 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, 1
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 259, 273 (2009) (noting spillover effects in adaptation,
such as “[w]hen infrastructure projects or other adaptation efforts affect multiple states”); cf.
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (“Global warming also confronts no matching or commensurate political or legal regime that, due to the regime’s geographical turf, subject responsibilities, or political constituency, is logically situated to take the lead and address global warming’s causes and
anticipated harms.”).
353 See, e.g., Steven J. Dundas & David J. Lewis, Estimating Option Values and Spillover
Damages for Coastal Protection: Evidence from Oregon’s Planning Goal 18, 7 J. ASS’N ENV’T &
RES. ECONOMISTS 519, 521 (2020) (describing armoring, displaced wave action, and erosion on
neighboring properties); ROBERT A. MORTON, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., AN OVERVIEW OF
COASTAL LAND LOSS: WITH EMPHASIS ON THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES (2003), https://
pubs.usgs.gov/of/2003/of03-337/landloss.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP9J-5KT4] (“Engineering structures such as groins, breakwaters, seawalls/bulkheads, and revetments are designed to control
coastal land loss, but they can accelerate land loss of adjacent beaches by changing wave refraction patterns and depleting sand supply.” (citation omitted)); cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1074–75 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (crediting as scientifically supported findings of the South Carolina legislature regarding the cross-property effects of beach and coastline
erosion in considering a regulatory taking challenge to South Carolina land use regulations
under the Fifth Amendment).
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eral resources to fund for relocation, pumps, coastal strengthening
projects, and other responses is critically needed.354 Counties in several states have created relatively robust regional organizations for
this purpose,355 but regional cooperative federalism would likely spur
more coordinated, innovative responses and provide needed funds.
Disaster response, too, would likely benefit from adding a regional layer beneath the Federal Emergency Management Authority
(“FEMA”)—not the regional FEMA divisions that already exist,356
but regional organizations comprised of counties, states, and other
stakeholders, and overseen by FEMA. Many areas of the country
share characteristics that make them susceptible to particular types of
disasters, such as wildfires or flooding. Responses within one local
government or state can have spillover effects. For example, allowing
land development without adequate flood control—such as too little
undeveloped land that can absorb water, too few catchment basins,
and other approaches—can cause flooding problems in neighboring
areas.357 Insufficient attention to controlled or accidental burns in national forests can allow wildfires to quickly expand and spread across
public-private and state lines.358 Yet regionally coordinated disaster
response actions need federal funding assistance, as evidenced by the
increasingly large amounts of federal dollars flowing to emergency response.359 And the federal government’s long history of emergency re354 The Impacts of Sea Level Rise on Domestic Energy and Water Infrastructure: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 112th Cong. 47 app. I (2012), https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76897/html/CHRG-112shrg76897.htm [https://perma.cc/PK6HKUVZ] (responses of Benjamin H. Strauss, COO and Director, Program on Sea Level Rise,
Climate Central) (“It seems very likely that many or most coastal cities, counties and states will
not be able to afford the cost of adapting to sea level rise, or at least will choose not to pay it.”).
355 See, e.g., supra note 56 (noting the Southeast Florida Climate Change Regional
Compact).
356 See Regions, FEMA (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.fema.gov/about/organization/regions/
[https://perma.cc/8W2T-HLHA].
357 See generally FEMA, TYPES OF FLOODS AND FLOODPLAINS 2-1, https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/fmc/chapter%202%20-%20types%20of%20floods%20and%20floodplains.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7TM-Q26T] (describing different types of flooding and the
associated causes, including lack of adequate avenues for “surface water runoff” and overdevelopment and urbanization).
358 See, e.g., Matthew Bloch, Scott Reinhard, Lucy Tompkins, Bryan Pietsch & Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, Fire Map: California, Oregon and Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/fires-map-tracker.html [https://perma.cc/APJ5VWXK].
359 See WILLIAM L. PAINTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45484, THE DISASTER RELIEF FUND:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 17–18 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45484.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S6DT-A8ZH] (graphs depicting increasing disaster relief expenditures between fiscal
years 1964 and 2020). Indeed, recent disaster events such as wildfires and hurricanes have
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sponse experience through FEMA—although a troubled history—
shows that this federal layer of expertise could augment local and
state emergency response capabilities.360
Regional cooperative federalism will not always be a superior
governance approach, but its potential applications are numerous. The
expanded use of this approach could, however, spur legal challenges—
albeit likely unsuccessful ones—as explored below.
IV. OVERCOMING LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS
REGIONAL APPROACHES

TO

With modification, regional cooperative approaches to federalism
can better achieve many of the purported values of federalism than
can states acting alone, or than can states exercising delegated authority within a traditional cooperative federalism regime. But these approaches could encounter legal hurdles—potentially in the form of the
nondelegation doctrine under the Constitution or under the Tenth
Amendment. These are unlikely to ultimately impede an expansion of
regional cooperative federalism, but they merit consideration in light
of potential legal challenges.
A. Nondelegation
The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,”361 which
further implies that Congress may not vest this power elsewhere
through delegation of its responsibilities.362 Congress cannot feasibly
shoulder the full burden of legislating (if we assume that Congress’s
governmental role should remain at its current level—a contested
point). Given this burden, the Supreme Court has interpreted
nondelegation to mean that Congress, when delegating any portion of
its legislative power, must provide an “intelligible principle” to guide
the specified governmental entity in implementing the congressional
prompted Congress to act in order “to broaden federal investments from the [Disaster Relief
Fund] into mitigation efforts that protect public infrastructure.” Id. at 11 (describing Congress’s
passage of the Disaster Recovery Act of 2018 “in the wake of wildfires in California as well as
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria”).
360 See generally FEMA, THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY PUBLICATION 1 (2010), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/publication-one_english_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67TS-N284] (describing the older and more recent history of the federal government’s involvement in local disaster relief and insurance).
361 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
362 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (“Accompanying that assignment of power to Congress is a bar on its further delegation.”).
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enactment.363 The Supreme Court has only twice struck down statutes
under the nondelegation doctrine—with the most recent of such decisions occurring in 1935.364 Many have declared the doctrine to be essentially dead.365 And although some hypothesized that a more
conservative Court—such as the current Court—might revive the doctrine, it declined this opportunity in Gundy v. United States,366 which
involved a sex offender registration statute and the purportedly impermissible delegation of legislative authority to the U.S. Attorney
General.367
Despite its rarity, the doctrine still arises in numerous challenges
to legislation and could potentially arise in the regional cooperative
federalism context. More relevantly, the delegation of legislative authority to regional governing entities might validly raise questions as
to whether such delegations conform with the values underlying the
nondelegation doctrine. These values include, among others, ensuring
a decision-making process that respects individual stakeholders’ and
states’ prerogatives, as well as ensuring that competent institutions are
entrusted to make policy decisions.368
1. The Status of the Nondelegation Doctrine
As noted above, the central concern of courts reviewing a congressional delegation of policymaking authority is that Congress give
the delegee an “intelligible principle” to which that delegee must
“conform” in implementing the enactment.369 When Congress delegates authority to the executive branch, such as a federal administrative agency, the nondelegation concern is that this delegation allows
363 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
[implement the enactment] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).
364 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Refin.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
365 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000)
(noting assumptions about the death of the nondelegation doctrine but arguing that courts simply apply the doctrine through other legal canons).
366 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
367 Id. at 2121.
368 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 365, at 315, 331, 342 (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine is “alive and well” in terms of its underlying values and noting “the idea that administrative
agencies will not be allowed to interpret ambiguous provisions so as to preempt state law” and a
“ban [on Congress] authorizing administrative agencies, or the executive branch, [to] mak[e]
certain decisions”); id. at 331–34 (describing values that implicate individual rights and states’
roles in the federalist system).
369 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).

R
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policy decisions that eschew the legislative process.370 These concerns
can be categorized within the camps of procedure, federalism, and decision-making competence, among many others.371 Procedurally
speaking, unelected officials promulgate policy when exercising delegated authority, and this risks jeopardizing the many accountabilitybased reasons to endow Congress, and Congress alone, with legislative
authority.372 And with respect to federalism, states’ rights are affected
too when agencies, rather than a Congress composed of representatives of the states, make decisions.373 States have a particularly powerful voice in the Senate, and the loss of decision making within Senate
chambers—the “federal institution specifically designed to represent
the states”—can negatively affect state power.374
Courts have identified processes that can adequately substitute
for the accountability potentially lost when agencies are permitted to
skirt the bicameral process under delegated authority, provided Congress has issued the requisite intelligible principle to the agency. For
example, the Supreme Court observed in A.L.A Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States375 that when Congress delegates authority to an
administrative body, with standards to be “enforced upon hearing,
and evidence,” this comports with the Constitution.376
With respect to competence, courts worry that giving the executive branch a duty that is not within its wheelhouse—law writing,
rather than law implementing—weakens decision making.377 On the
370 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (affirming the validity of
federal legislation over a nondelegation challenge and observing that the nondelegation doctrine
is “rooted in the principle of separation of powers” and that Congress “cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch,” although Congress can obtain “the assistance of its coordinate
Branches”).
371 For other concerns, see, for example, Sunstein, supra note 365, at 320–21 (noting rule of
law considerations, such as whether residents are adequately on notice of what is required by the
law and what the penalties will be for violations).
372 See id. (noting the political accountability aspects of the doctrine and that “[t]he evident
obstacles to the enactment of federal law . . . might be overcome if Congress could ask another
institution, not subject to those obstacles, to enact law as it chooses”).
373 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1321, 1374 (2001) (observing that the nondelegation doctrine “safeguards federalism” by
preventing Congress from avoiding “the lawmaking procedures established by the Constitution
to . . . preserve the governance prerogatives of the states”); Sunstein, supra note 365, at 319 (“In
light of the particular design of the central lawmaking institution, any delegation threatens to
eliminate the special kind of accountability embodied in that institution (not incidentally including, in the Senate, the representation of states as such).”).
374 Clark, supra note 373, at 1344.
375 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
376 Id. at 540.
377 Cf. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.

R

R

R
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flip side, courts allow congressional delegation of policymaking largely
out of a recognition that “the modern administrative state could not
function if Congress were actually required to make a significant percentage of the fundamental policy decisions.”378 Despite these concerns about delegation, they are rarely serious enough to invalidate
congressional delegation to agencies such as FERC.379
2. Nondelegation and Regional “Agencies”
If regional cooperative federalism—and RTOs, in particular—
were challenged on nondelegation grounds, it is unlikely that courts
would find a nondelegation violation. Beyond the fact that the Court
only rarely strikes down congressional delegations of authority to the
executive branch, regional organizations seem to hold up reasonably
well under the principles of accountability and competence that dominate the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence. This might not appear
to be true at first glance because regional cooperative federalism involves double delegation, in a sense.380 Congress delegates policymaking authority to FERC, and FERC, in turn, issues directives to utilities
and RTOs. For example, FERC directs these entities to regionally
plan for new transmission lines needed to support states’ public policies and enhance reliability.381 FERC, and only FERC, ultimately approves the proposed transmission policy of each utility and RTO.382
But because FERC cannot pick apart each and every RTO policy proposal, RTOs substantially influence the content of transmission
policy.383
1231, 1241 (1994) (bemoaning the “the demise of the nondelegation doctrine, which allows the
national government’s now-general legislative powers to be exercised by administrative
agencies”).
378 Id. (arguing that this is the justification underlying courts’ repeated rejection of asserted
nondelegation problems).
379 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (citing a string
of precedents for the proposition that the Supreme Court has “almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to
those executing or applying the law” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
380 For extensive discussion of delegation or regulatory authority to self-regulated enterprises, see Emily Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705
(2016).
381

See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.

R

See supra note 329 and accompanying text (describing courts’ review of FERC’s approval of transmission plans).

R

383 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting the limits on FERC’s ability to review
RTO proposals with great nuance).

R

382
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This quasi-double delegation from Congress to FERC and then
to RTOs could be problematic under some accounts. Courts interpret
the Federal Power Act384 to mean that FERC must reject or approve
certain RTO decisions wholesale and cannot partially amend them.385
Furthermore, RTOs, with FERC approval, make major policy decisions with substantial economic consequences.386 Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent in Gundy could be read to imply that Congress may not delegate away these types of decisions.387 But since 1935, Congress has
tasked FERC with the responsibility of ensuring “just and reasonable”
rates—an express directive from Congress to FERC under the Federal
Power Act.388 And as noted above, FERC has not fully delegated its
authority over transmission to RTOs. This differs from other examples
of impermissible agency subdelegation, such as the Department of
Homeland Security effectively delegating administration and adjudication of certain visa claims to the Department of Labor, with the
Department of Labor having the final say in the matter.389 In this type
of situation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that an agency may not “delegate its decision-making responsibility to an entirely different agency”—a practice that the court criticized
in an unpublished opinion as “passing the buck on a non-delegable
duty.”390
16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828.
See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
386 See, e.g., Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 774 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that
MISO’s Multi-Value Projects resulted in estimated cost savings worth hundreds of millions of
dollars); Joshua C. Macey & Robert Ward, MOPR Madness, 42 ENERGY L.J. 67, 71 (2021) (arguing that MOPRs in place within several RTOs “force consumers to pay for capacity they do not
need” and reprice “a significant percentage of resources that participate in east coast electricity
markets,” among other negative economic impacts); Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470,
474 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an RTO transmission financing decision that could have forced one
utility “to contribute hundreds of millions of dollars” to a transmission line project located far
from that utility, for which the court believed the benefits to the utility were not adequately
specified).
384
385

387 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131, 2136–37 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (asserting that Justice Gorsuch “would not wait” to revisit the nondelegation doctrine and
laying out a proposed test for determining when the nondelegation doctrine is violated); id. at
2141 (arguing that agencies cannot “fill in statutory gaps” for “major questions” involving “a
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central to the statutory scheme”
and thus analogizing the “major question” doctrine in administrative law to the nondelegation
analysis (quoting King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015))).
388

16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).

See G.H. Daniels III & Assocs. v. Perez, 626 F. App’x 205, 207 (10th Cir. 2015); Bijal
Shah, Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 279, 281–82
(2017) (discussing G.H. Daniels III).
389

390

G.H. Daniels III, 626 F. App’x at 207.
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FERC does not rely on RTOs to make final decisions; it must
approve their tariffs and subsequent tariff revisions.391 And Congress,
in establishing FERC’s authority to oversee and regulate wholesale
power rates, likely understood that FERC would review and approve
or reject rates and service practices formulated and proposed by
others.392 This was the existing practice at the state level when Congress approved the modern Federal Power Act.393
Beyond lacking the potential problems of subdelegation, regional
cooperative federalism to some degree also fulfills, rather than impedes, the values of the nondelegation doctrine. As compared to a
singular federal process, regional cooperative federalism enhances the
accountability of decisionmakers to constituents, strengthens state
representation—at least to a limited degree—and potentially improves the competence of the entities exercising decision-making authority. As explored in Part II, constituents wishing to comment on
RTO policy get two bites at the apple, with an opportunity to participate in RTO stakeholder meetings and again to intervene at the
FERC level.394 Rather than simply imposing one national policy, such
as a mandate for financing new transmission lines, FERC relies on
individual utilities and RTOs to submit specific financing proposals
within their tariffs, which FERC approves or rejects.395 This can help
respond to differing preferences of individual constituents and states.
Furthermore, regional cooperative federalism does not eschew
any federal agency processes that would have been available in the
absence of FERC’s subdelegation to RTOs. Individuals may still intervene within FERC proceedings and appeal FERC decisions to the
391 See, e.g., supra note 386 (describing cases reviewing FERC’s approval of RTOs’ proposed tariff revisions).

R

392 Congress amended the Federal Power Act in 1935 in order to establish FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, as an independent regulatory agency and empowered it
to regulate “[a]ll rates and charges, made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in
connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . .” Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, § 205(a), 49 Stat. 803, 851 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 824d).
393 See, e.g., Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 85–86,
90 (1927) (reversing the Rhode Island Public Utility Commission’s approval of a utility’s proposed rate increase for electricity transferred between two states because it interfered with interstate commerce and noting that if rate regulation is required “it can only be attained by the
exercise of the power vested in Congress”).
394 See supra Section II.D.1 (describing and contrasting the processes for intervention in
FERC proceedings with the RTO stakeholder participation process).
395 See supra note 386 (describing cases reviewing FERC’s approval of RTOs’ proposed
tariff revisions for financing transmission lines).

R
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federal courts.396 While some might reasonably challenge Congress’s
delegation of transmission grid and electricity market regulation to
FERC as unduly vague, that is a question separate from the issue of
subdelegation to regional agencies.
With respect to competence, FERC’s reliance on RTOs to do
much of the policymaking work also likely improves the policymaking
processes. Just as Congress could not realistically set policies in the
hundreds of subject areas in which policies now exist, FERC would be
hard pressed to establish transmission policy—particularly specific
plans for the location of new wires and their financing—for each distinct region covered by an RTO.
In a final affirmance of the likely constitutionality of RTOs’
quasi-delegated authority from FERC, some nondelegation decisions
have addressed agencies’ approvals of industries somewhat similar to
the transmission industry—those that serve the public, involve infrastructure that is expensive and often in limited supply, and that could
act as unfettered monopolies if not regulated by the government. For
example, the Supreme Court blessed Congress’s delegation of power
to the Federal Radio Commission—later the Federal Communications
Commission—to approve licenses to use particular broadcasting frequencies and to regulate radio stations’ broadcasting practices.397 Congress directed the Commission to grant licenses in the “public interest,
convenience, or necessity,” and the Court deemed that this language,
combined with the requirements, purpose, and context of the enabling
act, did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.398 The Court also affirmed the ability of FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, to set just and reasonable rates for the price of wholesale natural
gas, although a dissenting Justice argued that the Commission’s
choices in ratemaking are constrained by the nondelegation
doctrine.399
396 See supra note 274 and accompanying text; 16 U.S.C. § 825l (setting forth the process
and requirements for filing an appeal from a FERC order in the U.S. Courts of Appeals).
397 See Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 282
(1933) (holding that the Federal Radio Commission acted within its legitimately delegated authority from Congress in issuing licenses to radio stations to use certain broadcasting frequencies); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (addressing regulation of
“chain broadcasting,” i.e., affiliated radio stations broadcasting identical content, by the Federal
Communications Commission).
398 See Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216, 225–26.
399 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602–03 (1944) (holding
that an order by the Federal Power Commission requiring that the respondent reduce its wholesale natural gas prices “cannot be condemned under the [Natural Gas] Act as unjust and unreasonable”). But see id. at 620–21 (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that there are limits on the then-
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B. The Tenth Amendment
Another issue quite close to the nondelegation doctrine is the
question of the type of entity exercising delegated power. Just as the
Court has had many occasions to address congressional delegation to
federal agencies, it has also reviewed delegation of power to private
parties. Indeed, courts might be particularly concerned that RTOs, as
private nonprofit organizations, are not subject to federal procedural
requirements that agencies must follow. Historically, this issue arose
under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides
that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”400 On its face, this Amendment could be
interpreted to mean that only two entities have lawmaking authority
under the Constitution—the federal government and the states, and
not private parties. Indeed, the Court initially interpreted the Amendment in this manner in Schechter Poultry, but that approach quickly
died out.401
One of the only two cases in which the Supreme Court struck
down a statute on nondelegation grounds also involved what the
Court characterized as a Tenth Amendment issue—the delegation of
decision-making authority to private groups.402 In Schechter Poultry,
Congress allowed the President to approve “codes of fair competition” proposed by trade or industry groups provided that these codes
ensured genuine competitiveness—a lack of “inequitable restrictions
on admission to membership” and a lack of monopolistic practices, for
example.403 Under this statute, the President approved an industrywritten “Live Poultry Code,” which was an effort to ensure fair competition in the nation’s largest live poultry industry in New York
City.404 The code contained standards with limits on employees’
weekly hours, minimum pay rates and employee age limits, and allowances for collective bargaining.405 Fatal to the code was the fact
that the industry drafted it under a very vague congressional directive
FPC’s ratemaking authority because the Commission, unlike Congress, may not fix any utility
rate that it pleases, subject only to basic constitutional constraints such as due process and takings, and noting that the Commission is limited “by the standards of the delegation”).
400 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
401 See infra notes 418–19 and accompanying text.
402 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
403 Id. at 521 & n.4, 522 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3(a), 48 Stat.
195, 196 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 703)).
404 Id. at 523.
405 Id. at 524.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-1\GWN103.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 87

17-FEB-22

12:31

REG’L COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM & U.S. ELECTRIC GRID

233

to write a code of “fair competition”—a standard too loose to be an
intelligible principle guiding the agency in rulemaking.406 But another
point against the code was the fact that the code was privately written.
Congress provided that an industry advisory committee, “to be selected by trade associations and members of the industry,” was to administer the code and submit periodic reports of its code
administration to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator
of the National Industrial Recovery Act.407
The Schechter Poultry Court criticized this arrangement on Tenth
Amendment grounds, noting that the statute did not “seek merely to
endow voluntary trade or industrial associations or groups with privileges or immunities.”408 Rather, it involved “the coercive exercise of
the law-making power” by private trade groups, which were to write
codes of fair competition with enforceable penalties for their violation.409 These trade groups paid for the expenses of code administration themselves, and the President, not Congress, approved the
codes.410 Further, executive agencies, not Congress, reviewed reports
submitted by the industry group writing and administering the code to
ensure that consumers and others were adequately protected under
the code.411
The Schechter arrangement sounds eerily similar to RTOs. RTOs
are, in many respects, trade groups. Although they are nonprofit organizations, the bulk of their members are owners of utilities.412 And
they are private organizations, not states or the federal government.
Further, FERC requires RTOs to submit periodic reports on, for example, the status of their implementation of FERC orders, such as the
requirement for regional transmission planning.
This very type of approach was a problem in Schechter—the fact
that private entities exercised authority caused them to act extraconstitutionally under the Tenth Amendment.413 It did not matter that the
President approved the codes proposed by these private entities or
that executive agencies reviewed reports by these entities to ensure
that consumers and others were being protected by the codes adminis406

Id. at 521–22.

407

Id. at 524–25.

408

Id. at 529.

409

Id.

410

Id. at 521–24.

411

Id. at 525.

412

See Hart et al., supra note 320; supra text accompanying note 320.

413

Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 528.
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tered by trade associations.414 The Court characterized this as “action
which lies outside the sphere of [Tenth Amendment] constitutional
authority.”415
Despite this seeming legal peril for RTOs, since the 1935
Schechter Poultry decision—which contained only one paragraph discussing the Tenth Amendment—the Court has substantially constrained the meaning of the Tenth Amendment.416 In New York v.
United States,417 for example, the Court emphasized that although the
Tenth Amendment “restrains the power of Congress,” these restraints
do not actually come from the Tenth Amendment.418 Rather, the
Tenth Amendment simply means that Article I of the Constitution—
which expressly lays out the boundaries of federal authority—might in
some cases restrain federal power vis-à-vis the states.419 In simpler
terms, the Tenth Amendment, rather than specifying whether a particular governmental power is constitutional or not, serves as a guiding
principle in determining whether the federal government has impermissibly intruded into states’ sovereign authority.
Another Tenth Amendment challenge to regional cooperative
federalist entities such as RTOs might focus on the threat that regional entities operating beneath a federal mandate will somehow expand federal powers too much, thus intruding into state sovereign
territory. States made an argument akin to this in a challenge to
MISO’s initiative to expand transmission for wind energy, arguing
that FERC’s approval of MISO’s MVPs effort was essentially coercing
the states to accept MISO’s planned transmission projects within their
territories.420 The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument as “frivolous,” finding no such coercion and emphasizing that MISO’s projects,
Id.
Id.
416 Delegation of regulatory authority to a private entity could also run afoul of the private
nondelegation doctrine, but as Emily Hammond notes and examines in detail, “courts and scholars have recently questioned both the history of the doctrine and its continuing existence.” Hammond, supra note 380, at 1722–28.
417 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
418 Id. at 156–57 (emphasizing that the Tenth Amendment is “essentially a tautology”); see
also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“There is nothing in the history of [the
Tenth Amendment’s] adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship
between the national and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution . . . .”).
419 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157 (“[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms
that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance,
reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine . . . whether an
incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.”).
420 See Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 773 (7th Cir. 2013).
414
415
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approved by FERC, simply offered “a carrot that states won’t be able
to resist eating” due to the benefits of the project.421 And this was “a
far cry from the federal government’s conscripting a state government
into federal service” through a federal-regional initiative.422
All in all, the continued dormancy of the nondelegation doctrine,
combined with a Tenth Amendment largely restricted to policing federal-state relations—not delegation to private parties—makes regional cooperative federalism relatively immune to legal challenges.
There are, of course, important limits to this immunity. For example, if
states band together to address a policy issue with federal agency
oversight, but without the formal blessing of Congress, this might be
labeled as a violation of the Compact Clause.423 But Congress has
granted regional entities authority under the Compact Clause in a variety of contexts—including regional transmission planning—if the
states ultimately preferred to follow this course.424 Indeed, Congress
has given states the opportunity to create formal compacts in the line
siting context, although they have not opted to do so.425
CONCLUSION
The United States faces a growing list of complex policy issues
that are intensely local, regional, and national. Many local governments have pledged to move to wholly carbon-free energy mix in the
not-too-distant future, yet this will require even more cross-state planning for transmission lines to support new generation.426 These governments will similarly need to coordinate climate adaptation efforts
as sea levels and flood waters rise and threaten to engulf critical public
infrastructure and numerus homes.427 Strong storms unleash their fury
in small or vast swaths of the country—with hurricanes dumping fifty
inches of rain on Houston, for example, or cutting a vast path across
the entire Southeast.428 Even intensely local storms create regional
Id.
Id.
423 But see supra note 10 (describing the many types of state agreements not deemed to be
compacts that require congressional approval).
424 See, e.g., Florestano, supra note 11, at 20.
425 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
426 See, e.g., Local Government Climate and Energy Goals, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGYEFFICIENT ECON. (June 2021), https://database.aceee.org/city/local-government-energy-efficiency-goals [https://perma.cc/53UU-MX8K] (documenting local government goals and
commitments).
427 See supra Section III.D.
428 See generally Tom Di Liberto, Reviewing Hurricane Harvey’s Catastrophic Rain and
Flooding, NOAA: CLIMATE.GOV (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/event421
422
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challenges such as planning for flood control and coordinating evacuation routes and shelter plans. Pockets of opioid addiction riddle rural
towns and large cities, with ravaging effects on families, the health
care system, and the economy rippling beyond state lines.
Regional cooperative federalism could offer a highly effective
governance solution to these types of problems. It enables federal
oversight of local problems and coordinates local and state officials
across state boundaries, allowing them to address distinctive challenges while also harmonizing their responses to these challenges. It
can also reduce the negative spillovers that would arise from individual governments acting alone. The example of RTOs—the most common form of regional cooperative federalist regime—perhaps best
exemplifies these benefits. Although there is much room for improvement, some RTOs have successfully planned for transmission expansions to support burgeoning renewable energy projects and enhance
reliability, and most have kept the lights on through recent extreme
weather events. They have done this while navigating substantial differences among policies in the states covered by RTO territory and
avoiding potentially duplicative transmission and generation
infrastructure.
Well beyond the electricity context, addressing problems that implicate strong local, state, regional, and federal interests will increasingly require innovation, a diversity of policy responses, and
responsiveness to constituents’ demands—in other words, a system
that encompasses federalism values beyond state lines. Regional cooperative federalism offers a promising path forward.

tracker/reviewing-hurricane-harveys-catastrophic-rain-and-flooding [https://perma.cc/LC3VGWR2]; Hurricanes in History, NOAA: NAT’L HURRICANE CTR. & CENT. PAC. HURRICANE
CTR., https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/ [https://perma.cc/A59Z-PAWE] (“Katrina
brought hurricane conditions to southeastern Louisiana, southern Mississippi, and southwestern
Alabama.”).

